tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-43041380635711209092024-03-19T08:47:53.829+00:00Who Attacked Ghouta?An analysis of all evidence relating to the chemical attack in Ghouta on August 21st 2013 - An online collaborative effort.
Twitter: @WhoGhoutaAnonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.comBlogger38125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-45685825745231652622015-11-02T02:06:00.001+00:002015-11-02T02:07:24.587+00:00Review of Turkish MPs Allegations<div class="MsoNormal">
If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<br />
Recently two Turkish opposition MPs have claimed their
government was avoiding investigating the attempted purchase of chemicals for
production of sarin by Al-Nusra operatives. Their claims may be found <a href="http://www.todayszaman.com/national_chp-deputies-govt-rejects-probe-into-turkeys-role-in-syrian-chemical-attack_402180.html" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/393243/Savcidan__sarin__tarifi_.html" target="_blank">here</a>. Our previous discussion of this case can be found <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" target="_blank">here</a>. </div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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They provide no evidence for their claim that ex-minister of Justice, Bekir Bozdag ordered not to prosecute the case, but it is definitely not
unlikely given Turkey’s support of the Syrian opposition and the lack of any official
reason for closing the case.<o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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They do however provide a transcript of an intercepted phone
call from the case. This was so far only published in Turkish, so I ordered a
translation, which is provided in the appendix below. The
call itself does not provide any significant new information, except for the
amounts of chemicals (50kg and 200kg), which were not mentioned before. This is
yet another indication that the opposition was involved in sarin production in
the scale necessary for the Ghouta attack.</div>
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<br /></div>
<h3>
Review of Dan Kaszeta’s analysis</h3>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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Dan Kaszeta also analyzed these reports on <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2015/10/28/turkishsarin/" target="_blank">bellingcat</a>.
Following is a review of his main claims:</div>
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<br /></div>
<h4>
The ‘recipe’ is wrong in several aspects</h4>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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This claim is based on the assumption that the recipe was
obtained from the suspects, which is probably due to Kaszeta’s use of an
automatic translation of the article. As can be seen in the actual translation,
the recipe was reverse engineered by the Turkish Police from the list of
ingredients, and it is not surprising they got some of it wrong.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In fact, the list of ingredients (which is the only actual evidence we have) is an exact match to the
trivial sarin production process one could generate by going to ‘sarin’ in
Wikipedia, and clicking back through the preparation instructions. This is also
nearly exactly the same process used by Aum Shinrikyo, which is publicly
available (see appendix <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/response-to-dan-kaszetas-chemical.html" target="_blank">here</a>).<o:p></o:p></div>
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So in fact, the list of ingredients is exactly what one
would expect in underground sarin production. Especially interesting is the use
of basic chemicals like white phosphorous (instead of procuring Dimethyl methylphosphonate directly for example), which is indicative of an organization
trying to avoid detection by authorities, and also perfectly matches the
impurities found by the UN (more <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/response-to-dan-kaszetas-chemical.html" target="_blank">here</a>) </div>
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<br /></div>
<h4>
Sarin production requires very expensive equipment</h4>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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This claim was analyzed thoroughly <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/response-to-dan-kaszetas-chemical.html" target="_blank">here</a>. The examples Dan gives are for facilities designed for 1) production of thousands
of tons of agent, 2) at very high safety standards, and 3) for long-term
storage (rather than immediate use). There is no reason to believe the
opposition could not manufacture the hundreds of kg needed for the Ghouta attack at a
reasonable budget.</div>
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<br /></div>
<h4>
Isopropanolamine is an unlikely amine for the last stage in
sarin production</h4>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This is definitely correct. Isopropylamine is the well-known
amine for this purpose. However, given that the other ingredients are a perfect
match to the commonly found sarin process (which always uses Isopropylamine), this can be safely attributed to
human error at some stage in the chain of reporting. In fact, I myself didn’t notice they declared
Isopropanolamine and not Isopropylamine until Dan pointed it out.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Kaszeta also takes the opportunity to repeat the claim that Hexamine
was used in the Ghouta sarin, despite the new <a href="https://cryptome.org/2014/08/postol-debunks-kaszeta.pdf" target="_blank">evidence</a> that Hexamine is not soluble in alcohols,
making it ineffective for this purpose. More on Hexamine <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/04/hexamine-again.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</div>
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<br /></div>
<h4>
The amount mentioned (50kg) is too small for the Ghouta
attack, which required at least 1 ton</h4>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
1. As shown <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/response-to-dan-kaszetas-chemical.html" target="_blank">here</a> (under “Analysis of Amount of Sarin used“), Dan’s analysis of the amount of
sarin used in Ghouta was based on a simple miscalculation. The actual amount is likely a
few hundred kg.<o:p></o:p></div>
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2. It would be naive to assume that in the only case where
the opposition tried to obtain sarin, they were caught.</div>
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<br /></div>
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<br /></div>
<h3>
Appendix – Translation of <a href="http://www.cumhuriyet.com.tr/haber/turkiye/393243/Savcidan__sarin__tarifi_.html" target="_blank">Cumhuriyet Article</a></h3>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<h3>
Sarin Recipe Revealed by Prosecutor!</h3>
<div>
<b>Eren Erdem, CHP Istanbul Deputy, who recently brought back to headlines the shipment of chemical weapons from Turkey to ISIS, now claims that ex-minister of justice, Bekir Bozdag, has ordered the prosecutor not to investigate ‘Islamic oriented organizations’, causing the MIT to relinquish the case. In the “closed” file, the prosecutor defines in detail the sarin recipe used by the suspects.</b></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
CHP Deputy (i.e. Member of Parliament on behalf of the opposition Republican People’s Party) from Istanbul, Eren Erdem, who recently brought back to headlines the shipment of chemical weapons from Turkey to ISIS, has now brought up new claims. He now claims that ex-minister of justice Bekir Bozdag has ordered the prosecutor not to investigate ‘Islamic oriented organizations’, causing MIT (i.e. National Intelligence Service) to relinquish the case. Mr. Erdem said: “MIT referred the case to the Police after legal intervention on the shipment of chemical weapons. Even though the Police stated that ‘they cannot handle such a serious investigation’, MIT still relinquished the case. This is how the shipment to the Jihadist group ISIS was condoned - The delivery was even eased for them.”</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<h4>
Sarin Recipe Revealed by Prosecutor!</h4>
<div>
Adana Public Prosecutor Mehmet Arikan disclosed the sarin recipe in details in the “closed” file. Arıkan asked Adana Police Criminal Laboratory to analyze the chemicals that were sent to the Jihadists. The prosecutor said that the suspects’ chemical materials are a match to sarin’s production process, and he supports his claim with the following sarin formulas and recipe, which he disclosed in the criminal charges:</div>
<div>
<ul>
<li>Methanol (CH3OH) + White Phosphorus(P4) = DMMP (DiMethylMethylPhosphonate)</li>
<li>DMMP (DiMethylMethylPhosphonate) + Thionyl Chloride (SOCl2) = MethylPhosphonyldiChloride</li>
<li>MethylPhosphonyldiChloride + Potassium Fluoride (KF) = MethylPhosphonyldiFluoride</li>
<li>MethylPhosphonyldiFluoride + Isopropanol (C3H8O) = SARIN (C4H10FO2P) + HF</li>
<li>Isopropanolamine (C3H9NO) is added to reaction for deactivating HF (Hydrogen Fluoride)</li>
</ul>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<h4>
Desired Mix</h4>
<div>
Sarin produced using these formulas, is referred to as the “desired mix” in recorded phone calls between Hytham Qassab, codename “Ebu Kasim”, who organized the chemicals’ shipment, and his connection in Turkey, Khalid Ousta, codename “Ebu Abdo”.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
KHALED OUSTA: Inshallah (God willing), also let me know what exactly is required because the person is waiting for my call.</div>
<div>
HYTHAM QASSAP: My words would not make a difference, but I need to receive at least 1 kilogram of number 7 and 8, sorry I mean number 6 and 7</div>
<div>
K. O.: Got it, alright</div>
<div>
H.Q.: Because the mix of them will create the desired one.</div>
<div>
K. O.: 50 kilograms</div>
<div>
H.Q.: Yes</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<h4>
Negotiations Regarding White Phosphorous</h4>
<div>
Qassab negotiates with his connection Ousta on the phone the price of “white phosphorus”, which is a main ingredient of the gas:</div>
<div>
H.Q.: Yes Ebu Abdo</div>
<div>
K. O.: Thanks brother, it is the first item on the list I sent you, and also the last one, which is WHITE PHOSPHORUS</div>
<div>
H.Q.: Ok</div>
<div>
K. O.: The last one is the 200 kilogram barrel</div>
<div>
H.Q.: Ok...</div>
<div>
K. O.: Yes 16.8 plus VAT, the first and the most expensive one, of which we sent you a sample. It has a different name on yours compared to mine, and that one is 13.8 plus VAT.</div>
<div>
H.Q.: What’s its name, Ebu Abdo?</div>
<div>
K. O.: Bauxite</div>
<div>
H.Q.: Ok alright, good</div>
<div>
K. O.: The white one is the one with the price of 13.8 plus VAT</div>
<div>
H.Q.: Is it Euro or Dollar?</div>
<div>
K. O.: It is Euro</div>
</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com132tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-30151293966325026922015-10-10T20:13:00.000+01:002015-10-10T20:13:54.932+01:0060 Minutes' Review of the Ghouta AttackIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<br />
A few days ago, CBS' 60 Minutes <a href="http://www.cbs.com/shows/60_minutes/video/djK_Et4iC1UqVbVey433oQPlbGVLiSXi/a-crime-against-humanity-ted-talks-hoop-dreams/">aired</a> a review of the Ghouta attack. Following is my quick analysis:<br />
<ol>
<li>Despite the claim of new evidence, I could not identify any new videos. The new evidence must therefore be the eyewitness reports.</li>
<li>The show seems to be relying on Western Intelligence reports to claim government culpability, saying the rocket attacks originated from government held territory. This claim by the US has since been completely <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-us-intelligence-assessment_19.html" target="_blank">refuted</a>.</li>
<li>The show claims the rockets were of a type used by the government. This is known to be correct, although it is irrelevant when determining culpability, due to the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/reliability-of-using-munitions-to.html" target="_blank">numerous</a> rebel raids on army depots. Actually, these rockets were not part of the Syrian chemical weapons program, and were most likely <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/analyzing-previous-umlaca-attacks.html" target="_blank">repurposed</a> incendiary rockets. Such a weapon is therefore a much better fit for a false flag attack than for a government attack.</li>
<li>The eyewitness reports do not add any new information relevant to determining culpability. There is however one interesting report: The opposition activist from Moadamiyah describes hearing muffled rocket hits, and a strong burning sensation in his lungs. This strengthens our <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/what-happened-in-moadamiyah.html" target="_blank">conclusion</a> that no chemical attack occurred in Moadamiyah: Sarin is highly lethal, and by the time a victim can inhale enough sarin to feel lung irritation, he has long been unconscious or dead.<br />If we are to believe the claims of muffled hits and lung irritations, a white phosphorous or non-lethal gas attack is far more likely. Both of which have been used <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/prior-alleged-chemical-attacks.html" target="_blank">often</a> by the Syrian government (while there is no evidence of previous use of lethal chemical weapons).</li>
<li>Despite the numerous mistakes, the show does deserve some credit for leaving significant room for doubt regarding culpability, and even ending the interview with Scott Cairns of the UN investigation team, with the following:<br /><blockquote class="tr_bq">
<strong>60 Minutes:</strong> “Why would anyone launch the largest chemical weapons attack in decades, while [UN] chemical weapon experts are in town?”<br />
<strong>Cairns: </strong>“I ask myself this a lot... I don’t know... I don't think we'll ever truly know.”</blockquote>
Not many shows on a US mainstream channel would dare to do so. Kudos.</li>
</ol>
<br />Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com51tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-66256251451542028192015-01-04T01:15:00.002+00:002015-01-04T02:17:03.471+00:00New Satellite Imagery<div class="MsoNormal">
In his latest <a href="https://www.bellingcat.com/resources/articles/2015/01/01/updated-google-earth-imagery-from-august-24th-2013-reveals-more-details-about-the-august-21st-sarin-attack/" target="_blank">post</a> Eliot Higgins analyzes recent satellite images uploaded to Google Earth, taken
just three days after the August 21<span style="font-size: 13px;">st</span> attacks. <o:p></o:p></div>
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<br /></div>
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The images show many tanks scattered throughout North Jobar,
some of them within Volcano <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/umlaca-simulation.html" target="_blank">range</a> of the impact sites. This leads Eliot to
conclude that “government forces were well established in the area”, and
therefore the Volcano’s short distance does not contradict the regime attack
scenario.</div>
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<br /></div>
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As I will show below, this conclusion is incorrect. But first, it’s worth noting that this information is not new - We already know the army was operating in the area on the 24<span style="font-size: 13px;">th</span> from several sources:<span style="font-size: 7pt; font-stretch: normal; text-indent: -0.25in;"> </span></div>
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</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">The <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/01/analysis-of-second-un-report.html" target="_blank">UN final report</a></span><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;"> </span><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">describes a sarin attack on Syrian
soldiers that took place in Jobar on the 24th. The report provides a location for the attack,
which I added to Eliot’s map of the area below. </span><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">So we know the SAA was operating even closer to the impact sites than the tanks shown.</span></li>
</ul>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjKbCByU2Ly7dl5cPRraGm35_-ZbZflVeiGs8Rle5urMw0k99FZ2zBpwtkg-n8XuqR8jZphvR-yQtlLO7uFIZn416LE_7Spf6vOs-cqcLkuIcORZWcYeEbNTNybnFaE-7qYBcEBWF3z7Xk/s1600/jobar+24.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: left; display: inline !important; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjKbCByU2Ly7dl5cPRraGm35_-ZbZflVeiGs8Rle5urMw0k99FZ2zBpwtkg-n8XuqR8jZphvR-yQtlLO7uFIZn416LE_7Spf6vOs-cqcLkuIcORZWcYeEbNTNybnFaE-7qYBcEBWF3z7Xk/s1600/jobar+24.jpg" height="196" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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</div>
<ul>
<li><o:p> </o:p><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">A TV report from the 24th describes an Army incursion in Jobar which uncovered an opposition chemical lab (a report that was later <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/03/ridiculed-jobar-lab-actually-was-sarin.html" target="_blank">confirmed</a>).</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">The ANNA TV reports which Eliot has already analyzed in detail.</span></li>
</ul>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
As to Eliot’s conclusion: While we can place SAA operations on
the 24<span style="font-size: 13px;">th</span> within range of the Zamalka impact sites, they cannot be
associated with the chemical attack, for the following reasons:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="text-indent: 0px;">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">The impact sites <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/impact-site-analysis.html" target="_blank">clearly point</a> to a northern launch source, while the SAA was operating north-west to
the impact sites. In
particular, it is very difficult to reconcile the findings in <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/impact-site-analysis.html" target="_blank">impact site 2</a> with
an attack from Jobar.</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">SAA positions on the 24th are significantly different than the </span><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">SAA positions on the 21<span style="font-size: 13px;">st</span></span><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">. As detailed above, the SAA was
leading a concentrated effort in Jobar during these days, and it is safe to
assume the front line was significantly farther to the West when the chemical attack
occurred.</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">Even if we were to ignore
the two limitations above, it would still mean that the SAA decided to bring their
chemical Volcanos to the very edge of the frontline. A chemical Volcano launch is a complex operation involving
two unarmored trucks, several people operating in the open, and a large amount
of highly lethal sarin. From the ANNA videos and the multiple attacks on SAA
forces in the area, it is clear that this was not a safe zone. Why on earth
would they take such a risk, when they can launch longer range chemical weapons
from the safety of SAA army bases all around Damascus?</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo2; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><o:p></o:p></div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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<o:p></o:p></div>
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Each of the three facts above strongly contradict an SAA
Volcano attack from Jobar. Considered together, they make such an attack near
impossible.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
There is however something we can learn from the new imagery: W<span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">hile there are dozens of
tanks in Jobar, I could not find a single tank anywhere near the launch site, or
even anywhere east of the highway (the Southern Bypass) for that matter. Furthermore, as Eliot notes
in his post, the only government position east of the highway (“Tohme
Checkpoint”) was wiped off the ground within days. Since we do have videos and
reports of the opposition operating in the area, as well as them <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AFGfC1DccM4" target="_blank">attacking</a> SAA forces from east of the highway, our conclusion that the launch site was under
opposition control on August 21<span style="font-size: 13px;">st </span></span><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">is strengthened.</span></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Conclusion: The new satellite imagery from August 24<span style="font-size: 13px;">th</span>,
2013 somewhat strengthens the claim that the sarin Volcano launch site was
under opposition control.</b><o:p></o:p></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com89tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-70059227142712808242014-04-13T03:53:00.004+01:002014-04-13T04:05:58.609+01:00Seymour Hersh's New ReportIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<br />
Seymour Hersh has recently published another <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n08/seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line" target="_blank">piece</a> on the August 21st attack (analysis of the previous one <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/12/review-of-seymour-hershs-piece.html" target="_blank">here</a>). The article is a mix of information and speculation on many issues, which is hard to use as evidence for our purposes, but a close read does seem to point to three interesting information sources, which I'll try to examine here.<br />
<br />
<h3>
The Main Points</h3>
<br />
<b>A June 20 DIA report assesses that the opposition is attempting to manufacture sarin.</b><br />
<br />
Since Hersh provides direct quotes from the document and in this <a href="http://youtu.be/VYCKk2TzXoE?t=9m31s" target="_blank">video</a> claims to be reading from it directly, it does seem fairly reliable. It is also in line with <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" target="_blank">many other indications</a> that the Syrian opposition was attempting to develop sarin.<br />
<br />
Since the report was published 3 weeks after Turkey's <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" target="_blank">arrest</a> of opposition operatives attempting to procure sarin precursors, and since most of the quotes from the DIA report provide information that could be deduced from these arrests alone, it seems like this is the primary source of this report. However, the following quote goes further:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Qassab and his associate Khalid Ousta worked with Halit Unalkaya, an employee of a Turkish firm called Zirve Export, who provided ‘price quotes for bulk quantities of sarin precursors’. Abd-al-Ghani’s plan was for two associates to ‘perfect a process for making sarin, then go to Syria to train others to begin large scale production at an unidentified lab in Syria’. The DIA paper said that one of his operatives had purchased a precursor on the ‘Baghdad chemical market’, which ‘has supported at least seven CW efforts since 2004’.</blockquote>
This looks very much like information that would be obtained in the interrogations following the arrests, indicating Turkey has shared this information with the US.<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>A sarin sample obtained by Russia and analyzed by British Intelligence was found not to match Syria's batches.</b><br />
<br />
This claim is a bit weird, since it requires knowledge of the exact composition of all of Syria's sarin batches, which were secret at the time. Hersh's source (a former intelligence official) explains:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
The DIA’s baseline consisted of knowing the composition of each batch of Soviet-manufactured chemical weapons. But we didn’t know which batches the Assad government currently had in its arsenal. Within days of the Damascus incident we asked a source in the Syrian government to give us a list of the batches the government currently had. This is why we could confirm the difference so quickly.</blockquote>
So apparently western intelligence has a source within Syria capable of providing such detailed information on Syria's chemical weapons program. This is possible, but seems a bit unlikely. A more likely explanation is that this sample showed the same traces reported by the UN, which <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/response-to-dan-kaszetas-chemical.html" target="_blank">indicate</a> use of very low quality chemicals, and this information got distorted on its way to Hersh's source. Indeed, in a later <a href="http://youtu.be/VYCKk2TzXoE?t=22m1s" target="_blank">interview</a> Hersh states that the assessment provided to the President was: "the sarin that we found was not military grade".<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>Turkey orchestrated the August 21 attacks in an attempt to bring the US to respond.</b><br />
<br />
Of course, this is a severe war crime that would carry life sentences for everyone involved, and Turkey, which was not directly involved in the war, is very unlikely to commit. It therefore requires very strong evidence to be accepted. This does not seem to be the case:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"Principal evidence came from the Turkish post-attack joy and back-slapping in numerous intercepts."</blockquote>
As we've seen in <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html" target="_blank">previous</a> <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/other-evidence-for-regime-attack.html" target="_blank">intercepted calls</a>, this kind of evidence is not reliable: When such a major event happens, millions of people discuss it, speculate about it, circulate rumors, and attempt to appear more knowledgeable than they really are. It is very easy to misinterpret one of these calls as real evidence - especially from a second hand report.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, if this theory was correct it would imply that Turkish intelligence don't know how to avoid being detected by their own police.<br />
<br />
<br />
<h3>
The Counter Claims</h3>
<br />
The article of course generated many responses. I'll review the main counter claims below:<br />
<br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>Hersh ignores the evidence that the attack was carried out by Volcanoes - a Syrian government weapon (from <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2014/04/seymour-hershs-volcano-problem.html" target="_blank">Brown Moses</a>)</b><br />
<br />
This is mostly an attack on Hersh's earlier piece which quoted Ted Postol's estimate that the rockets were improvised. This was indeed a major mistake (as analyzed <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/12/review-of-seymour-hershs-piece.html" target="_blank">here</a>), which Hersh chose not to repeat. Brown Moses provides two ways to settle this discrepancy with Hersh's false flag theory: Either the Volcanoes were looted, or they were replicated.<br />
<br />
The latter is very unlikely, as it would be very complex and costly. The former, however, makes perfect sense, and is currently considered here to be the most likely scenario. BM counters by claiming:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"...the Syrian government has never claimed any of their chemical weapons have been captured by the Syrian opposition, even when required to do so by the OPCW".</blockquote>
Here BM conveniently ignores the strong evidence that the Volcano was never intended to be a chemical weapon. There were two Volcano impact sites <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/analyzing-previous-umlaca-attacks.html" target="_blank">documented</a> prior to August 21, both of them clearly showing smoke emanating from the rockets, having no effect on the cameraman. This is typical to incendiary weapons (which coincidentally have warhead designs very similar to chemical warheads).<br />
<br />
The various Volcano variants have been spotted numerous times during the civil war, making it one of the most popular heavy weapons used by the Syrian Army. Since practically every type of heavy weapon used by the Syrian Army was <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/reliability-of-using-munitions-to.html" target="_blank">captured</a> by the opposition, and since we have evidence of the opposition capturing the small Volcano variant, it is unreasonable to assume that the incendiary Volcanoes were the only weapon to have survived the raids.<br />
<br />
<b><br /></b>
<b>The 2 km Volcano range does not exclude government positions (from <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2014/04/the-knowledge-gap-seymours-hersh-of.html" target="_blank">Brown Moses</a>)</b><br />
<br />
This is an attack on Hersh's statements in follow-up interviews in which he claimed the short range indicates a launch location within opposition control.<br />
<br />
Brown Moses provides his analysis of the areas under control of the Syrian government on August 21st, some of which being within 2 km of all impact sites. Here BM chooses to ignore the strong <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/impact-site-analysis.html" target="_blank">evidence</a> that the launch sites are north to the impact sites (not north-west), in an area that is outside government control, even according to BM's analysis.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, the areas marked by BM are based on videos showing government incursions into opposition territory. They are far from being under complete government control, with operations mostly carried out by tanks for short periods, while other videos show opposition fighters operating within this territory. This is an extremely uncomfortable location to launch a Volcano attack - an operation that involves two unarmored trucks and requiring several people to operate in the open.<br />
<br />
The two theories to be considered here are therefore:<br />
<ol>
<li>The Syrian Army chose to launch a chemical Volcano attack on a residential neighborhood from within opposition territory, despite the low-quality Volcano never been used for this purpose, and despite having many long-range dedicated chemical rockets and shells.</li>
<li>The opposition launched the attack using the only rocket they could possibly use - a repurposed looted incendiary rocket, and doing so from within opposition territory, as evidenced by the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/impact-site-analysis.html" target="_blank">impact sites</a> and the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/location-of-liwa-al-islam-videos.html" target="_blank">videos</a> documenting the launch.</li>
</ol>
Pending new evidence, the latter is by far more likely.<br />
<br />
BM also brings up the issue of the M14 rocket reported in Moadamiyah - something that wasn't mentioned in the August 21 discussions for a very long time, and for a good reason. This single M14 body shows no signs of ever being launched, and was recorded a few days earlier in a different location than the claimed impact site. The evidence for a chemical attack on Moadamiyah is <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/what-happened-in-moadamiyah.html" target="_blank">highly questionable</a> and should not be used in any productive discussion on the subject.<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>The amounts ordered by the opposition in Turkey were smaller than the amounts used in the attack (from <a href="https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/542509-hersh-and-the-red-herring" target="_blank">Dan Kaszeta</a>)</b><br />
<br />
This is a very peculiar line of reasoning, that manages to turn one of the most interesting pieces of evidence for opposition culpability into a counter claim. The fact that we somehow got a glimpse into one of the few attempts in history to produce underground sarin is nothing short of amazing. It is ridiculous to assume that the only time the opposition tried to procure sarin, they were captured. A more likely explanation is that this is a wide-scale operation, and the arrests are just the tip of the iceberg - the unlucky few who got caught.<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>A sarin sample provided by the Russians cannot be trusted (<a href="http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2014-04-07/who-trusts-russian-spies-on-syria" target="_blank">here</a>)</b><br />
<br />
The idea that within days the Russians fabricated a low-quality sarin sample to deceive the British could not be dismissed, but it is of course much less likely than the straightforward explanation, which also happens to match the other evidence.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<br />
<br />
<h3>
Attacking Straw Man Theories</h3>
<br />
<br />
One thing to remember in this discussion is that Hersh is not a researcher of the August 21st attack. He is a journalist with sources in the intelligence community who forward to him interesting information - some reliable, and some less so. Trying to 'win' the discussion by attacking his statements is nothing more than a <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Straw_man" target="_blank">straw man argument</a>.<br />
<br />
This quote is a good example (from <a href="https://now.mmedia.me/lb/en/commentaryanalysis/542509-hersh-and-the-red-herring" target="_blank">Dan Kaszeta</a>):<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
Somehow, this Sarin was produced, using a secret hexamine acid reduction process hitherto unknown to the world, and only mastered by Syria’s chemical weapons program. It was put into rockets that are exact copies of Syrian ones, down to the paint and bolts. The Sarin-filled rockets were smuggled via the “rat line” into Syria to Damascus, without a single one being caught. And quickly, I should add, due to the short shelf life of binary Sarin. Then they were supposed to be fired onto rebel areas from government positions without the Syrian regime knowing about it? It defies belief.</blockquote>
All of the above are straw man arguments:<br />
<ol>
<li>There is no evidence of a "secret hexamine process" in Syria (see <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/04/hexamine-again.html" target="_blank">here</a>).</li>
<li>No one claims the rockets were replicas.</li>
<li>No one claimed sarin was smuggled from Turkey - only precursors.</li>
<li>The rockets were not launched from government positions.</li>
</ol>
Those who object to the false flag theory, should attack the well researched hypothesis reached in this blog, which could be summarized as follows:<br />
<ol>
<li>Following the US's clear statement that they will only intervene in Syria following the use of chemical weapons, one of the extreme factions of the opposition chose to carry out a false flag chemical attack, which could potentially win the war and save thousands of lives.</li>
<li>They produced sarin using basic chemicals procured in neighboring countries, and possibly utilizing one of the many labs and factories that they seized and are now under their full control.</li>
<li>In one of their <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/reliability-of-using-munitions-to.html" target="_blank">many raids</a> of Army bases, they seized an incendiary Volcano launcher, which would prove to be an ideal weapon.</li>
<li>The perfect opportunity came when Syrian forces were progressing into East Ghouta right when the UN team arrived in Damascus to investigate the Khan Al-Assal incident (which they later <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/01/analysis-of-second-un-report.html" target="_blank">determined</a> to be a sarin attack against Syrian soldiers and government-supporting civilians).</li>
<li style="direction: ltr;">The rockets were filled with the low-quality sarin, brought to an opposition-controlled field near the front-line and launched towards the residential neighborhood of Zamalka - a target with low military value, but one which would produce powerful images for the international media.</li>
</ol>
This is the hypothesis that explains the timing, the motive, the launch location, the sarin quality, the videos of the launch, and all the other evidence, and that is the hypothesis that should be attacked, rather than any other straw man theory.<br />
<br />
Furthermore, even if someone were to provide evidence that refutes this theory (which is yet to happen), this would not suffice, as that someone would also need to write an alternative plausible hypothesis that is consistent with the evidence. And once again - despite dozens of requests for such a theory, no one was able to produce one!<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion: Mr. Hersh provides interesting information from his sources, but it cannot be independently verified and is therefore not usable in our investigation. </b><br />
<ol>
<li><b>The DIA document seems to be mostly based on the Turkey arrests, but does provide more inside information from the interrogations that followed.</b></li>
<li><b>The Russian sarin sample sounds reliable and plausible, but does not add any information over the UN's analysis.</b></li>
<li><b>The claims of Turkey's involvement are based on weak evidence, which is far below the evidentiary threshold required for such an outrageous claim.</b></li>
</ol>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com78tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-64084528260958335292014-04-05T11:36:00.000+01:002014-04-08T12:03:39.715+01:00Hexamine AgainIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<br />
Dan Kaszeta has <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2014/04/why-nigel-farage-has-it-all-wrong.html" target="_blank">published</a> another piece that claims hexamine proves the Syrian government is behind the August 21st attack. Most of these points were refuted <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/12/hexamine-is-not-smoking-gun.html" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/02/more-on-hexamine.html" target="_blank">here</a>, but there are a few new claims which will be addressed here.<br />
<ol>
<li>For the first time, Dan attempts to address the issue of samples that contained hexamine but no sarin. As detailed in the previous posts here, this is one of the indications that hexamine could have come from many sources and is therefore not a "smoking gun".<br />Dan dismisses it by saying: "this is a logical state of affairs as hexamine does not evaporate like Sarin does".<br />This, however, fails to explain why none of the stable sarin degradation products (which were found elsewhere) are absent from these samples.</li>
<li>Dan brings up sample 25 from the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/01/analysis-of-second-un-report.html" target="_blank">UN report</a>, which shows hexamine in one of the rocket's bolts. He claims this proves hexamine findings were not a result of environmental contamination.<br />This sample is originally described by the UN as <i>"Metal bolt removed from rocket head combined with paint rust scratched from the surface surrounding the bolt"</i>, which provides a good clue to the source of hexamine in this sample: One of hexamine's <a href="http://www.innovateus.net/science/what-hexamine" target="_blank">numerous uses</a> in chemistry is in paints.</li>
<li>Dan claims "the UN <u>firmly</u> concluded that the 8/21 Sarin came from Syrian government stockpiles".<br />The original quote: <i>"The evidence available concerning the nature, quality and quantity of the agents used on 21 August indicated that the perpetrators <u>likely</u> had access to the chemical weapons stockpile of the Syrian military".</i><br />Besides the misquote - as discussed in detail <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/03/quote-from-commission-of-inquiry-on.html" target="_blank">here</a>, this UN statement is probably not significant.</li>
</ol>
Dan concludes with the following logical equation:<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
Nobody’s used hexamine previously as a Sarin additive</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
+</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
There’s hexamine in the field samples</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
+</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
There’s 80 tons of hexamine in the declared inventory of the Assad Regime</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
+</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
The Syrian government’s admission to Sellstrom’s team</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
EQUALS</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
The Assad Regime Did the Wicked Deed</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
To sum up the weaknesses of this line of reasoning:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li>There is no indication hexamine was used in production of sarin, rather than another agent, or for another use completely (e.g. safe neutralization of by-products).</li>
<li>Syria has specifically declared Isopropylamine in its stockpiles, which is the standard amine used in binary sarin. Furthermore, the amount of Isopropylamine reported matched the amounts of other reported chemicals, making hexamine redundant.</li>
<li>Hexamine is a <a href="http://www.innovateus.net/science/what-hexamine" target="_blank">very common</a> agent in chemical processes, and there is nothing that associates the hexamine field samples with sarin. More specifically, we have hexamine samples that have no trace of sarin, and we have samples showing explosive traces (hexamine is also used in explosives).</li>
<li>There are no traces of hexamine salts in the field samples, which is a strong indication that hexamine was not present in sarin. If hexamine was indeed intended to react with the HCl created in the sarin binary process, then where are the products of this reaction? (credit to Paveway).</li>
<li>Even if we were to accept this far-fetched connection between the hexamine in the field and the hexamine in the stockpiles, and assuming Syria did make this amazing break-through in sarin production, there is still no way to know that this information was not leaked to the opposition (e.g. by one of the many defectors).</li>
</ol>
<br />
<br />
All in all, the fact that this weak circumstantial evidence is still claimed to be a "smoking gun", is mostly a testament to the weakness of the other evidence for a regime attack. And once again: So far no one was able to provide a regime-attack scenario that is consistent with the evidence!<br />
<br />Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com42tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-88553044759091670682014-03-18T22:38:00.001+00:002014-03-21T02:12:15.652+00:00Richard Lloyd's Trajectory AnalysisIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<br />
Richard Lloyd of Tesla, who previously published a widely-reported <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006045/possible-implications-of-bad-intelligence.pdf" target="_blank">estimate</a> of 2 km for the UMLACA/Volcano's range, and <a href="http://www.aug21st.com/syriachemicalIED.pdf" target="_blank">confirmed</a> the Syrian Army's report of a rebel CW store in Jobar, has recently <a href="http://www.aug21st.com/slides/Bearing_Analysis.pdf" target="_blank">published</a> an analysis of the sarin rocket trajectories.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The analysis reaches very similar results to those published <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/impact-site-analysis.html" target="_blank">here</a> and in other blogs, indicating a launch source to the north.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
However, Richard points to an interesting finding: A Syrian Air Force Intelligence <a href="http://www.syrrevnews.com/archives/43711" target="_blank">facility</a> located on this trajectory, at a distance of 2.8 km from the farthest impact site. (Note: For some reason, the diagrams show the base to be exactly on the trajectory. However, the impact sites provide an accuracy of only around 20 degrees, which covers the entire field west of Irbin).</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
This is of course a very important finding, since so far there was no evidence of government activity near the launch site (despite numerous reports of such activities all over Damascus).<br />
<br />
However, there are a few obstacles before this could be used as evidence:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li>The base is beyond the UMLACA/Volcano range. The report does not provide any explanation why a range beyond 2 km is considered (which was previously <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006045/possible-implications-of-bad-intelligence.pdf" target="_blank">defined</a> as the "upper possible range"). In any case, our more detailed <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/umlaca-simulation.html" target="_blank">model</a> puts the upper limit at 2.5 km.</li>
<li>Air force Intelligence is an Internal Security and Counter-Intelligence service. It is not involved in military operations, rocket artillery or chemical warfare. More specifically, this facility seems to have civilian cars parked outside and no military equipment.</li>
</ol>
</div>
<div>
Nevertheless, some scenarios could benefit from this new finding: For example, if we are to assume that the government had specific interest in targeting the civilian neighborhood of Zamalka, it is definitely conceivable that they brought the launcher and support truck to the facility, drove them after midnight to the nearby field to launch the attack and then retreated back.<br />
<br />
The problem with this scenario is that it doesn't provide any significant military advantage over the alternative of driving the trucks directly from the nearby highway into the field. It of course still doesn't explain the many other discrepancies with such a scenario.<br />
<br /></div>
<div>
During the writing of this post, Mr. Lloyd published another <a href="http://www.aug21st.com/slides/CircularErrorProbability.pdf" target="_blank">report</a>, which makes two claims:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li>The wide distribution of impact sites could not have come from random dispersion around a single target, implying multiple launchers.<br />The estimate of this blog is that a single launcher was used, each time rotated to a different azimuth. It is unclear why this simpler explanation is ignored.</li>
<li>The range of the chemical Volcano is longer due its smaller mass.<br />This blog's <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/umlaca-simulation.html" target="_blank">model</a> has already examined this and found the difference to be negligible, since the lower mass also results in lower resistance to drag force, which in this case has significant effect on range.</li>
</ol>
<br />
<b>Conclusion: The Air Force Intelligence facility near the launch location could have provided some cover to a government operation, but since it is beyond the Volcano range, its contribution is negligible compared to the alternatives. Therefore, this finding, while interesting, does not have significant implication on culpability.</b><br />
<br /></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com31tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-6163500335528912302014-03-10T01:22:00.000+00:002014-07-10T03:36:16.949+01:00Ridiculed Jobar Lab actually was Sarin RelatedIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<br />
Richard Lloyd of Tesla, who previously published a widely-reported <a href="https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006045/possible-implications-of-bad-intelligence.pdf" target="_blank">estimate</a> of 2 km for the UMLACA/Volcano's range, has recently made another interesting <a href="http://www.aug21st.com/syriachemicalIED.pdf" target="_blank">discovery</a>.<br />
<br />
First, some background: Three days after the Ghouta attack, the Syrian news agency reported that Syrian soldiers who entered Jobar discovered an underground chemical weapons store, and that some of them suffered from "suffocation". This was quickly dismissed as a desperate attempt to divert attention, and the equipment was estimated to be related to explosives production or to protection from a chemical attack. This blog too <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html" target="_blank">did not find</a> that report useful.<br />
<br />
However, Mr. Lloyd managed to identify in a <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cGz_LCGg2TI" target="_blank">video</a> of the location two items which perfectly match the sarin IEDs used against Syrian soldiers in Jobar, as reported in the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/01/analysis-of-second-un-report.html" target="_blank">final UN report</a>. This attack was of special interest as it was the only one where the UN <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/01/analysis-of-second-un-report.html" target="_blank">detected</a> sarin in a soldier's blood sample (despite a one month delay in sampling).<br />
<br />
See <a href="http://www.aug21st.com/syriachemicalIED.pdf" target="_blank">here</a> the full report.<br />
<br />
Update: An anonymous contributor below noted that the soldiers were attacked by the IEDs just 250m from the likely launch location of the August 21st attack. Besides further strengthening the connection between the two attacks, it provides another important indication: Since the Syrian army has reported being attacked while advancing into this area on August 24th, it is likely that the area (and rocket launch location) was under opposition control on August 21st.<br />
<br />
Update: The UN <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/07/us-syria-crisis-chemicalweapons-idUSKBN0FC1U420140707" target="_blank">reported</a> that two cylinders seized in August by the Syrian Army tested positive for sarin. It is reasonable to assume this report relates to the IEDs found in Jobar. <br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion: The underground store discovered by the Syrian Army in Jobar was indeed a chemical weapons store.</b>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com35tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-70472260885348950332014-03-07T00:25:00.004+00:002014-03-07T13:24:33.145+00:00Quote from Commission of Inquiry on SyriaIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<br />
The <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/IICISyria/Pages/IndependentInternationalCommission.aspx" target="_blank">Independent International Commission of Inquiry on the Syrian Arab Republic</a>, has issued its <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session25/Documents/A-HRC-25-65_en.doc" target="_blank">7th report</a> which deals with many atrocities committed by all parties to the conflict, but also provided the following interesting quote (page 19):<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>The evidence available concerning the nature, quality and quantity of the agents used on 21 August indicated that the perpetrators likely had access to the chemical weapons stockpile of the Syrian military, as well as the expertise and equipment necessary to manipulate safely large amount of chemical agents.</i></blockquote>
The report also states that the chemical agents used in Ghouta were similar to the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/01/analysis-of-second-un-report.html" target="_blank">Khan Al-Assal attack</a>, and concludes that <i>"In no incident was the commission’s evidentiary threshold met with respect to the perpetrator".</i><br />
<br />
This seems to indicate the commission had information that could prove valuable for our research here. Unfortunately, UN bodies have <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/summary-of-anomalies-in-un-report.html" target="_blank">proven</a> in the past to be a problematic source of information when dealing with the Ghouta attack, so some care should be practiced. Indeed, the first thing that stands out is that the commission does not provide any evidence to support its conclusion, or even provide an indication of what that evidence could be. This obviously renders this information unusable for our investigation.<br />
<br />
Nevertheless, we can try to deduce what information the commission has by analyzing their statements.<br />
<br />
A first clue is given in the first question in the <a href="http://webtv.un.org/watch/commission-of-inquiry-on-the-syrian-arab-republic-press-conference-geneva-5-march-2014/3296881094001/" target="_blank">press conference</a> that followed the report, where the commission's chairman explains that since they did not visit Syria, their conclusion is based principally on the existing findings of Sellstrom's team, as well as <i>"interviews with experts and functionaries"</i>.<br />
<br />
A second clue is the comparison to the Khan Al-Assal attack, which is said to have <i>"the same unique hallmarks as those used in Al-Ghouta"</i>. Since Sellstrom's team did not visit Khan Al-Assal and had no field samples, the only source for such a comparison would be Russia's <a href="http://rt.com/news/chemical-aleppo-findings-russia-417/" target="_blank">100-page report</a> of the attack submitted to the UN, which included certified lab results of field samples. The full results were not published, but were reported to provide evidence that RDX was used as the bursting charge.<br />
<br />
These clues bring us back to the well-known <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/02/more-on-hexamine.html" target="_blank">Hexamine issue</a> - which serves as the current "smoking gun", ever since the "<a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/dispatches-mapping-sarin-flight-path" target="_blank">trajectory intersection</a>" theory was refuted. Since RDX is based on Hexamine, it seems likely that the Russian labs reported Hexamine in their samples, which brought the commission to connect them to the Hexamine in the Ghouta attack (probably correctly), and both attacks to the Syrian stockpiles (<a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/02/more-on-hexamine.html" target="_blank">probably incorrectly</a>).<br />
<br />
So since the commission refuses to provide any evidence, states that their conclusion is based on Sellstrom's data, and found similarities to Khan Al-Assal, there is little reason to believe they have more information besides the well-known Hexamine finding.<br />
<br />
The other evidence mentioned is the amount of agent used, which is indeed one of the main challenges to the opposition-attack theory. However, detailed <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" target="_blank">analysis</a> indicates that while not an easy feat, producing such amounts is within the opposition's capabilities. The recent UN <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/01/analysis-of-second-un-report.html" target="_blank">evidence</a> showing the opposition deploying tens of kg of sarin, further strengthened this position.<br />
<br />
As a side note, for those who are not familiar with the UN's multiple <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/summary-of-anomalies-in-un-report.html" target="_blank">manipulations</a> during the Ghouta investigation and choose to take this report at face value as indicative of a government attack, it should be pointed out that this would indicate that the only two cases where the government chose to use sarin at large scale are (a) an attack against Syrian soldiers in a government-controlled area, and (b) a massive attack on a purely civilian opposition neighborhood carried out upon arrival of a UN team invited to investigate the first attack. - An obviously perplexing choice of targets.<br />
<br />
<br />
Finally, it is important once again to remember that the Ghouta attack is no longer a mystery where each little clue can change the picture (like it was in the early days). We now have very strong evidence implicating the opposition in the attack, and so far <b>no one was able to propose a regime attack theory that is consistent with the evidence </b>(see the end of <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/02/more-on-hexamine.html" target="_blank">this post</a> to understand why this is so difficult). For our understanding to change, very strong contradicting evidence should be brought forward, or alternatively a plausible theory for a regime attack should be formulated. Vague statements or general-purpose chemicals claimed to be smoking guns, sadly, do not qualify.<br />
<br />
<br />
<b>Conclusion: The commission's quote seems to be based on the Hexamine findings and the amount of agent used, both of which have already been known and analyzed here before, and found to be of little value.</b>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com17tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-91671146193033913342014-02-14T04:07:00.004+00:002014-02-16T03:08:23.126+00:00More on Hexamine<div class="MsoNormal">
If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In recent weeks new information has surfaced regarding the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/12/hexamine-is-not-smoking-gun.html" target="_blank">Hexamine findings</a>,which require revisiting the issue.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
First, to summarize the “Hexamine is the smoking gun” theory: This claim is based on Hexamine being reported by Syria as part of their chemical program, and Hexamine being found in all sarin-positive samples in Ghouta. Supposedly, this is a “smoking gun” connecting Syria’s stockpiles to the sarin used in Ghouta. The <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/12/hexamine-is-not-smoking-gun.html" target="_blank">main objection</a> raised so far to this theory is that Hexamine findings in the field could come from many sources, such as the rockets’ booster charge, and that Hexamine was never associated with sarin production – specifically, it is a well-known Mustard Gas stabilizer.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The new information:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li>Ake Sellstrom was <a href="https://plus.google.com/108344897173120412718/posts/62vsHPVJPua" target="_blank">quoted</a> as saying that Hexamine “is in their formula, it is their acid scavenger”.</li>
<li>Dan Kaszeta has <a href="https://twitter.com/DanKaszeta/status/431450817648812032/photo/1" target="_blank">published</a> on twitter a list of components found in US mustard gas containers, none of which contained Hexamine, decreasing the likelihood that Hexamine was used as a mustard gas stabilizer, and increasing the likelihood it was used for sarin.</li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
Let’s examine these in detail.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h3>
Sellstrom’s Quote</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
There are three problems with this quote:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li>Quotes by Mr. Sellstrom should be taken with a grain of salt, given the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/summary-of-anomalies-in-un-report.html" target="_blank">many manipulations</a> detected in his first report. He has specifically made a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/09/16/us-syria-crisis-un-idUSBRE98F0ED20130916" target="_blank">misleading statement</a> in the past claiming that sarin found in the field was of higher quality than Iraq’s, while omitting the fact that Iraq produced very low purity nerve agents.</li>
<li>While the question did mention sarin, Sellstrom’s answer did not explicitly state Hexamine is used as an acid scavenger for sarin.</li>
<li>In the December press conference (13:00) Sellstrom presented himself as having little understanding of this issue.</li>
</ol>
<br />
<h3>
US Mustard Gas list</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
These lists <a href="http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp49-c4.pdf" target="_blank">originate</a> from a study done on Mustard containers kept at Aberdeen, Maryland, and indeed do not list Hexamine.<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
However, Aberdeen has been developing chemical weapons <a href="http://www.epa.gov/reg3hwmd/npl/MD2210020036.htm" target="_blank">since 1917</a>, while Hexamine was discovered to be a Mustard Gas stabilizer only in <a href="https://www.google.com/patents/US2672484" target="_blank">1945</a>. It is therefore possible these batches were manufactured before Hexamine was used, and indeed, the chemical agents are described in the reports as partly solidified.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
Whether or not this is the case, it should be noted that this is of little relevance to Syria. Syria started its program in the 1990s, at which time the use of Hexamine was already published in several patents, one of them explicitly <a href="https://www.google.com/patents/US2780653" target="_blank">states</a>: “Hexamine [is] currently adopted as the official stabilizer for Levinstein mustard by the [United States] Chemical Warfare Service” (as detailed <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/12/hexamine-is-not-smoking-gun.html" target="_blank">here</a>, the patents also state this applies to distilled mustard / HD).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
So whether or not the US has used Hexamine for this purpose, Syrian scientists had easy access to this information, and it is definitely likely they would make use of it.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h3>
Hexamine is Probably not a Mustard Stabilizer</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Despite these two findings not being enough to discredit the theory that Hexamine was used to stabilize Mustard Gas, there is another problem with this theory: Syria has reported very large amounts of Hexamine (80 Tons). Since Hexamine is used as a Mustard stabilizer at 1% concentration, this would equate to 8000 Tons of Mustard Gas, while it seems like Syria reported only <a href="http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/2013/11/world-faces-syria-chemical-weapons-sarin-vx-legacy" target="_blank">400 Tons</a>. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
I therefore no longer believe Mustard stabilization is the main purpose of Syria’s Hexamine.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
So why is it there?</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
First, let’s examine Dan Kaszeta‘s <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/responses-to-final-un-report-into-use_8611.html" target="_blank">theory</a> that it is an additive to binary sarin intended to neutralize HF generated during the final stage. As discussed in the past, Isopropylamine is the well-documented additive for this purpose. It was the choice made in all known sarin programs, and there is likely a good reason they chose a chemical that is closely related to one of sarin’s immediate precursors (isopropanol).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
There is no reason to think Syria made a different choice, especially when we know they declared <a href="http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/ADM/PSB/Tender/Request_for_EOI_OPCWCDB_EOI012013.pdf" target="_blank">40 Tons</a> of Isopropylamine. Furthermore, this amount matches the report of <a href="http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/ADM/PSB/Tender/Request_for_EOI_OPCWCDB_EOI012013.pdf" target="_blank">120 Tons</a> of Isopropanol, which is close to the ratio required for mixing <a href="http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-0-387-69260-9_8#page-1" target="_blank">OPA</a> (the 28%:72% mix of Isopropylamine and Isopropanol that is used in binary sarin). </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
If we are to accept Dan’s <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/responses-to-final-un-report-into-use_8611.html" target="_blank">claim</a> that Hexamine is more efficient than Isopropylamine (<i>“can bind to as many as four HF molecules”</i>), then 80 Tons should equate to a much larger amount of sarin than was reported.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
We can therefore safely discredit this theory.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h3>
Hexamine Still far from a Smoking Gun</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
At this point, it is hard to say what the exact purpose was. Hexamine is used in many <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hexamethylenetetramine" target="_blank">organic chemistry processes</a>, and there is no way to know whether it was used for neutralizing by-products, for assisting in synthesis of precursors, or directly added to the final products. There is also no way to know whether its use was related to sarin, VX, or mustard, all of which produce acids in the process (e.g. Phosphorous acid for Mustard Gas).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Whatever it may be, it is definitely not a “smoking gun”. It can maybe be qualified as “weak circumstantial evidence”. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Before it is remotely useful in determining culpability, all the following points must be proven:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li>It was not intended for another purpose or for one of the other agents.</li>
<li>It was used in a way that keeps significant amounts of it in the final product (i.e. detectable in the field samples).</li>
<li>The Hexamine findings in the field originate from the sarin, and not from other sources such as the explosive booster charges. This is probably the weakest link in the chain, since the UN reported 3 Hexamine findings in sarin-negative areas, and several explosive-related findings in sarin-positive areas.</li>
<li>The opposition doesn’t also use it in their sarin process. Especially difficult to prove since the opposition is assisted by many Army defectors. If the government found Hexamine to be useful, this could have easily leaked.</li>
</ol>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Clearly, there is still significant work ahead for anyone trying to use Hexamine as evidence for regime culpability.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h3>
The Big Picture</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Since it’s been a long time since we examined the scenarios, and it is easy to get lost in the details, this seems like a good opportunity to remember the big picture: Despite many requests, no one was yet able to provide a regime-attack scenario that is consistent with all the evidence. The main issues that make such a scenario highly implausible are:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li>Why was the attack carried out from a field near Irbin that is under opposition control, when the government possesses many long range chemical shells and rockets?</li>
<li>Why was the sarin manufactured using basic chemicals?</li>
<li>Why was a low-grade alcohol used in the process?</li>
<li>Why was a low-quality rocket, originally designed as an incendiary weapon chosen?</li>
<li>Why did they choose to attack a residential neighborhood behind the front lines for little military gain?</li>
<li>Why didn’t Western intelligence sensors detect activity at Syria’s chemical sites prior to the attack?</li>
<li>Why attack during the UN’s visit?</li>
<li>Why invite the UN and then divert them from the Khan Al-Assal investigation, especially as we now know Khan Al-Assal to be a sarin attack against Syrian soldiers and pro-government civilians? It would seem the government had a strong incentive to allow the UN to carry out this investigation and publish these findings.</li>
<li>Is it pure coincidence that two more sarin attacks against Syrian soldiers occurred just a few days after the Ghouta attack, and in the same area?</li>
<li>What are the Liwa Al-Islam launch videos? If they are fabricated, why make them so unusable for mass media, and why publish them long after the military threat was averted? Is the Liwa Al-Islam sarin video <a href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=b85_1373564487" target="_blank">published</a> before the Ghouta attack also a fabrication? For what purpose? </li>
</ol>
(More details can be found on <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>).<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Claiming that these severe discrepancies are somehow outweighed by a finding of some multi-purpose chemical in the field and in Syria’s stockpiles, is highly speculative.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It is especially problematic when we know there is a solid opposition-attack hypothesis that is fully consistent with all the evidence, and the only objections raised against it so far are extremely weak, namely:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li>We don’t have direct documentation of the opposition looting this specific version of the Volcano launcher. <br />Weaknesses:</li>
<ul>
<li>We do have <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/08/proof-syrian-military-is-using.html" target="_blank">documentation</a> of the opposition using the smaller Volcano version.</li>
<li>The same claim is true for the government: There is no documentation of it using using this Volcano version (the incendiary/chemical).</li>
<li>This claim assumes the Liwa Al-Islam videos, which show the opposition using the chemical Volcano are fabricated.</li>
</ul>
<ol>
</ol>
<li>Despite ample <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" target="_blank">evidence</a> that the opposition is producing sarin, we don’t know the exact location of the opposition’s sarin production plant (sometimes ridiculed as “a giant secret plant”). <br />Weaknesses:</li>
<ul>
<li>As described <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" target="_blank">here</a> there is no need for a giant lab using today’s laboratory technologies.</li>
<li>The opposition is in control of vast areas of land. There is no reason to think we should be able to locate the plant.</li>
<li>We do have <a href="http://gerarddirect.com/2012/12/09/syria-jihadist-al-nusra-front-siezes-chemical-factory-in-allepo/" target="_blank">documentation</a> of the opposition capturing a large chemical plant.</li>
</ul>
<ol>
</ol>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Conclusion: While it is possible that Syria used Hexamine in the sarin production process, and it is not impossible that the Hexamine findings in the field are related to sarin, this is only one of many plausible explanations, and therefore very far from being a “smoking gun”. Given the much stronger evidence indicative of an opposition attack, and the lack of any plausible regime-attack scenario, this evidence is of negligible value.</b></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com28tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-74318710153351069552014-01-22T03:46:00.000+00:002015-01-03T22:42:09.448+00:00Analysis of the Second UN Report<div class="MsoNormal">
If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This post analyzes the <a href="https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/report.pdf" target="_blank">UN's final report</a> on the use of
Chemical Weapons in Syria, published on December 12th, 2013.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The report, which covers seven separate attacks, spans 82
pages and contains a mix of evidence collected by the UN, evidence reported by
the Syrian government, UN analysis and estimates, and procedural documentation. This post attempts to extract from it new findings, which may be relevant for inferring culpability for
the August 21<sup>st</sup> attack.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
Ghouta, August 21st</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Given the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/summary-of-anomalies-in-un-report.html" target="_blank">multiple omissions and mistakes</a> in the initial
report of September 10<sup>th</sup>, the final report was widely anticipated to
provide more information and clarifications. Particularly interesting issues were (a) whether
the wrong trajectories reported would be corrected, (b) any conclusions that could be made from the many chemical
by-products found in the scene, and (c) clarifications on the
<a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/what-happened-in-moadamiyah.html" target="_blank">numerous discrepancies</a> in the Moadamiyah site. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In that aspect the final report was a huge disappointment.
The writers simply chose to sidestep the issues by stating that the September
report <i>“forms an integral part of this final report”</i> and only provided some minor
updates to the lab results. This leaves us with two possible explanations:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li>The team had no new
information to offer since the September report, despite the large amounts of raw data involved and its short time constraints.</li>
<li>The team simply wished
to avoid highlighting the many mistakes made in the first report, by pretending
the objective of the final report was only to investigate new sites.</li>
</ol>
<div>
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
Khan Al Assal, March 19th</h3>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The fact that a chemical attack occurred was already known,
but the report adds two interesting findings:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">Syrian soldiers were indeed
attacked and the site was under Syrian government control at the time. These claims
by the Syrian government were not widely accepted prior to the report.</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">The agent was an organophosporous
compound. This matches the Russian’s finding of sarin in soil samples, but was
also not widely accepted, especially since some eyewitnesses reported a
Chlorine smell.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="mso-list: l4 level1 lfo1; text-indent: -.25in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It should be noted that the team did not visit the site to
take samples due to security restrictions, so their conclusions were based on
numerous interviews, which they felt were strong enough evidence (or as mentioned in
the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/12/review-of-un-press-conference.html">press conference</a>: “the footprints in the society… were so obvious”).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The report does not offer any reliable evidence on the
delivery method.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Judging by a map attached to the report, the lethal area seems
to be 2 hectares (200x100m), which matches the death toll of 25 people. Based
on US DoD models, this translates to 20 kg of sarin used.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
Bahariyah, August 22nd</h3>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In this event, Syrian Army soldiers were attacked by
improvised devices distributing a blue gas with a very bad odour. The symptoms
reported by the soldiers are clearly indicative of some irritant and not a
nerve agent, and their blood samples were negative for sarin (samples were
taken by the hospital on the day of the attack, and by the UN a month later).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
Jobar, August 24th</h3>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In this event, Syrian Army soldiers were attacked by an IED.
The interesting findings:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">A sample taken by the
UN team a month after the attack from one soldier tested positive for sarin
exposure.</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">All 4 samples taken on the
day of the attack by the hospital were positive. This includes samples from 3
soldiers who tested negative by the UN. This is likely explained by the long
time passed.</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">The attack involved at
least 4 IEDs of 4 liters each, which is 17.4 kg of sarin.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="mso-list: l2 level1 lfo2; text-indent: -.25in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
These findings are ground-breaking, as they show for the
first time positive proof of a Syrian Army soldier being attacked by sarin. Combined
with the evidence previously collected, it can now be ascertained with high
certainty that the Syrian opposition possesses sarin. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
Ashrafiya August 25th</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In this event, Syrian Army soldiers were attacked by canisters
launched by the opposition using catapults. One of them landed near a group of
five soldiers and released a foul smelling smoke. They then experienced
symptoms consistent with nerve-agent poisoning and were evacuated. The
interesting findings:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">All 5 samples taken by the
hospital on the day of the attack were positive for sarin.</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">All 3 samples taken by the UN
samples a month later were negative .</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">One sample taken by the UN 5
days after the attack was negative.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; text-indent: -.25in;">
<!--[if !supportLists]--><o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; text-indent: -.25in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="mso-list: l0 level1 lfo3; text-indent: -.25in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Since we have both a government and a UN positive result in Jobar,
and a match in the negative results provided by the government in Bahariyah, it is safe to trust the positive samples in this case and
attribute the negative samples to the time passed.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
However, the last finding raises an obvious question: Why
was only one sample taken from the five injured soldiers? The astounding answer
is hinted in the report:</div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"Biomedical sampling was performed on 30 August 2013 on
selected patients… Due to technical problems during the sampling, only one
blood sample was recovered”. </i></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The following points may help better understand
this statement:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">The report goes to great
lengths to describe the meticulous procedures used by the UN team to protect
the integrity and authenticity of samples.</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">The team did not report any
procedural failures in the collection of samples from makeshift hospitals in
the warzone, but only in this secure military hospital.</span></li>
<li><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">The UN’s visit to the hospital
was <a href="http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/08/30/un-experts-delay-start-on-last-day-syria-probe-after-assad-gives-warning-to/" target="_blank">reported</a> by the media</span><span style="text-indent: -0.25in;">, but for some reason was not mentioned in the September report - an omission which
raised a few eyebrows at the time.</span></li>
</ol>
While previously there was some hope that the UN's multiple
mistakes were somehow attributable to human error, this mess-up leaves us with
the unavoidable distressing conclusion that someone within the UN team has been
manipulating evidence. The blunt error in the Zamalka trajectory, the
ridiculous analysis of the Moadamiyah “impact site”, and now the loss of blood
samples cannot all be honest mistakes, especially when considering all three happen
to contribute to the regime-attack theory.<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This suspicion must be investigated to ensure this would never happen again. A first good step would be to pressure the UN
to expose the full raw data (e.g. the raw GoPro recordings, and quantitative lab
results).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<h3>
Saraqeb 29 April</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<br /></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
This case, along with a similar
attack two w<span style="font-family: inherit;">eeks earlier, was extensively analyzed by Brown Moses <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/04/links-between-alleged-chemical-attacks.html">here</a>,<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/05/was-attack-in-saraqeb-chemical-weapons.html">here</a>,
and<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span><a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/05/devices-linked-to-alleged-chemical.html">here</a>.
<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">According to the opposition sources quoted in the report a helicopter
dropped an improvised weapon built from a cinder block with holes
containing grenades whose safety pins were removed. When the block hits the
ground and breaks, the levers detach and the grenades detonate. The sources
claim the grenades contained tear gas and sarin.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Following the attack 13 victims were evacuated to Turkey, of
which a 52 year old woman died, and the rest quickly recovered. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The new findings:</span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">Body parts taken from the woman in an autopsy tested positive for
sarin exposure.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">A blood sample taken from the woman had low cholinesterase levels,
which is consistent with nerve-agent poisoning, but also other conditions such
as a heart attack.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">To make this incident even more
puzzling, here are a few more details to consider:</span></div>
<div style="margin-bottom: .0001pt; margin: 0in;">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">Turkish doctors previously
reported blood samples from all 13 patients </span><a href="http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/syria/130505/syria-chemical-weapons-obama-red-line-turkey-idlib-aleppo-sarin-israel" style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">tested
negative</a><span class="apple-converted-space" style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">for sarin, while
France </span><a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2013/06/04/laurent-fabius-confirme-l-utilisation-de-gaz-sarin-en-syrie_3424140_3218.html" style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">reported</a><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;"> finding
sarin in samples from this incident.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">According to <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22551892" target="_blank">this eyewitness report</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">,
other people were affected in the same location as the woman. However, the UN
report states no one else exhibited severe symptoms.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">The grenades allegedly used
in the attack are probably <a href="http://rogueadventurer.com/2013/05/09/alleged-cw-delivery-systems-in-syria-are-more-likely-less-lethal-munitions/" target="_blank">tear-gas</a> or <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/the-hunt-for-chemical-weapon-attack.html">smoke</a> grenades.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">The opposition has <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/07/the-hunt-for-chemical-weapon-attack.html">acknowledged</a> using these grenades, stating they were seized from Syrian army depots.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">T</span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">his was the only case
(besides Ghouta) where the government accused the opposition of carrying a false-flag
chemical attack (</span><a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/05/01/301178/militants-use-chemical-material-syria/" style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">here</a><span class="apple-converted-space" style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">and </span><a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20130517165323/http:/sana.sy/eng/21/2013/05/01/480240.htm" style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">here</a><span class="apple-converted-space" style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">).</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">So what happened in Saraqeb? The main scenarios to consider are:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">A government attack using an
improvised device containing previously unheard-of sarin grenades. The amounts used were so low that it had lethal
effects only when falling in close proximity to a 52 year-old woman, indicating the use of sarin had no military gain.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">The woman’s body was contaminated
with sarin (or IMPA) in the Turkish morgue in an attempt to deceive the UN.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">The lab results were a
false positive.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">A false-flag by the
opposition, as claimed by the government.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoListParagraph">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">None of these scenarios seem very plausible, leaving this
incident a complete mystery. If anyone can make sense of it, please share your
ideas.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></o:p>
<br />
<h3>
<o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;">Summary of Evidence</span></o:p></h3>
<o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></o:p>
For the sake of clarity, here is the full evidence trail described above that links the opposition to the sarin attacks:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li>In Jobar, a blood sample independently taken by the UN from a soldier tested positive for sarin.</li>
<li>In Bahariyah, the only of the four opposition attacks that was not a sarin attack, the samples supplied by the hospital were also negative, indicating the government was not attempting to tamper with evidence.</li>
<li>In Ashrafiya, the hospital provided 5 positive blood samples, which were confirmed to be from the attacked soldiers.</li>
<li>In Khan Al Assal the UN team was convinced from interviews with the victims and medical personnel that an attack with an ogranophosphorus compound has occurred against soldiers and civilians. This adds to the sarin findings by the Russian investigation team.</li>
</ol>
<br />
<br />
<o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Conclusions:</b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;"><b>The opposition attacked Syrian
government soldiers and government-supporting civilians with sarin on three separate
occasions.</b></span></li>
<li><b><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">The opposition has access
to at least tens of kg of sarin. This significantly increases the plausibility
of them being able to obtain the hundreds of kg needed for the Ghouta attack –
closing one of the main gaps in our <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html">current scenario</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;">.</span></b></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit; text-indent: -0.25in;"><b>Elements within the UN team
have likely manipulated evidence in attempt to incriminate the Syrian government.</b></span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoListParagraph" style="mso-list: l3 level1 lfo5; text-indent: -.25in;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com21tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-19256284868752313382013-12-21T04:18:00.000+00:002014-01-21T01:05:36.499+00:00Review of UN Press ConferenceIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<div>
<br />
Before examining the findings of the <a href="https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/report.pdf" target="_blank">full UN report</a> published recently, I thought it would be interesting to review the press conference that accompanied it, which provides some interesting information.<br />
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<iframe frameborder="0" height="270" scrolling="no" src="https://link.brightcove.com/services/player/bcpid1722935254001?bctid=2932994876001&autoStart=false&secureConnections=true&width=480&height=270" width="480"></iframe></div>
<div>
<b><br /></b>
The most interesting findings:<br />
<br />
16:00 - While probably not too relevant anymore, Sellstrom makes a very significant statement distancing himself from the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-un-report.html" target="_blank">"trajectory intersection" theory</a>, saying <i>"The flight paths do not seem to meet as may be indicated in the report"</i>, and adds that a <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/umlaca-simulation.html" target="_blank">range</a> of 2km for the UMLACA is <i>"a fair guess"</i>.<br />
<br />
9:30 and 17:10 - In these two questions Sellstrom is asked about the sarin's quality, referencing his early statement that <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/summary-of-anomalies-in-un-report.html" target="_blank">hinted</a> at high-quality sarin (which was of course interpreted to imply regime culpability). He seems to avoid the first question (9:30) by addressing only the recent incidents where samples were taken from blood and not from soil. The second question (17:10) is more direct, prompting the interesting and evasive response: <i>“I tried to make some comment on the quality of sarin and I compared it to my experience in Iraq”</i>, which seems like an attempt to downplay the original statement and undo its effect.<br />
<br />
41:00 - Probably the most interesting finding. Here the panel is asked whether the munitions reported by Syria to the OPCW were related to those used in Ghouta. The response:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"I could say 'No Comment', but I will give you an answer: Not really, there’s no information that sheds light on what happened in Ghouta”.</i></blockquote>
To understand the significance of this statement it should be explained that the information provided by Syria to the OPCW is confidential and cannot be shared. Sellstrom therefore cannot answer the question directly, but his response heavily hints that UMLACAs were not reported as a Syrian chemical weapon, which is in line with the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/analyzing-previous-umlaca-attacks.html" target="_blank">analysis</a> that it is a repurposed incendiary rocket. Of course, other explanations are also plausible, such as the government secretly destroying a stockpile of chemical UMLACAs to avoid it being associated with the attack.<br />
<b>Update: </b><a href="http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2014/01/15/214656/new-analysis-of-rocket-used-in.html" target="_blank">This report</a> claims that UMLACAs were indeed not reported to the OPCW, but does not provide direct evidence.<br />
<br />
Overall, it is hard to miss the difference in attitude during this press conference compared to the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/summary-of-anomalies-in-un-report.html" target="_blank">spirit of the interim report</a>. While in September the message was along the lines of "We're not allowed to tell you , but we all know <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10308480/Assad-guilty-of-crimes-against-humanity-says-UN-chief-Ban-Ki-Moon.html" target="_blank">who did it</a>", the team is now much more cautious, clearly stating that the evidence is insufficient to implicate either side (39:00), and there is no <i>"information that will stand in court"</i> (43:30).</div>
<div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Update: <a href="http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:mEqeIzQ9ri8J:online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304858104579262882620510434+" target="_blank">This WSJ article</a> about the UN report contains two interesting statements from Sellstrom: </span><br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 1.4em;">But Mr. Sellstrom said he believed both sides in the conflict had the "opportunity" and the "capability" to carry out chemical weapons attacks.</span> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #333333; line-height: 1.4em;">Mr. Sellstrom had just arrived in Damascus to negotiate a visit to Khan al-Assal when the Aug. 21 attack occurred. He said one of his earliest reactions to the attack was that the Syrian government had to be stupid to pull it off with U.N. inspectors in town.</span></span></blockquote>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Did I miss anything? Please share your evidence and analysis and help improve the conclusions.</span></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com192tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-66777721370780051772013-12-15T00:26:00.000+00:002013-12-21T21:24:50.817+00:00Hexamine is not the Smoking GunIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
In his <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/12/responses-to-final-un-report-into-use_8611.html" target="_blank">recent analysis</a>, Dan Kaszeta provides some interesting chemical analysis of the <a href="https://unoda-web.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/report.pdf" target="_blank">recent UN report</a>, and also suggests <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hexamethylenetetramine" target="_blank">Hexamine</a> could be the smoking gun of the Ghouta attack, going so far as describing it as "very damning evidence of government culpability".</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
The reasoning could be summarized as follows:</div>
<div>
<ol>
<li>Hexamine was <a href="http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/ADM/PSB/Tender/Request_for_EOI_OPCWCDB_EOI012013.pdf" target="_blank">reported</a> by the OPCW as part of the Syrian chemical program. This implies it had a purpose in the program, rather than being used for explosives manufacturing etc.</li>
<li>Hexamine can be used to bind the HF generated during the sarin binary process.</li>
<li>No one else is known to use Hexamine for this purpose.</li>
<li>Hexamine was found in multiple samples taken by the UN in Ghouta (both Zamalka and Moadamiyah).</li>
<li>It is unlikely the opposition will choose the same HF binding chemical as the government, implying government culpability.</li>
</ol>
<div>
I believe there is a much more plausible explanation for these findings:</div>
</div>
<div>
<ol>
<li>As Dan notes, the <a href="http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/831901-overview" target="_blank">standard</a> chemical for binding HF in the sarin binary process is isopropylamine. It was used by the US for this purpose, it was declared by the OPCW (<a href="http://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/ADM/PSB/Tender/Request_for_EOI_OPCWCDB_EOI012013.pdf" target="_blank">in the same report</a>), and it was <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" target="_blank">ordered</a> by Al-Nusra in Turkey. There is no reason to believe Syria decided to replace it with Hexamine.</li>
<li>So why was it part of Syria's chemical program? This is easily explained when remembering Syria produced not only sarin, but <a href="http://www.opcw.org/index.php?eID=dam_frontend_push&docID=16874" target="_blank">also mustard gas</a>. Hexamine is a well-known stabilizer for mustard gas, <a href="http://www.google.com/patents/US2498684" target="_blank">discovered</a> in 1945 and adopted by the US Army's Chemical Warfare Service.</li>
<li>Which now requires us to explain the Hexamine findings in the field. These are not surprising given the <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hexamethylenetetramine" target="_blank">many uses</a> and <a href="http://www.amazon.com/s/ref=nb_sb_noss?url=search-alias%3Daps&field-keywords=hexamine" target="_blank">high accessibility</a> of Hexamine. Specifically of interest are its uses in explosives (which were used to disperse the sarin) and as heating tablets for camping stoves, which are probably widely used in these neighborhoods under siege.<br />This conclusion is further strengthened when considering that (a) Hexamine was reported in several samples that did not contain any indications of sarin, and (b) some samples contained other explosive-related chemicals such as TNT and trinitro triazine.</li>
</ol>
<div>
<u><br /></u></div>
<div>
<u>Update</u></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Dan Kaszeta has referred me to <a href="http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-11-9.pdf" target="_blank">this US Army publication</a>, which states on page II-38 that <i>"a small amount of degradation occurs when stored in steel ton containers for over 50 years"</i>. It should be noted this refers to the pure form of mustard gas (HD), which is different than the Levinstein Mustard (H) mentioned in the patent above (70% purity). Dan claims H is an obsolete agent, and since <i>"<a href="https://twitter.com/DanKaszeta/status/413947375972286464" target="_blank">pure HD is quite stable on its own</a>"</i>, Hexamine could not be a mustard gas stabilizer, as previously claimed.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
This is an important correction which requires revisiting the analysis.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
First, we should confirm that Syria indeed stores HD and not H. There is no direct evidence that this is the case, but given that Iraq's inferior program <a href="http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/new/documents/technical_documents/s-2006-701-munitions.pdf" target="_blank">reached</a> purity levels of 90-95%, it is fair to assume Syria does have HD.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Second, we need to confirm that HD does not require stabilizers. The above US Army publication seems to imply it doesn't, but <a href="http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/234270.pdf" target="_blank">this one</a> states <i>"The stability of Levinstein mustard which has been purified by various methods is also improved by the addition of 1 per cent hexamine"</i> (p. 42), and <a href="http://www.google.com/patents/US2780653" target="_blank">this patent</a> discusses methods of stabilizing HD, stating <i>"mustard gas thus purified still corrodes steel containers and the corrosion rate is fairly rapid at temperatures in the range of 110F. to 150F". </i>Additionally, when considering that "pure" HD is actually <a href="http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/tp49-c3.pdf" target="_blank">only 96% pure</a>, it makes sense that while it should degrade slower it might still need some stabilization.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Trying to settle this discrepancy I looked into the sources of the first publication and found the most significant one to be <a href="http://books.google.co.il/books/about/Selected_Physical_Properties_of_Ton_Cont.html?id=JisgGwAACAAJ&redir_esc=y" target="_blank">this research</a>, which I could not find in full. However, according to its summary it is based on samples taken from US stockpiles held for 50 years. Obviously, these stocks were intended for long-term storage, which according to the other sources contain stabilizers. </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
So apparently, the low degradation findings refer to the actual final product (containing Hexamine), and not the hypothetical chemical. </div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
While investigating this issue, I also found this interesting quote (<a href="http://www.google.com/patents/US2780653" target="_blank">here</a>): </div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
"Regardless of the exact reasons for the instability of Levinstein mustard, the problem is fully recognized and is extremely serious during time of war and national emergency when it becomes necessary to build up a very great strategic reserve of this chemical warfare agent in contemplation of the fact that chemical warfare may, at any time, be resorted to."</blockquote>
<div>
This brings up another option: That the Hexamine in Syria's stockpile was intended for emergency production of large amounts of H. Since HD's advantage over H is in storage and not in battlefield use, this is a very plausible scenario.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Finally, Dan's response still fails to explain why Hexamine was found in the sarin-negative samples.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
As a more general claim: Hexamine seems to have multiple uses in chemical warfare and multiple reasons to be found in the field samples (see many more <a href="http://kanoriachem.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=71" target="_blank">here</a>). Correlating the two is impossible before meticulously striking off all the alternative causes.</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<b>Conclusion: The Hexamine findings in the impact sites are not indicative of Syrian government culpability as they are not reliably linked to the Hexamine from Syria's chemical stockpiles.</b></div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Did I miss anything? Please share your evidence and analysis and help improve the conclusions.</span></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com53tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-61477888576922417892013-12-08T23:57:00.001+00:002013-12-08T23:58:45.501+00:00Review of Seymour Hersh's LRB PieceIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<br />
The London Review of Books published today a <a href="http://www.lrb.co.uk/2013/12/08/seymour-m-hersh/whose-sarin" target="_blank">long piece</a> by Seymour Hersh analyzing the intelligence surrounding the August 21st attack. In this post I'll review the main points raised in the article.<br />
<br />
<b>Sensors around chemical weapons sites were not triggered prior to the attack</b><br />
The article doesn't provide any firm evidence that supports this, but it does provide some circumstantial evidence (when they were triggered in December Obama issued a warning, while no such warning was issued in August), and it's reasonable to assume such an early warning system exists.<br />
Since we already know the sarin was <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/response-to-dan-kaszetas-chemical.html" target="_blank">probably not</a> from the government's stockpile, and that the rockets <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/analyzing-previous-umlaca-attacks.html" target="_blank">were not</a> standard chemical rockets, this new observation makes perfect sense but does not change the picture significantly. In other words, even if this attack was somehow carried out by the regime, it used non-standard weaponry and should not have triggered the alarm.<br />
<br />
<b>The US evidence relating to personnel movements and military orders was cherry picked in hind sight.</b><br />
This again makes perfect sense. There are probably millions of data points collected every day from Syria, which cannot be analyzed in real time. It's safe to assume that following the attack this data was analyzed in retrospect. The fact that despite this effort, the only evidence presented by the US was very weak and circumstantial, is a strong testimony to cherry-picking. Actually, the fact that nothing incriminating wasn't found in all these sources is strong probabilistic evidence that the regime was not involved. This is analyzed in detail <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-us-intelligence-assessment_19.html" target="_blank">here</a>.<br />
<br />
<b>The 330 mm rocket (aka UMLACA) is an improvised munition, implying it is not related to the government.</b><br />
Here Seymour is of course out of touch with the current research at Brown Moses and WhoGhouta, which clearly indicates that the rocket was developed for the Syrian Army, probably to fit its special needs in short-range urban warfare.<br />
However, this in itself is a weak indication of government involvement, since most of the opposition's heavy weaponry has been <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/reliability-of-using-munitions-to.html" target="_blank">looted</a> from Army depots.<br />
<br />
<b>The rocket's range is less than 2 km, indicating the NY Times report claiming the attack came from an Army base 9 km away is incorrect.</b><br />
This was already <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-un-report.html" target="_blank">established here</a> three months ago. However, he does say this range estimate was based on "a thorough study", so unless this refers to the WhoGhouta research, it gives yet more credibility to our range estimate.<br />
<br />
<b>US Intelligence estimates the opposition has the capability to acquire and use sarin.</b><br />
This is in line with <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" target="_blank">our analysis</a>, and while no additional hard evidence is provided, his quotes from intelligence sources seem reliable.<br />
<br />
Summary: While Hersh does not provide significant new evidence, his quotes from intelligence sources are in line with many of our findings, and his analysis provides much-needed counterweight to the many erroneous reports in the media.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com71tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-24919169542647238572013-12-02T02:42:00.001+00:002013-12-04T02:59:14.800+00:00Response to New Brown Moses TheoryIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<br />
In his <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/11/new-key-evidence-in-understanding.html" target="_blank">latest blog post</a>, Brown Moses has updated two key points in his analysis of the August 21st attack:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li>Following the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/geolocating-new-umlaca-video.html" target="_blank">recent UMLACA video</a>, and after consulting with warhead expert Richard Lloyd, he estimates the UMLACA range at 2.5 km, which is consistent with <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/umlaca-simulation.html" target="_blank">our findings</a>.<br />Although Brown Moses has never officially claimed a longer range, his <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/09/who-was-responsible-for-august-21st.html" target="_blank">original analysis</a> assumed a range of 6-8 km to army sites (<a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/08/finding-exact-location-of-alleged.html" target="_blank">more details here</a>). </li>
<li>He decided to replace his own <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/08/finding-exact-location-of-alleged.html" target="_blank">trajectory analysis</a> (pointing North) with those reported by the UN and Al Jazeera (West to North-West).</li>
</ol>
<br />
These updates are substantial in two aspects:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li>So far the WhoGhouta blog was the only source to claim the 2.5 km range. Having a warhead expert and the leading blogger on Syria issue a similar estimate lends much-needed credibility to this number.</li>
<li>This officially refutes the HRW <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/dispatches-mapping-sarin-flight-path" target="_blank">"trajectory intersection" theory</a> (also <a href="http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/world/europe/syria-united-nations.html?_r=0" target="_blank">published</a> in the NY Times), which was probably the main rationale for regime culpability in Western public opinion.</li>
</ol>
<br />
<div>
While those of us who know the details, have long ignored this theory, we should remember the mainstream understanding is still heavily based on this kind of discredited evidence. So whether or not Brown Moses' updates indicate opposition culpability (he argues they do not), it is important that HRW and the Times be aware of these developments, and be allowed to correct their reports. If anyone has relevant connections, feel free to use them and let us know their response. Ideally, this would be done by Brown Moses himself.</div>
<div>
Just to clarify: Brown Moses has never supported this theory, and based his support of government culpability on his (much more reliable) analysis of the munitions used.</div>
<br />
As to the analysis itself, I believe it suffers from two weak points:<br />
<br />
<h3>
Trajectories</h3>
Brown Moses decided to replace his own trajectory analysis with those reported by the UN and Al Jazeera, which are both highly unreliable:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li><b>UN Trajectory - </b>Normally, a UN report would always be the preferable source of information when available, but in this case their error is so obvious and easy to verify that it can't be used. Any theory relying on the UN azimuth must explain why <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/impact-site-analysis.html" target="_blank">this analysis</a> of impact site 1 is wrong. Such strong evidence cannot be simply ignored.</li>
<li><b>Al Jazeera trajectories - </b>Unlike the UN, Al-Jazeera are not a reliable source for the Syrian conflict. They are owned by the government of Qatar and have shown strong pro-opposition bias. Since they don't provide any evidence on how the azimuths were calculated we cannot use their data. <br />An example of their low standards is evident when they claim a 5-10 km range for the UMLACA - a number which they do not explain, we know to be wrong, and seems to have been arbitrarily chosen so it matches army positions.</li>
</ol>
We have <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/impact-site-analysis.html" target="_blank">three strong indications</a> of a northern source for the Zamalka attack. There is currently no other reliable evidence to support a different trajectory.<br />
<br />
<h3>
Control of Qaboun</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The impression from watching the Qaboun videos is clearly of an area that is not under firm government control. Movements in open areas are done by armored vehicles, with troops mostly operating under cover.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
However, an UMLACA launch is a complex operation involving two trucks and multiple people operating in the open. In all UMLACA launches <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/launchers-for-munitions-linked-to.html" target="_blank">documented</a> so far we see troops comfortably operating around the launcher unprotected. It just doesn't seem to be intended for front-line operation.<br />
<br />
More analysis on the status of Qaboun on August 21st is ongoing and will be updated here.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
Update: In the comments below Amund Hesbol analyzed news reports from Qaboun to build a map of the front line. It is still work in progress, but seems to indicate the positions suggest by Brown Moses are under rebel control.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiae2rps3fPMBqyHZ65jUVaoAS09DWcKnxJkdEq_RGz_P2IPHBUs97g1GEtUqSEHTkHGQpC-X8yN-MhyCBHhTN5D1VMM8n9hJlQR9ZoUKk7iueMAM5oNp1uiJPkcgZqh0Ke2KvynCEAUBA/s1600/Qaboun+Amund.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="169" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEiae2rps3fPMBqyHZ65jUVaoAS09DWcKnxJkdEq_RGz_P2IPHBUs97g1GEtUqSEHTkHGQpC-X8yN-MhyCBHhTN5D1VMM8n9hJlQR9ZoUKk7iueMAM5oNp1uiJPkcgZqh0Ke2KvynCEAUBA/s320/Qaboun+Amund.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Update 2: Charles Wood prepared a map of ranges from the launch location proposed by Brown Moses. It indicates that the farthest impact sites may be beyond UMLACA range. However, it should be noted that except for sites marked UN-1 and UN-2, these were reported to HRW by local activists and were not independently verified.<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_9bVLWkpCdOf6rUCCt2B3kY85qaYHKhRKrpdg6AVYOCmOOHEoFjTsdP19RKXl73tL7ocl3i9yri-QVndnqWWaoZtq2Lp7LZj0QxhqHzoXbLLEFwL9JmR8206AqI-BdueR9QiStTIkiC4/s1600/Qaboun+Wood.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="223" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEj_9bVLWkpCdOf6rUCCt2B3kY85qaYHKhRKrpdg6AVYOCmOOHEoFjTsdP19RKXl73tL7ocl3i9yri-QVndnqWWaoZtq2Lp7LZj0QxhqHzoXbLLEFwL9JmR8206AqI-BdueR9QiStTIkiC4/s320/Qaboun+Wood.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
Update 3: Charles Wood went through numerous videos from <a href="http://www.youtube.com/user/fightersGhouta/videos" target="_blank">this channel</a>, and concluded the following.<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 19px; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">"With absolute certainty all Government positions between Fares al Khouri in Jobar and 6th Tishreen South of Qabon were under sustained insurgent attack in the lead-up to August 21 and afterwards. By sustained attack, I include mortaring and sniping from positions overlooking the army base. e.g. sniping"</span></span><br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Last, the new theory doesn't explain why the government chose to use low quality sarin and a low-quality chemical weapon instead of the weapons they acquired and tested over the many years of their chemical program.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Conclusion: While Brown Moses' new theory addresses the UMLACA range problem, it raises other issues which make it an unlikely explanation of the August 21st attack.</b></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com83tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-63514973057902976442013-11-29T02:05:00.003+00:002013-11-30T12:39:16.915+00:00Geolocating New UMLACA VideoIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<br />
<a href="http://humanrightsinvestigations.org/2013/11/28/evidence-ghouta-chemical-weapons-rockets-fired-from-rebel-areas/" target="_blank">HRI found</a> this video showing another UMLACA launch.<br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/5HWXqd69Vsc?rel=0" width="420"></iframe>
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
The location seems like a perfect match to <a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lat=33.477431&lon=36.290583&z=19&m=b" target="_blank">Qadam railway station</a>. This image shows the location of the camera and the apparent launch direction - 100 degrees (East). </div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivfcbM9z9G1plHG3QBNVeV0gLkMXywP28JBSvHAjO5hyGCjrYh6OTj9ee_NQex_9FpdSYA5-etRpAuOJYCpN5Pw38ZnvJF-UOhAKMmaR4r-dUFAE_Uc1uX-iyOlWvHf8allcopZBz8YX8/s1600/Qadam+launch.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="280" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEivfcbM9z9G1plHG3QBNVeV0gLkMXywP28JBSvHAjO5hyGCjrYh6OTj9ee_NQex_9FpdSYA5-etRpAuOJYCpN5Pw38ZnvJF-UOhAKMmaR4r-dUFAE_Uc1uX-iyOlWvHf8allcopZBz8YX8/s320/Qadam+launch.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
The video gives the most accurate evidence so far of the conventional UMLACA's range, being launched here at a distance of 1.9 km (details <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/umlaca-simulation.html" target="_blank">here</a>).<br />
<br />
Following 1.9 km in that azimuth falls between an area marked as "Palestine camp" and the Al Tadamoun neighborhood, both marked <a href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/68/Military_situation_in_Damascus_region_as_of_15th_of_September_2013.png" target="_blank">here</a> to be under rebel control. Al-Tadamoun is often mentioned as the site of clashes between government and rebel forces.<br />
<br />
At 1.9 km and 101.3 degrees there is a large industrial building there, which might have been the target.<br />
<br />
Some of you may remember we've already seen an UMLACA launch from Qadam station (this is very likely the larger version of the UMLACA - see discussion in comments):<br />
<br /></div>
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<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/5ddlAXHmfLQ?rel=0" width="420"></iframe>
</div>
</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
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Overall, an interesting finding, which agrees with our previous estimates. Thanks Mark/HRI!<br />
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<u>Update:</u><br />
<br />
Going over all the videos related to the Qadam station indicate it is under government control, and frequently attacked by rebel forces. A major attack occurred on January 27-30th, 2013, which resulted in rebel forces capturing at least part of the station. It is documented in the following videos:<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/fX8aXw6ik14?rel=0" width="560"></iframe>
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
Shows forces carrying the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Islamic_State_of_Iraq_and_the_Levant" target="_blank">ISIS</a> flag fighting in <a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lat=33.474516&lon=36.292278&z=19&m=b" target="_blank">this area</a> to the south of the station.</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/gC1Knny-6j4?rel=0" width="560"></iframe>
</div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
More fighting in the same area, and then capturing a few buildings inside the station (probably <a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lat=33.474221&lon=36.290344&z=19&m=b" target="_blank">these</a>).</div>
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<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
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<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/mI66SQ0jbbY?rel=0" width="560"></iframe>
</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
More fighting inside the station (probably <a href="http://wikimapia.org/#lat=33.475042&lon=36.292120&z=19&m=b" target="_blank">here</a>).</div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
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<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/KxzWcxvJJtA?rel=0" width="560"></iframe>
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<br /></div>
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This seems to be deeper inside, not clear where exactly.</div>
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<br /></div>
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<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/uObG8Q4V4d8?rel=0" width="560"></iframe>
</div>
<br />
This video is said to show regime jet shelling in the exact locations found above.<br />
<br />
Update: In a comment below Charles Wood points to another video showing rebels inside the northern part of the station.<br />
<br />
This brings up an interesting scenario: We have <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/analyzing-previous-umlaca-attacks.html" target="_blank">strong evidence</a> of UMLACAs with incendiary warheads falling in Darayya a few weeks earlier (most likely launched from the nearby Mazzeh airport). Since we already know Qadam station is an UMLACA launch site, it is definitely plausible it too had incendiary UMLACAs and a launcher stationed there during the opposition raid. They could be the ones later repurposed to carry sarin and used on August 21st (as described <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">here</a>).<br />
This is of course mere speculation, but it does provide a plausible example for the "captured UMLACAs" theory.<br />
<br /></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com110tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-4647749497735577102013-11-09T01:32:00.001+00:002013-11-16T03:31:46.465+00:00Response to Dan Kaszeta's Chemical Analysis<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 21px;">If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 21px;">.</span><br />
<br />
Brown Moses recently published a <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/11/industrial-and-economic-aspects-of.html" target="_blank">detailed response by Dan Kaszeta</a> to this blog’s <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/chemical-analysis.html" target="_blank">chemical analysis</a> and estimate of <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" target="_blank">sarin production complexity</a>.<br />
<br />
First, thanks for publishing it. The more opinions and evidence we gather, the better our analysis will be.<br />
<br />
<h3>
Summary of Dan's Response</h3>
<br />
Dan generally agrees that the sarin used in Zamalka was of low quality and lacked stabilizers. However, he believes this is not the result of underground manufacturing, but rather a result of Syria having a chemical program similar to the one Iraq had during the Iraq-Iran war. Specifically:<br />
Sarin's main precursor (Methylphosphonyl difluoride) is produced at low purity and stored without stabilizers. When the need comes, it is mixed with isopropyl to create sarin, poured into the munitions and quickly shipped to the battlefield, before it degrades.<br />
<br />
He believes Syria chose this process due to the technical difficulties of producing high purity sarin, which he bases on the following claims:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>"The US and USSR made Sarin in poor to mediocre condition for years before perfecting the process".</li>
<li>"Iraq devoted a large effort to manufacturing nerve agents and did so in large quantities during the Iran-Iraq war. The size, expense, and scope of the Iraqi industrial program is well documented by UNSCOM and UNMOVIC, and appears to be larger than the Syrian program. Yet it made an inferior grade of Sarin".</li>
</ul>
<br />
Additionally, he believes the opposition could not have produced the amounts of sarin used in Zamalka (several hundred kg), for the following reasons:<br />
<br />
<ul>
<li>The last underground attempt to manufacture large amounts of sarin (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarin_gas_attack_on_the_Tokyo_subway" target="_blank">Aum Shinrikyo</a>) was unsuccessful despite large investments.</li>
<li>It is a very expensive operation: “The US OTA study estimated that you needed at least $10 million in 1993 USD to get a basic setup going”.</li>
<li>Using this investment to produce conventional weapons would be much more efficient, or in his words: “Thirty million dollars buys a lot of conventional equipment that is much more immediately useful than a few tons of Sarin”.</li>
</ul>
<br />
All of these claims are incorrect or irrelevant.<br />
<br />
<h3>
Rebuttal of Claims</h3>
<br />
<b>Claim: The US and USSR took years to reach high purity (implying Syria's product would be of low quality).</b><br />
<br />
Response: Comparing a modern chemical program to ones started over 50 years ago is meaningless. Lab technology is far more advanced and know-how has dissipated. In any case, even back then the US and USSR were able to reach high purity within a few years. Why would the Syrian program not reach this ability after 30 years?<br />
<br />
<b>Claim: Iraq’s bigger chemical program never reached high purity </b><b>(implying Syria's product would be of low quality)</b><br />
<br />
This is a misunderstanding of Iraq’s program. Iraq developed agents to be used immediately in the battlefield. They therefore focused on quantities rather than shelf-life. A few relevant quotes:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>“While the purity of nerve agents produced were effective enough for immediate use on the battlefield during the Iran-Iraq war, they were not suitable for long-term storage”. </i>(Source: <a href="http://www.un.org/depts/unmovic/new/documents/technical_documents/s-2006-701-munitions.pdf" target="_blank">UN report on Iraq’s chemical weapons</a>)</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"The short shelf life of Iraq's nerve agents was not a problem during the war with Iran, because Iraq's CW manufacturing facilities were able to produce large quantities of agent shortly before it was to be used in battle".</i> (Source: <a href="http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/960715/72569.htm" target="_blank">Declassified CIA report</a>)</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>“Although the Iraqis could have distilled their sarin to remove the excess HF, they chose not to do so because the batches of agent were intended to be used within a few days”. </i>(Source: <a href="http://ota-cdn.fas.org/reports/9344.pdf" target="_blank">A U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment report</a>)</blockquote>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"CIA analysts believe that the shelf life problem was only temporary and that the Iraqis can now produce unitary agents of sufficient quality by adding a stabilizer or improving the production process".</i> (Source: <a href="http://www.fas.org/irp/gulf/cia/960715/72569.htm" target="_blank">The same CIA report</a>)</blockquote>
Syria, however, has a completely different goal. Their chemical program is intended to counter Israel’s nuclear program. It therefore requires long-term storage and quick deployment of large quantities. A “just in time” mixing operation imposes a significant bottleneck which limits the amount of agent that can be deployed in a short time frame.<br />
<br />
Syria would therefore need either a high-purity unitary process (i.e. storage of prepared sarin ready for quick deployment), or have binary weapons that mix the agent in-flight. Recent OPCW reports state Syria’s stockpiles are held in binary form, indicating the latter is more likely.<br />
<br />
And indeed, Syria is generally believed to have large stockpiles of operational binary warheads and <i>“a high level of know-how in the chemical </i><i>weapons technology”</i> (source: <a href="http://www.defense.gouv.fr/content/download/219128/2437985/file/National%20executive%20summary%20of%20declassified%20intelligence.pdf" target="_blank">French Intelligence Report</a>). As early as 1991 the US estimated that <i>“Syria has an advanced CW program. The program has concentrated on developing sarin in two binary-type munitions: 500-kg aerial bombs and Scud B missile warheads”</i> (<a href="http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb423/docs/11.%20special%20weapons.pdf" target="_blank">source</a>).<br />
<br />
The only reason one would be forced to assume that Syria’s program is based on this non-standard “just in time” binary process is to justify why the rockets used in Zamalka don’t have binary warheads (evident by the rockets not having slanted fins or multiple nozzles, which are required to spin the rocket and mix the agents in-flight). When accepting that Zamalka was an opposition attack, these unlikely assumptions are no longer needed.<br />
<br />
Last, the claim that Iraq’s program was bigger than Syria’s is not backed by evidence. Syria’s program is active for over 30 years with access to current technology, while Iraq was a 10 year program that ended 20 years ago.<br />
<br />
<b>Claim: The last underground attempt to manufacture large amounts of sarin (<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarin_gas_attack_on_the_Tokyo_subway" target="_blank">Aum Shinrikyo</a>) was unsuccessful despite large investments.</b><br />
Aum Shinrikyo indeed developed only around 100 kg of sarin in a year and half, while the Zamalka attack required several 100 kg’s. However, the Syrian opposition has several advantages over Aum Shinrikyo:<br />
<ol>
<li>Much weaker government supervision. Treating the opposition as a non-state actor would be inaccurate, as they have full control of some areas of Syria, making them the de-facto state there. This is critical: Aum Shinrikyo had stopped their process several times and destroyed products because of police investigations. </li>
<li>Possible access to former Chemical Warfare professionals from Iraq, Libya or Syria.</li>
<li>Access to lab technology that is 18 years more advanced. This was specifically addressed in <a href="http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_Danzig_1.pdf" target="_blank">this detailed analysis</a> of Aum’s chemical program, which estimated that current lab equipment would make a similar effort much cheaper. Quotes:<br /><i>“Such an effort might be well disguised or established on a smaller scale, however, by taking advantage of the development over the last decade of powerful, low-cost <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Micro_process_engineering" target="_blank">micro-production</a> chemical capabilities”.<br />“… the chemical industry has, over the last decade, introduced modular and flexible designs where reactions may occur in a solvent-free environment, at increased concentrations and in much smaller and less expensive facilities”.</i></li>
<li>International allies. This could prove very helpful when trying to obtain regulated chemicals or lab equipment.</li>
<li>Internet access, which makes information on sarin production widely available (e.g. details of Aum Shinrikyo’s process). This can significantly accelerate production - Aum Shinrikyo scientists spent much of their time in trial and error.</li>
</ol>
Furthermore, Aum’s big investment was in a plant intended to produce 2 tons per day. The opposition does not need such a large plant to carry out the attacks documented so far.<br />
<br />
<b>Claim: "The US OTA study estimated that you needed at least $10 million in 1993 USD to get a basic setup going"</b><br />
<br />
This quote was taken out of context, without providing a link to the source (<a href="http://ota-cdn.fas.org/reports/9344.pdf" target="_blank">source here</a>). The full quote is:<br />
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<i>"Arsenal for substantial military capability (hundreds of tons of agent) likely to cost tens of millions of dollars”</i>. </blockquote>
This capacity is 100 times larger than what the opposition requires, and assumes military-grade quality, which wasn’t the case in Zamalka.<br />
<br />
Additionally, this estimate is not only in “1993 USD”, but also in 1993 technology. As described above, lab technology has advanced significantly since then.<br />
<br />
Last, it is very possible that the opposition’s plant was not built from scratch but was rather based on a captured chemical plant. Significant work would still need to be done to convert the plant to produce sarin, but it would be much easier and cheaper than building a new one. We know of at least <a href="http://world.time.com/2013/04/01/syrias-civil-war-the-mystery-behind-a-deadly-chemical-attack/?iid=tsmodule" target="_blank">one captured plant</a>.<br />
<br />
It’s hard to give an accurate estimate, but when considering all the factors above, it won’t be surprising to find that the whole operation cost less than $1 Million.<br />
<br />
<b>Claim: Using this investment to produce conventional weapons would be much more efficient, or in his words: <i>“Thirty million dollars buys a lot of conventional equipment that is much more immediately useful than a few tons of Sarin.”</i></b><br />
<br />
Besides the cost estimate being greatly exaggerated, this analysis assumes the weapons were intended to be used exclusively against regime forces. When considering the <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/03/world/meast/syria-civil-war" target="_blank">US red line</a>, the value of a well-executed false flag attack becomes obvious: The US could win the conflict for the opposition within weeks, like it did in Libya. This would make a sarin plant the best investment possible.<br />
<br />
<br />
<h3>
Additional Evidence</h3>
<br />
Besides none of the claims holding up to scrutiny, the theory fails to explain why the opposition has been <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" target="_blank">ordering</a> large quantities of chemicals only relevant to sarin production. Were they risking arrest and spending money without having a laboratory that can process them?<br />
<br />
Probably the most important aspect that Dan doesn’t address at all is the specific nature of impurities found in Zamalka. These can give us important insights into the production process. Most notable are the following two findings:<br />
<br />
<ol>
<li>Ethyl isopropyl methylphosphonate is the most common by-product reported by the UN. It is very telling, because the sarin production process introduces only chemicals with methyl groups. Ethyl groups should not be present in the final product at all. <br />This indicates that one of the alcohols used (Methanol in stage 2 and/or Isopropanol in stage 6, see appendix) was in itself impure and contained ethanol. This level of contamination occurs in very low grades of chemicals, and is a strong indication of underground production. <br />A military operation would not have any problem getting access to high-purity alcohols and paying the modest difference in price.<br />Update: Charles Wood pointed to this <a href="http://www.opcw.org/news/article/opcw-executive-council-adopts-plan-for-the-destruction-of-syrias-chemical-weapons-programme-in-t/" target="_blank">OPCW report</a> which indicates Syria's chemical weapon sites contained stocks of Isopropanol. This removes the remote possibility that they had to obtain Isopropanol elsewhere to produce sarin, and reduces the likelihood that government-produced sarin would contain Ethyl groups.</li>
<li>Hexafluorophosphate was also found by the UN. It could have come from two places:<br />(a) Residual phosphorus trichloride in step 2, which reacts with thionyl chloride in step 4 to produce Phosphorus pentachloride, and then reacts with Hydrogen Fluoride in step 5 (see appendix).<br />(b) A by-product of step 1 intended to produce Phosphorus trichloride, but also producing Phosphorus pentachloride, which later reacts with Hydrogen Fluoride in step 5 (see appendix).<br />This indicates that the sarin used in Zamalka was produced starting at step 1 or 2 (which is also consistent with the chemicals ordered in Turkey). A Military operation would have no reason to start with such basic chemicals, and could easily acquire large quantities of Dimethyl methylphosphonate of high purity, a common agent in the chemical industry, thus skipping directly to step 4.</li>
</ol>
<br />
<br />
<h3>
Summary</h3>
<br />
So the scenario proposed by Mr. Kaszeta requires us to believe that:<br />
<ol>
<li>Despite 30 years of development, and in contradiction to intelligence estimates that Syria has binary warheads, they chose to use a “just in time” binary process for its CW program – A process that would make the program an ineffective deterrent against Israel’s WMD program.</li>
<li>They chose to develop sarin from basic chemicals and use cheap low-grade alcohols, for no apparent reason, damaging product efficiency and shelf-life.</li>
<li>They chose to use a lower-quality locally developed rocket that requires them to go into rebel-held territory, instead of deploying one of the many advanced delivery devices in their disposal.</li>
<li>The opposition has been ordering chemicals that can only be used to produce sarin, without having the equipment to process them.</li>
</ol>
On the other hand, the alternative explanation only requires us to assume that one opposition faction decided to try to meet the US red line and potentially win the war, by making a modest investment.<br />
<br />
<h3>
Analysis of Amount of Sarin used</h3>
<br />
I will also take this opportunity to respond to another <a href="http://strongpointsecurity.co.uk/site/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Managing_the_deficit.pdf" target="_blank">report</a> by Dan Kaszeta, which raised doubts as to whether the number of rockets used in the attack is sufficient to cause the number of casualties reported. The calculations are based on several incorrect assumptions, but most importantly it uses data tables that assume an attack on prepared troops who wear gas masks within 15 seconds ("Based on... 15 second masking time"). This was obviously not the case in Zamalka, where sarin was inhaled by victims for a 50-100 times longer period. The longer exposure time is more than enough to account for the gap in Dan's report, making 5-12 rockets of 60 kg sarin a sufficient explanation for the number of casualties reported.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<h3>
Some Thoughts</h3>
</div>
<div>
This section contained an off-topic discussion of the public debate. Now that it is no longer being discussed, I removed it.</div>
<br />
<h3>
Appendix - Sarin Production Process</h3>
<br />
This is a process that starts with the most basic chemicals. It was found to be consistent with the chemicals ordered in Turkey, and the by-products found by the UN. In an advanced program, the first steps could be skipped by starting with more complex chemicals.<br />
<ol>
<li><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">White Phosphorus + Chlorine = <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Phosphorus_trichloride" target="_blank">Phosphorus Trichloride</a></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Phosphorus Trichloride + Methanol = <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trimethyl_phosphite" target="_blank">Trimethyl Phosphite</a></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Trimethyl Phosphite + Halo-Methane = <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dimethyl_methylphosphonate" target="_blank">Dimethyl Methylphosphonate</a></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Dimethyl Methylphosphonate + Thionyl Chloride = <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methylphosphonic_acid_dichloride" target="_blank">Methylphosphonic Dichloride</a></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Methylphosphonic Dichloride + Potassium Fluoride or Hydrogen Fluoride or Sodium Fluoride = <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Methylphosphonyl_difluoride" target="_blank">Methylphosphonyl Difluoride</a></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Methylphosphonyl Difluoride + Isopropanol / Isopropyl alcohol (+ Isopropylamine to neutralize Hydrogen Fluoride) = <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarin" target="_blank">sarin</a></span></li>
</ol>
Diagram copied from <a href="http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_Danzig_1.pdf" target="_blank">this analysis of Aum Shinrikyo's process</a> (starting from step 2 above):<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6N_v2s4R-m-FNgz8GESl5dq3qZ-vYvwsVNkgzbs3OYuLfiaJo42z8qtqjZKAMgdNhbQwY7aL0d2IfLw2obbpCo5tqfcxMXxmQBdds5lwlgt_cTtUptGCgoVKdP853brKNYm7cT6qPZvY/s1600/sarin+process.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi6N_v2s4R-m-FNgz8GESl5dq3qZ-vYvwsVNkgzbs3OYuLfiaJo42z8qtqjZKAMgdNhbQwY7aL0d2IfLw2obbpCo5tqfcxMXxmQBdds5lwlgt_cTtUptGCgoVKdP853brKNYm7cT6qPZvY/s320/sarin+process.jpg" width="232" /></a></div>
<br />
Thanks to DDTea for his contributions in analyzing the UN’s chemical report.<br />
<br />Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com79tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-48474272615651939112013-11-02T21:29:00.000+00:002014-01-24T14:02:49.515+00:00The Conclusion<div class="MsoNormal">
On August 21<sup>st</sup> the world woke up to horrifying
images of a chemical attack against civilians in Syria. Over time the details emerged:
Rockets with sarin filled warheads landed in rebel-held residential areas, killing
hundreds and injuring thousands. However, one crucial detail remained unclear:
Who carried out the attack? Each side naturally blamed the other, with western
intelligence agencies providing evidence supporting the opposition, and Russian
intelligence supporting the regime. Both sides issued biased reports with
cherry-picked evidence, only adding to the confusion.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This blog was created to counter these disinformation
campaigns, by providing an open online collaboration platform to investigate who
is behind the attack. It turned out to be very successful with dozens of
contributors meticulously documenting and analyzing thousands of pieces of
evidence. Due to the sensitivity of the matter, high standards were enforced:
Only reliable evidence verified by multiple sources may be used. No unverifiable
statements from a single source, no generous interpretations of blurred images,
and no cherry-picked circumstantial evidence. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This post summarizes this effort and provides the final
conclusion. It should not be read as an opinion piece that tries to promote a
certain point of view by choosing convenient evidence and making unsubstantiated
claim. It is the result of a ground-up process that started by meticulous
collection of <b>all</b> relevant evidence (regardless of what theory it supports),
scrutinizing each item, and examining which scenarios can best match the evidence.
At the end of the process only one scenario was found plausible. It is
presented below in a hierarchical structure that allows the reader to
independently verify <b>every</b> statement: Just follow the links and you will always
reach hard evidence: a video, an eyewitness report, a
mathematical model etc.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The only plausible
scenario that fits the evidence is an attack by opposition forces. Following
is a description of the main findings, with each one linked to the evidence
that backs it.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
Background Evidence</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This section provides background information on the attack that
is not directly related to culpability, but is necessary for understanding the
rest of the evidence.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;">On the night between August 20</span><sup><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;">th</span></sup><span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;">and 21</span></span><sup><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;">st</span></sup><span class="apple-converted-space"><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;"> </span><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;">the regime launched a wide scale attack on the Ghouta area</span></span><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;">. <o:p></o:p></span></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Evidence that a regime attack was ongoing at that time:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Regime attacks on this area are a <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rif_Dimashq_offensive_(March%E2%80%93August_2013)" target="_blank">regular occurrence </a></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/robert-fisk-in-damascus-assads-troops-may-be-winning-this-war-in-syrias-capital--untouched-by-obamas-threats-8825005.html" target="_blank">Report</a> of a non-chemical heavy artillery attack</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Opposition social media accounts reported </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">heavy
fighting at 1:15 AM, more than an hour before the chemical attack was reported.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The US reported seeing rocket launches from
government territory at about 1:00 AM (60 minutes before the chemical attack).</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">All evidence and more details <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-us-intelligence-assessment_19.html" target="_blank">here</a> (item 3)</span></li>
</ul>
</ul>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">On the same night, rockets with large sarin warheads
(hereinafter “UMLACA”) landed in Zamalka, an opposition dominant residential
area, killing hundreds.</b><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: inherit;">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Evidence that sarin poisoning occurred only in the Zamalka area:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">There are dozens of first-hand reports of sarin poisoning, and all of them are from the Zamalka area (see examples</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><a href="http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports/chemicaldamascussuburbs" style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="text-decoration: none;">here</span></a><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">,<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span></span><a href="https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports/chemicalmassacrefollowup" style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="text-decoration: none;">here</span></a><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">, </span><a href="http://www.itv.com/news/2013-08-23/we-smelt-a-strange-smell-eyewitness-accounts-of-damascus-chemical-attack/" style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="text-decoration: none;">here</span></a><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">)</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">It should be noted that initially the attack was thought to encompass nearly all of the Ghouta area. This was later found to be a misunderstanding due to nearby hospitals helping patients from Zamalka. The only town that continued to claim a chemical attack was Moadamiyah. However, this report was found highly unreliable.</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">See full analysis of the Moadamiyah site <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/what-happened-in-moadamiyah.html" target="_blank">here</a></span></li>
</ul>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Evidence that UMLACAs landed in Zamalka:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Multiple videos of UMLACA in their impact sites were
found in Zamalka, some of them reported only a few hours after the attack</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Three UMLACA impact sites are analyzed </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/impact-site-analysis.html?showComment=1383135961529#c424028846795454596" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">here</a></li>
<li><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pZA4Tknw1Zk" target="_blank">Video</a> of a fourth Zamalka impact site</li>
<li><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xrmPdJhbxcA" target="_blank">Video</a> of a fifth Zamalka impact site</li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Human Rights Watch received from local activists information
of 12 UMLACA impact site, all in the Zamalka area. Report and map </span><a href="http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria_cw0913_web_1.pdf" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">here</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">There were no reports of UMLACA impacts anywhere else.</span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Evidence that the UMLACA was the sarin delivery device:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">They were found immediately after the sarin poisoning, and in the same area. No other munitions were reported.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The impact sites and rocket remains show no signs of damage from explosives or incendiary.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The impact sites have remains of a container capable
of carrying around 60 kg sarin. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">The remains are stripe-shaped, indicating the container was designed to explode on impact, tear open, and release its content to the environment.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The UN has reported finding sarin in soil samples
taken near the impact sites.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">More details in the <a href="http://info.publicintelligence.net/UN-SyriaChemicalAttack.pdf" target="_blank">UN report</a>.</span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Evidence that hundreds were killed:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">We have not yet concluded our analysis of the number
of casualties, but most sources report numbers in the hundreds. A good analysis
of the different sources may be found <a href="http://www.uslaboragainstwar.org/article.php?id=27737" target="_blank">here</a>, reaching an estimate of less than
500.</span></li>
</ul>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Primary Evidence</span></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This section contains findings which are directly indicative of a rebel attack.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>The attack was launched from an opposition-controlled area 2 km north of Zamalka.</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li>Evidence the rockets were launched from the north:</li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">One impact site </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">was documented by locals during the UN visit,
showing a rocket buried in the ground pointing north</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">A second impact site was documented by locals a few hours after
the attack, showing an UMLACA and crater clearly pointing from north to south</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">A third impact site </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">was documented during the UN visit showing a
hole in the northern wall of an apartment</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Full details <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/impact-site-analysis.html" target="_blank">here</a></span></li>
</ul>
<li>Evidence the rockets were launched from 2 km north:</li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The UMLACA’s maximum range is 2.5 km, as indicated by:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Computer simulations.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Three videos showing launches of this rocket (although
with a different warhead).</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">A comparison to other rockets with known range</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Two expert opinions</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Full details <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/umlaca-simulation.html" target="_blank">here</a></span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The 12 impact sites seem to form an arc around this launch
site (see map below)</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">There is an open field in that area, which would make an UMLACA attack (which requires two trucks) easier to coordinate</span></li>
</ul>
<li>Evidence the area is opposition-controlled:</li>
<ul>
<li><a href="http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria_cw0913_web_1.pdf" target="_blank">A map</a> prepared by HRW shows it as "opposition contested area" (no separation between full and partial control).</li>
<li><a href="http://www.understandingwar.org/press-media/graphsandstat/battle-damascus-current-state-play-syria" target="_blank">A map</a> reportedly obtained from Syrian troops shows the area as "rebel held".</li>
<li>The <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Military_situation_in_Damascus_region_as_of_15th_of_September_2013.png" target="_blank">Wikipedia map</a> shows the area as partly "rebels held" and partly "contested". It is very far from regime held territories (excluding the freeway).</li>
</ul>
</ul>
<div style="direction: ltr;">
<b style="font-family: inherit;">The sarin was of low quality and contained impurities that indicate it was likely produced underground and not in a military plant</b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The evidence:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The UN reported finding multiple chemical impurities, indicating failures in the sarin production process.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Two of the impurities are directly indicative of low-budget underground production.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Eyewitness accounts are near unanimous in their reports
of strong odors, whereas pure sarin is odorless.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The UN report found no indication of chemical stabilizers
in their samples, which are often used in military-produced nerve agents.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Syria has an advanced chemical warfare program, which
can be assumed to produce high quality agents.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">All evidence and more details <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/chemical-analysis.html" target="_blank">here</a> and <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/response-to-dan-kaszetas-chemical.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></li>
</ul>
</ul>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">A video leaked by an anonymous source associates Liwa Al-Islam (a Jihadist rebel faction) with a rocket attack that is likely
related to the chemical attack</b><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li>Evidence the video depicts a Liwa Al-Islam attack:</li>
<ul>
<li>The cameraman describes it as such.</li>
<li>Liwa Al-Islam flags are seen on the launcher.</li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Evidence the attack in the video is related to the chemical attack</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The time reported in the video is the night of the attack.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The video contains several indications of its location, which</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/location-of-liwa-al-islam-videos.html" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">could only be matched</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">to the real location of the attack.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The video shows three UMLACA launches.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The fighters are wearing gas masks.</span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The video is unlikely to be a fabrication, since it </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">is very ineffective as propaganda, specifically:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The video quality is very poor, making it unusable
for mass media distribution.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The specific launches documented in the video are on
regime forces, and on different neighborhoods (not Zamalka).</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The videos show a Howitzer canon being used, which
was never associated with the chemical attack before.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The videos were leaked nearly 4 weeks after the
attack, when the risk of military intervention already subsided.</span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Full analysis of the videos </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">here</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></li>
</ul>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhsRaaHDhlrAs9CAnmKH87qFFV11h5rH5Ib7aV4VTQfu6DuZxQct7kNd-5BVWH7K4aWVY3cXo9Nf5RSA5BrbG9t5pA9HJ_uzEqDkBeZMhvhT61LsQcntuvnUFJJRTY8j-T74tFMgy_6Now/s1600/conclusion+map.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEhsRaaHDhlrAs9CAnmKH87qFFV11h5rH5Ib7aV4VTQfu6DuZxQct7kNd-5BVWH7K4aWVY3cXo9Nf5RSA5BrbG9t5pA9HJ_uzEqDkBeZMhvhT61LsQcntuvnUFJJRTY8j-T74tFMgy_6Now/s320/conclusion+map.jpg" height="264" width="320" /></a></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<u>Map of the attack:</u></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
Red triangle - Likely source of the attack. </div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
Red pins - UMLACA impact sites in Zamalka (with calculated trajectories in greeen). </div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
Purple pins - Areas reported to have been attacked by UMLACA in the Liwa Al-Islam videos. </div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Red line - Border between rebel-held area and contested area, according to Wikipedia's map.<br />
Blue line - Border between contested and regime-held areas (i.e. Qabun and Jobar are contested)<br />
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Secondary Evidence</span></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Despite the strong primary evidence, the rebel-attack scenario could
not be accepted without answering the following questions:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>How did the opposition obtain sarin?<o:p></o:p></b></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white;">Syrian opposition groups have been building
chemical capabilities for some time</span>, and most likely manufactured the
sarin themselves.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">Evidence that the opposition acquired sarin:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">A Syrian opposition group was arrested
in Turkey attempting to acquire chemicals that can only be used to manufacture
sarin.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Production of sarin in the quantities used to attack Zamalka is within the reach of well-funded underground organizations.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">More evidence </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">here</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">Evidence that the opposition used chemical
weapons in the past</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">While there were many claims of chemical attacks,
there was only one prior to August 21</span><sup style="font-family: inherit;">st</sup><span style="font-family: inherit;"> that had a significant number
of casualties and was consistent with a nerve-agent attack. This attack in Khan
Al Assal in April targeted </span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">Syrian troops and regime-supporting civilians</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">A UN investigator of war crimes in Syria <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22425058" target="_blank">shared</a> </span><span class="apple-converted-space" style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;">her personal impression that prior chemical attacks were
initiated solely by the opposition</span></span></li>
<li><span class="apple-converted-space" style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial;">Additionally, the UN has found strong evidence indicating two sarin attacks on Syrian soldiers occurring a few days after the Ghouta attack (details <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/01/analysis-of-second-un-report.html">here</a>).</span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Full details and m</span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">ore analysis of previous chemical attacks <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/prior-alleged-chemical-attacks.html" target="_blank">here</a></span></li>
</ul>
</ul>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">How did the opposition obtain UMLACAs?</b><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">While manufacturing sarin is a task within the capabilities
of such groups, developing a rocket with an effective chemical warhead is fairly complex.
Stealing one would also be very difficult, since Syria’s chemical weapons are
heavily guarded. However, it turns out that the UMLACA was originally designed as
an incendiary weapon, and not a chemical one. The opposition could have easily captured a stock of these
incendiary UMLACAs and refilled them with sarin.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Evidence that the UMLACA was a Syrian Army incendiary
weapon, refilled with sarin:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">All previous reports of the UMLACA with this warhead showed clear
signs of White Phosphorus or a similar incendiary surrounding the impact sites.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">These signs were not found in the impact sites of
the sarin attack in Zamalka.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Chemical and incendiary warheads have similar
designs, and in some cases the same design is used for both.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Full details <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/analyzing-previous-umlaca-attacks.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Evidence that the opposition has access to nearly every weapon
of the Syrian Army:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Raids on Syrian Army depots are a frequent occurrence.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">There are numerous videos showing the opposition using
looted weaponry, including tanks, APCs, artillery, rocket launchers, and even
surface-to-air missiles. </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">More details </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/reliability-of-using-munitions-to.html" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">here</a>.</li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">An opposition raid on a site that was likely to hold incendiary UMLACAs is documented <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/geolocating-new-umlaca-video.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></li>
</ul>
</ul>
<br />
<h3>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Refuted Contradicting Evidence</span></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">While the evidence for a rebel-attack is very strong, we
must also verify there is no strong evidence to support the competing regime-attack
theory. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">This section lists evidence which was used in the past to
imply regime culpability.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Western intelligence agencies claimed the attack spanned
a large area and was therefore beyond the capabilities of the opposition.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">As described above, this was a result of initial confusion. All first-hand accounts and UMLACA sites are in the Zamalka area. The
attack was launched from a single location by a small team, and does not
require the large-scale coordination claimed.</span></li>
</ul>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">Human Rights Watch found that two rocket trajectories reported
by the UN (one in Moadamiyha, one in Zamalka) intersect at a large Syrian Army
base.</b><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">First Trajectory (Moadamiyah): </span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The evidence indicates there was no chemical attack in Moadamiyah.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">According
to the details given by the UN, the Moadamiyah trajectory is unreliable.</span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Second trajectory (Zamalka):</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The azimuth was miscalculated by 60 degrees. It points north, not west.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Two other impact sites in Zamalka also indicated a
northern source.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The distance from Zamalka to the suspected Syrian army base is 9.5
km, while the UMLACA’s range is 2.5 km.</span></li>
</ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">See the map above for the correct source of the attack.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Full details <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-un-report.html" target="_blank">here</a></span></li>
</ul>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">The UN reported chemical stabilizers were found in the
soil samples, indicating a military source.</b><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">This was a result of a reporter misreading a
statement in the UN report. No stabilizers were found. Full details in update 2 <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-un-report.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></li>
</ul>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">The US reported rocket launches from regime-held
territory 90 minutes before poisoning reports flooded social media (i.e. 1:00 AM).</b><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">These were part of a regime conventional attack. Eyewitnesses
consistently report the chemical attack started at 2:00 AM.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Full details </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-us-intelligence-assessment_19.html" target="_blank">here</a> (item 3).</li>
</ul>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">US and German intelligence claimed to intercept calls
confirming regime culpability.</b><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">These was shown to be highly unreliable <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-us-intelligence-assessment_19.html" target="_blank">here</a> (item 4) and
<a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/other-evidence-for-regime-attack.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></li>
</ul>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>A former Syrian officer claims that he was in charge of
chemical warfare, and was ordered to use chemical weapons.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">His story was found to be unreliable, and probably an
attempt to provoke international intervention. The evidence:</span></li>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Photos of him found online indicate he was not
in military service during the war.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">His discussion of chemical weapons shows poor
understanding.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Full analysis <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/other-evidence-for-regime-attack.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></li>
</ul>
</ul>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">The US and UK intelligence claimed Syria has used chemical
weapons on a smaller scale on 14 occasions.</b><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">These were analyzed one by one, concluding that the
regime has used White Phosphorus and possibly </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-lethal_weapon" style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="text-decoration: none;">less-than-lethal</span></a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> chemical
agents against opposition fighters, but there are no reliable indications of nerve
agent use by the regime.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">A similar analysis by the Harvard Sussex program on
chemical and biological weapons reached a similar conclusion.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Full analysis <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/prior-alleged-chemical-attacks.html" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></li>
</ul>
<br />
<br />
<h3>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Refuted Supporting Evidence</span></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This section lists evidence that was claimed to support the
rebel-attack theory, but was found to be unreliable. Although not relevant to evaluating
this scenario, it is provided here to demonstrate the neutrality of the evidence
analysis process.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Local activists admitted that the poisoning was a result
of an accident involving chemicals brought from Saudi Arabia.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">A close reading of the text indicates the locals are
most likely referring to another accident and the reporter heavily edited their
quotes to make it seem related.</span></li>
</ul>
<b style="font-family: inherit;">Hostages have overheard a Skype call in which rebel
commanders admit the attack was a rebel provocation.</b><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Like the calls reported by the US and Germany, these
were most likely speculations misinterpreted as actual knowledge.</span></li>
</ul>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Full details and more cases </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">here</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">.</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Motives</span></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">To reliably determine culpability, evidence should be
accompanied by a motive. Two possible motives were found plausible:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Targeting Mistake</b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The Liwa Al-Islam videos indicate that the sarin UMLACAs
were intended to be used against regime forces, and the launches are probably in response
to the regime attack that started earlier. The attack on Zamalka may therefore
have been the result of a targeting mistake – either in azimuth calculation,
or in wrongly identifying Zamalka as regime territory.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>False flag</b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Another plausible explanation is a deliberate attack
on an opposition neighborhood, in attempt to meet the US’s red line for
intervention. This could possibly be an unauthorized decision made by the
chemical rocket team.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Detailed discussion of scenarios and motives <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/suggesting-scenarios.html" target="_blank">here</a>. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Regime Attack Alternative</span></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Besides demonstrating the high likelihood of a rebel
attack, the research also exposed the implausibility of the regime attack
scenario: To believe that the attack was carried out by the regime, one would
need to assume the following:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The regime decided to carry out a large-scale sarin attack against
a civilian population, despite (a) making steady gains against rebel positions, (b) receiving a direct threat from the US that
the use of chemical weapons would trigger intervention, (c) having constantly
assured their Russian allies that they will not use such weapons, (d) prior to
the attack, only using non-lethal chemicals and only against military targets.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The regime pressed for a UN investigation of a prior chemical attack on Syrian troops, and then decided to launch the large-scale sarin attack at the time of the team's arrival, and at a nearby location.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">To execute the attack they decided to (a) send forces into rebel-held
area, where they are exposed to sniper fire from multiple directions, (b) use locally manufactured short-range rockets, instead of any of the long-range high
quality chemical weapons in their arsenal, and (c) use low quality sarin.</span></li>
</ol>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Detailed discussion and other regime-attack scenarios </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/suggesting-scenarios.html" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">here</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">.</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><br />
<div>
<br />
<br /></div>
<h3>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Summary</span></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">An analysis of all evidence relating to the August 21st chemical attack indicate it was carried out by opposition forces. According to the most likely scenario, they used looted incendiary rockets, refilled them with sarin they manufactured themselves, and launched them from a rebel-held territory 2 km north of Zamalka.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The evidence was presented above in a unique structure that allows the reader to independently verify every claim. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">The purpose of this structure was to make sure that you, the reader, can reach one of three mindsets:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Contradicting evidence</b> – You followed the links and found
faulty evidence, or you have reliable contradictory evidence that was not yet
considered. If so, please post your findings in the page where
that evidence is discussed. We will then scrutinize it and if it holds up, the
conclusions may change. Thank you for contributing!</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Alternative theory</b> – You agree with the evidence but can
come up with an alternative theory that better explains it. So far no one was
able to come up with a plausible regime attack scenario, but maybe you can.
Post your suggested scenario <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/suggesting-scenarios.html" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">here</a> and we’ll discuss it. Thank you for
contributing!</span></li>
<li><b style="font-family: inherit;">Convinced</b><span style="font-family: inherit;"> – Awesome, glad we could be of help. All we ask is that you spread the word and help us change the mainstream perceptions. Let’s prove that an open collaborative effort can overcome governments’ propaganda and disinformation. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">This is not just an</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> intellectual experiment. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">Every day that passes with the world thinking the
regime is behind the attack, is another day where the real perpetrators are accumulating
sarin and improving their capabilities. It is just a matter of time until it is used outside Syria.</span></li>
</ol>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
Many thanks to all the contributors. Amazing work!</div>
<div>
Members of the media wishing to publish the report, please email sasa1wawa@gmail.com.</div>
</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com244tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-64032018499111426722013-10-29T01:40:00.001+00:002013-11-12T12:26:12.013+00:00Impact Site Analysis<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 21px;">If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 21px;">.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This post estimates the direction of the rocket trajectories, by analyzing the impact sites in Zamalka. </span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<br />
<h3>
Impact Site 1</h3>
<br /></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This impact site has a rocket dug into the ground which was investigated by the UN, and which they believe was undisturbed. The UN visit to the site is well documented (</span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N_4CoM3kJP8" style="font-family: inherit;">Video 1</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MmP6wPdTIUM" style="font-family: inherit;">Video 2</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=H4jx5V2PvnE" style="font-family: inherit;">Video 3</a>)<span style="font-family: inherit;">, and seen in this photo:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="http://www.popularresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/UN-inspection-team-takes-samples-in-Syria.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="211" src="http://www.popularresistance.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/UN-inspection-team-takes-samples-in-Syria.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
</div>
</div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This location was accurately identified <a href="http://storyful.com/stories/63271" target="_blank">here</a>. </span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The video below shows the rocket from </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">several directions, and it is clear its angle with the wall is 60-70 degrees</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">:</span><br />
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/MmP6wPdTIUM" width="420"></iframe></div>
</div>
<div>
<div>
<div style="text-align: center;">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">A few screenshots:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigfC2t08JdMsNSNdX801IUuGiS-k5nbSgshJhToLACNMXOnWPChIXdDtjOwwRnXxukW6reWngGczAU0_eNcb0jWsQHSBO7mce1LuiIoppNoBLqlWKDVJ3pi0NhHfveA3mMenfHTGAIxLY/s1600/buried+angles.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="177" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEigfC2t08JdMsNSNdX801IUuGiS-k5nbSgshJhToLACNMXOnWPChIXdDtjOwwRnXxukW6reWngGczAU0_eNcb0jWsQHSBO7mce1LuiIoppNoBLqlWKDVJ3pi0NhHfveA3mMenfHTGAIxLY/s320/buried+angles.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
</div>
<div>
<br /></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Drawing a 60-70 degree angle to the wall on a satellite image gives us a northern trajectory (The red trajectory is what the UN mistakenly <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-un-report.html" target="_blank">reported</a>).</span></div>
<div>
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjykNYTY_7gXVjw_gmFWQuNPh7AhOy4TLRvSqSqOXcRJhDWPhKF_vgWZieezz6C_akgbxWmMxIZZK9S_lpLl45Hmg9WvWEsHGqC7zfUJuy75rva9JVWi3gDVTpP2OeD66Q_fZBWjoSQ48c/s1600/buried+angles.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="clear: right; float: right; margin-bottom: 1em; margin-left: 1em;"><br /></a><a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1lC9YeqBeL484WN9bIYSuDfV87khXY-Q3IIi1XNYCElmYS3tzc-q8WLRKBLlsAu4Kc4CRpgm629jj292oritXZDX-8MiaGJQmjvXTkNx7P8KPX2F5gZrO8jVa0fdIXV749P1m0tBWfzY/s1600/umlaca.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" height="224" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEi1lC9YeqBeL484WN9bIYSuDfV87khXY-Q3IIi1XNYCElmYS3tzc-q8WLRKBLlsAu4Kc4CRpgm629jj292oritXZDX-8MiaGJQmjvXTkNx7P8KPX2F5gZrO8jVa0fdIXV749P1m0tBWfzY/s320/umlaca.jpg" width="320" /></span></a></div>
<div>
<br /></div>
</div>
<div>
<h3>
Impact Site 2</h3>
<div>
<br /></div>
</div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This site was <a href="http://storyful.com/stories/63271" target="_blank">matched to a location</a> 100 meters east of site 1. This photo of the site (and more <a href="http://thekurdishcause.blogspot.co.uk/2013/08/analysis-on-origin-of-cw-missile-191.html" target="_blank">here</a>) clearly show the crater is oriented at a right angle to the plough lines:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<br />
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjUQ3Pfv-v3K7HD_n7INjeMxR8-NXGZXup05fs3zU_-CBpHbDe9-pzTjgCoIyRUg96Og3hEb3yeD7GMvl7YYp3c4RWh5P4Zv61PjtJpYy3rnItFc_L9paqJrVu_mFhzoTXxPvw_RbHE29w/s640/Pic-3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjUQ3Pfv-v3K7HD_n7INjeMxR8-NXGZXup05fs3zU_-CBpHbDe9-pzTjgCoIyRUg96Og3hEb3yeD7GMvl7YYp3c4RWh5P4Zv61PjtJpYy3rnItFc_L9paqJrVu_mFhzoTXxPvw_RbHE29w/s320/Pic-3.jpg" width="320" /></span></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Placing this on the satellite image gives us another northern trajectory:</span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
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<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEizQ5JjvPzah4cGDMKLi94DivNdjVAAnjc89PJFcxDsHQPot1TTGiSe_Om8M2Qt0_k8IDMiPHKnGZlU9v4mQDdw7Sevv25gpdkfy9nvZTD9Zi6nsJ4NwcPvEor5bDgqrUbf5qWw0fHCsXM/s1600/umlaca+197.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><img border="0" height="213" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEizQ5JjvPzah4cGDMKLi94DivNdjVAAnjc89PJFcxDsHQPot1TTGiSe_Om8M2Qt0_k8IDMiPHKnGZlU9v4mQDdw7Sevv25gpdkfy9nvZTD9Zi6nsJ4NwcPvEor5bDgqrUbf5qWw0fHCsXM/s320/umlaca+197.jpg" width="320" /></span></a></div>
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<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<h3>
Impact Site 3</h3>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">This site is a direct hit to a building, examined by the UN investigators in the following video:</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<iframe allowfullscreen="" frameborder="0" height="315" src="//www.youtube.com/embed/unjKmIr6ruQ" width="420"></iframe></div>
<br />
At minute 1:40 we see the impact hole at the northern wall and no signs of an angled impact. <span style="font-family: inherit;">At minute 1:28 a shadow line is seen, indicating sunlight is coming from behind and slightly to the left. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">In t</span>his <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=unjKmIr6ruQ">video</a> the team is seen exiting the building from the other side. At minute 2:11 shadows are seen on a balcony in the background:<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjtMVBcjcuhNMR534ZWU81BTtCuby7VijB83EE8nSE9oUr99yyfnsBwnV-GZoPDNXfqlCY6K-OsHs6OH_mGgSuZy9PTjaFYfgtF-gHDgnUbQAmGj1GRY6r6VX-JuRKErJ20AWzs3Ao_zLM/s1600/impact+site+3.jpg" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="178" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEjtMVBcjcuhNMR534ZWU81BTtCuby7VijB83EE8nSE9oUr99yyfnsBwnV-GZoPDNXfqlCY6K-OsHs6OH_mGgSuZy9PTjaFYfgtF-gHDgnUbQAmGj1GRY6r6VX-JuRKErJ20AWzs3Ao_zLM/s320/impact+site+3.jpg" width="320" /></a></div>
<br />
These confirm the angle of the sun as coming from behind and slightly to the left of the impacted wall (which is on the opposite side).<br />
<br />
Based on the UN report (Page 26) this visit occurred at August 29th 13:35. Since the <a href="http://suncalc.net/#/33.5111,36.3064,13/2013.09.27/13:40" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">sun at that time</a> was at South-South-West, this means the balcony is facing north, and providing us <span style="font-family: inherit;">a third indication of a northern trajectory.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Conclusion: The rockets were launched from a location north to Zamalka.</b></span></div>
</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com87tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-91319235284766134372013-10-13T12:45:00.002+01:002013-10-13T12:45:36.371+01:00Victim CountThis post will try to estimate the number of victims in the attack.<br />
<br />
At this point it is used to coordinate evidence collection, and does not contain any analysis. Please post your evidence in the comments.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com44tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-11624355914176272262013-10-11T05:30:00.001+01:002013-11-03T02:05:28.387+00:00Suggesting Scenarios<div class="MsoNormal">
This page was used to discuss possible scenarios and their fit to the evidence. A conclusion has since been reached and is available <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">here</a>.<br />
<br />
===<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">After weeks of meticulous collection and evaluation of
evidence, it is time to reach a conclusion as to what exactly happened on
August 21<sup>st</sup> in Zamalka.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This will be an ongoing process in which suggestions will be
brought forward and examined in an open discussion. Suggested scenarios will be
examined on two criteria:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Fit to Evidence – The scenario should explain ALL the
evidence well. In other words, a good scenario is one that is not contradicted
by evidence.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Scenario Plausibility – The scenario should be plausible by itself.
This means that regardless of the evidence, it should describe events that are
likely to happen in a situation such as the Syrian civil war.</span></li>
</ul>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">To take two extreme examples:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Claiming that aliens launched the chemical attack and then
planted all the evidence to confuse us, provides a perfect explanation for all the
evidence but is not in itself plausible, and therefore an unlikely scenario.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Claiming that no chemical attack occurred on that day is a
very plausible scenario (that’s what usually happens), but does not explain the
evidence well, and is therefore also an unlikely scenario.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b><br /></b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>The Evidence</b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The following lists all the evidence that so far withstood
scrutiny, and should therefore be addressed by proposed scenarios:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<ol>
<li>Hundreds of <a href="http://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLPC0Udeof3T4NORTjYmPoNCHn2vCByvYG">videos</a>,
social media <a href="http://storyful.com/stories/62835">reports</a> and eyewitness <a href="http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports/chemicaldamascussuburbs">testimonies</a> describe a mass poisoning event in Zamalka starting at August 21<sup>st</sup> 2:00
AM, with symptoms that are highly consistent with nerve agent poisoning:
miosis, headaches, nausea, dizziness, foaming, convulsions, loss of
consciousness, apnea and death.</li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Many <a href="http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports/chemicaldamascussuburbs">eyewitnesses</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">describe multiple rockets or shells landing in Zamalka prior to the poisoning event.
A few hours after the attack <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/08/more-videos-emerge-of-chemical-attack.html">videos and images</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">were uploaded showing several rocket remains in their impact sites.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The rockets (codename “UMLACA”) show signs indicative they
were used to deliver chemicals: small impact craters with little damage,
relatively intact rocket bodies, and remains of a container that seem to
explode on impact (e.g. Page 22 of the <a href="http://info.publicintelligence.net/UN-SyriaChemicalAttack.pdf">UN report</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">describes container remains found on a roof while the rocket body penetrated to
the floor below).</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Rockets of a similar design but with a conventional warhead were
launched by the Syrian Army on <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/09/launchers-for-munitions-linked-to.html">multiple occasions</a>.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Rockets that seem identical in design to the ones used on
August 21</span><sup style="font-family: inherit;">st</sup><span style="font-family: inherit;"> landed in rebel-held
territory in January, and <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/analyzing-previous-umlaca-attacks.html">showed signs</a> indicative of a White Phosphorus
payload. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">None of the UMLACA reports prior to August 21</span><sup style="font-family: inherit;">st</sup><span style="font-family: inherit;"> are consistent with a
sarin payload.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The rockets found on August 21</span><sup style="font-family: inherit;">st</sup><span style="font-family: inherit;"> were launched from
an <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/mapping-source-of-attack.html">area</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">that is about 2.5 km north of Zamalka.<br />A scenario that assumes a different
launch area must show how all UMLACA <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/umlaca-simulation.html">range calculations</a> are incorrect and
provide an alternative range calculation that exceeds </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">3.5 km. Alternatively it would have to show why the three impact sites analyzed
<a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-un-report.html">here</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">do not indicate a northern source.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">This area is <a href="http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/68/Military_situation_in_Damascus_region_as_of_15th_of_September_2013.png">not under regime control</a>, with parts of it rebel-controlled and other parts contested </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The UN investigation team has found multiple indications
that sarin was used in the attack.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The sarin used in the attack was of <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/chemical-analysis.html">low quality</a>.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Zamalka is the first alleged chemical attack targeting a
residential rebel-held territory. In all <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/prior-alleged-chemical-attacks.html">previous cases</a> victims were males of
fighting age. It is also the first attack in rebel-held territory to result in
a large number of deaths.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">On March 19</span><sup style="font-family: inherit;">th</sup><span style="font-family: inherit;"> in Khan Al Assal, Syrian troops and
regime-supporting civilians were poisoned, possibly by sarin or chlorine, killing
26 and injuring 86, making it the deadliest chemical attack prior to August 21</span><sup style="font-family: inherit;">st</sup><span style="font-family: inherit;">.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">On September 16</span><sup style="font-family: inherit;">th</sup><span style="font-family: inherit;"> three <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/liwa-al-islam-videos-improved-quality.html">videos</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> were published anonymously which claim to show Liwa Al-Islam launching UMLACAs
at regime forces in Qabun and Jobar, on the date of the chemical attack, while
wearing gas masks.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">These videos contain information indicating that its <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/location-of-liwa-al-islam-videos.html">claimedlocation</a> is very similar to the real launch site.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">A scenario should choose whether to treat these videos as real
(implying certain discrepancies), or as a fabrication (implying another set of discrepancies),
or possibly provide some other explanation. See full discussion <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html">here</a>.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">A scenario should choose whether or not to claim a chemical
attack in Moadamiyah, again with each explanation implying a different set of
discrepancies. See full discussion <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/what-happened-in-moadamiyah.html">here</a>.</span></li>
</ol>
<o:p></o:p><br />
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<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="font-family: inherit;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Please comment if you think I missed any verified evidence of importance.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">I will start off the discussion with a few suggested scenarios.
After each scenario I will examine its fit to the evidence and its plausibility. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Within each scenario, each piece of evidence receives one of five scores:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Match – The evidence is what one would expect to see under this scenario.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Medium Match – The evidence is not what one would expect to see
under this scenario, but still reasonable.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Weak Match – The evidence is unlikely under this scenario,
yet not impossible.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">No Match – The evidence directly contradicts the scenario.
For the scenario to be considered, this evidence must be disproved.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">n/a – Not applicable in this scenario.</span></li>
</ul>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Scenario 1 – Regime Attack / The Mainstream Scenario</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This is the scenario dominating most media reports, and
promoted by <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/the-us-intelligence-assessment_19.html.">western intelligence agencies</a>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">According to this scenario, the regime has grown so frustrated
with its inability to rid Damascus suburbs of rebels, that it decided to use
chemical weapons to achieve a breakthrough. The regime was confident that there
will be no international implications, since its previous smaller-scale
chemical attacks had no repercussions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The attack was <a href="http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/09/17/dispatches-mapping-sarin-flight-path">launched</a> from Syrian bases on Mt. Qasiun, using rockets fitted with sarin warheads – a chemical agent that the regime has
been known to develop in large quantities for over 20 years under its advanced
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction#Chemical_Weapons">chemical warfare program</a>. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The area of Zamalka was attacked by UMLACA rockets, while
Moadamiyah was attacked with M14 rockets.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Later, in an attempt to relieve international pressure, the regime fabricated
videos implicating Liwa Al Islam in the attack.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Fit to evidence:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li>Match</li>
<li>Match</li>
<li>Match</li>
<li>Match</li>
<li>Match</li>
<li><b>No Match</b>. The source of the attack is nowhere near Mt.
Qasiun.</li>
<li>n/a</li>
<li>Match</li>
<li><b>Weak Match</b>. The Syrian chemical program is a strategic asset
intended to counter Israel’s nuclear weapons, and is considered very advanced. It
is unlikely that after 20 years of development they cannot manufacture high
quality sarin.</li>
<li><b>Weak Match</b>. The scenario claims the regime expected no
response to the August 21<sup>st</sup> attack, based on the responses to previous
attacks. This is unlikely, given the dramatic differences between this attack
and previous attacks.</li>
<li><b>Weak Match</b>. Victims in Khan Al Assal are Syrian troops and
regime supporters.<br />Note: The mainstream scenario does not claim an accident or false flag in Khan
Al Assal.</li>
<li>Medium Match. The Liwa Al-Islam videos are a <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html">weak fabrication job</a>, and were published when international pressure was already relieved.</li>
<li>Match.</li>
<li>Medium Match. The Liwa Al Islam videos have <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html">several discrepancies</a>
when considered a fabrication. </li>
<li>Medium Match. The Moadamiyah scene has <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/what-happened-in-moadamiyah.html">numerousinconsistencies</a> which make it unlikely to be a chemical attack site.</li>
</ol>
<o:p></o:p><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
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<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Scenario Plausibility:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The
first thing nearly everyone noted when this scenario was proposed was
how suicidal it seems. This is best understood
when examined on a timeline:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">In
August 2012 movements of chemical weapons were detected by the west, triggering
Obama's '</span><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-09036bcb182b_story.html" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">red line</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">'
speech, which clearly conditions foreign intervention on the deployment of
chemical weapons. (a <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/07/13/syria-crisis-weapons-idUSL6E8ID5O020120713">reasonable explanation</a> for these movements was protection from opposition advances, and indeed </span><a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/chemical-weapons-watchdog-chief-inspectors-need-to-check-more-than-20-sites-in-syria/2013/10/09/a226d076-30da-11e3-ad00-ec4c6b31cbed_story.html" style="font-family: inherit;">later reports</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">indicated that all weapons are currently in regime controlled areas).</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">In
December 2012 Obama goes further and </span><a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/03/world/meast/syria-civil-war" style="font-family: inherit;">issues</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">
a direct warning stating: "if you make the tragic mistake of using these
weapons, there will be consequences".</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">During
this time, the regime constantly </span><a href="http://blogs.aljazeera.com/topic/syria/russia-assad-would-not-commit-political-suicide-using-chemical-arms" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">assures</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> Russia that chemical weapons will never be used.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Following
the </span><a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/19/us-syria-crisis-chemical-idUSBRE92I0A220130319" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">Khan Al-Assal</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> attack
in March 2013 which left 16 Syrian soldiers dead, the regime </span><a href="http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2013/130430_Syria.doc.htm" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">pressed</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">
for a UN investigation.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">When
the UN investigation got delayed over disagreements on its mandate, the regime invited
the Russian investigation team (who blamed the rebels).</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">In August 2013 the UN team finally arrived in Syria, and upon its arrival the regime decides to launch an
unprecedented mass-scale sarin attack on a residential area.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The
regime allows the UN to visit the attacked sites within two days of being
requested to do so.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">It
is hard to read this as anything but an attempt by the regime to bring international
military intervention to Syria. This seems even weirder when considering these points:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Even
if for some reason the regime has decided to kill hundreds of innocent
civilians, it could have easily done so with conventional weapons.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">No
explanation is given as to why, after months of fighting and the regime making
steady gains, did its “frustration” suddenly become so unbearable that it had
to launch a chemical attack.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Summary: This scenario is highly
implausible, and is in strong contradiction to the evidence.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Many analysts felt uncomfortable with the mainstream
scenario, and proposed some variations on it. some of these somewhat increase its plausibility
and explain some of the evidence, but are still far from likely. A few
examples:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The attack was ordered by a rogue officer. This may explain
the poor strategic choice, but imposes other difficulties such as gaining
access to sarin, reaching the launch location in rebel-held territory and not
explaining the Khan Al Assal attack. Furthermore, rogue operations on this
scale are very rare to begin with.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">It was an intentional regime attack, but was not meant to be
so deadly, using the wrong concentrations of sarin. As discussed <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/prior-alleged-chemical-attacks.html">here</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">sarin is intended to kill. You use it when you want an attack to be as
lethal as possible. If the intention is instead to terrorize there are much
better weapons, such as napalm.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">It was an intentional regime attack on a military target,
but missed its target. Looking at the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/mapping-source-of-attack.html">map</a> of the attack </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">shows this is implausible. If the target was not the residential areas but the
front line, it would mean the regime sent the attackers to infiltrate rebel
territory only to attack the front lines from behind – an act that makes no
military sense.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">So the mainstream story and its variations don’t seem to
make any sense, but is there another regime attack scenario that was not yet suggested
and is more reasonable? Here’s the best I can think of, but if anyone can come
up with a better one, please share.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Scenario 2 – Regime Attack / Double False-Flag Scenario</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In this scenario, the regime decided to launch a chemical
attack on rebel residential areas, but to avoid international response tried to
make it look like a rebel false-flag attack (hence a double false-flag).<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">They decided to use the UMLACA, a proprietary design which
is not documented and will be easier to attribute to the opposition, and filled
it with sarin that was intentionally manufactured in a sloppy manner.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">On the night of the attack an UMLACA team and launch vehicle
infiltrated rebel-held territory to reach the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/mapping-source-of-attack.html">launch site</a>,
launched over 10 sarin rockets, and returned safely to base.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">After the plan failed miserably and the regime was blamed, they tried to divert the
pressure by fabricating the Liwa Al Islam videos.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Moadamiyah – In this scenario the M14 could not be the
chemical weapon, since it is easily associated with the Syrian arsenal, and in
general attacking two locations far apart undermines the credibility of the
operation. So in this scenario Moadamiyah was attacked only by conventional
weapons, and the sarin findings there are a result of contamination and patient
evacuation from Zamalka.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Khan Al Assal may have been a false-flag to gain
international support or an accident during a previous double false-flag attempt.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Fit to evidence:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This scenario fits all evidence well.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Scenario Plausibility:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Probably the first double false-flag operation in history
(anyone knows otherwise?)</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Seems like a very big risk to take. The western narrative
was pro-opposition, and it seems over-optimistic to assume the west will
believe this was a false-flag attack, rather than a regime attack.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">If the regime intended to convince the world this is a rebel
false-flag, they should have prepared an extensive Psychological Warfare
campaign, including high quality fabricated evidence. In practice, the evidence
presented by the regime was so weak that it is very unlikely to be a
fabrication. This includes <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html">two ambiguous phone calls</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">,
discovery of a <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html">rebel cache</a> with some multi-purpose chemicals and gas masks</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">,
and undocumented <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/08/24/us-syria-crisis-jobar-idUSBRE97N04T20130824">claims</a> of soldiers “suffocating” when entering Jobar</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">As long as three weeks after the attack, Assad still did not
want to commit to a specific theory, stating <a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/president-al-assads-interview-with-cbs-news/5349165">“</a><a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/president-al-assads-interview-with-cbs-news/5349165">We’re not
sure that anything happened</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/president-al-assads-interview-with-cbs-news/5349165">”</a>. </span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">It was only four weeks after the attack, when international
pressure has already subsided, that significant evidence was published, namely the
Liwa Al Islam videos. However, these too would make for a <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html">very poor fabrication job</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">that was unusable for propaganda.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">So at this point it doesn’t seem like there’s any plausible regime-attack
scenario that fits the evidence.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">But what about a rebel-attack scenario? Let’s examine one
option.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Scenario 3 – Rebel Attack</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">According to this scenario, extreme fundamentalist factions
in the Syrian opposition have been building chemical capabilities for some time
(possibly related to groups carrying <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chlorine_bombings_in_Iraq">chemical attacks</a>
in Iraq). The motivation may have been to counter the Syrian Army’s military
advantage, or for carrying out a false-flag operation that will meet the US’s
red line requirement.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">While they were relatively successful in <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html">producing sarin</a>,
they still did not have the technology to build an efficient delivery device.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In one of the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/reliability-of-using-munitions-to.html">many raids</a> on Syrian Army bases, they captured one of the regime’s UMLACA launcher and rockets,
including some with <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/analyzing-previous-umlaca-attacks.html">incendiary warheads</a>. They realized these can be easily refilled with sarin, creating a very
efficient chemical rocket.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Prior to August 21<sup>st</sup>, they made several <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/prior-alleged-chemical-attacks.html">chemical attacks</a>
on Syrian troops,
including in Darayya, Khan Al Assal and Barzeh, and possibly many more which
the Syrian Army chose not to report. It is also likely that many of these
attacks did not cause casualties due to high preparedness among Syrian troops. Since
we don’t have direct evidence on when the opposition gained access to the UMLACA,
it is hard to estimate whether these attacks used the UMLACA or more primitive
devices.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr;">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">On the night between August 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup>
the regime launched a wide scale attack as part of its <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rif_Dimashq_offensive_(March%E2%80%93August_2013)">Rif Dimashq Offensive</a>. In response, a Liwa Al Islam chemical unit positioned itself in a <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/mapping-source-of-attack.html">clearing west to Irbin</a> and proceeded to attack government forces advancing in Qabun and Jobar, using
the chemical UMLACAs. Part of this attack was recorded on <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/liwa-al-islam-videos-improved-quality.html">video</a>,
and later shared among acquaintances until leaked.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">At some point the unit decided to target Zamalka. Several
sub-scenarios may explain this decision:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Scenario 3.1 – Misreading the battle situation. In this scenario the group is not composed of locals, and were misinformed to think Zamalka is an abandoned area (like Jobar and Qabun). They detected (or thought they detected) Syrian Army advances into Zamalka and attacked them.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Scenario 3.2 – A mistake in orientation. In this scenario the group believed it is targeting Qabun and Jobar, but they miscalculated their orientation by 90 degrees, attacking Zamalka instead. Important to note that the whole area has been <a href="http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/syria/10227896/Syrian-army-kills-62-rebels-in-dawn-ambush.html">disconnected from electricity</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">, which would make it easier to make such a mistake.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Scenario 3.3 – False-flag contingency plan. According to
this scenario, the team was trained in advance to perform a false-flag
operation on rebel residential areas. This was a contingency plan to be
activated in case of a major deterioration in the battle.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Scenario 3.4 – Rogue false-flag. According to this scenario,
the group took an unauthorized decision to use their chemical capability to bring
international intervention and change the course of the war. In this case the videos
were intended as an alibi, to give the impression of a mistake.</span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></li>
</ul>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In this scenario, Moadamiyah was attacked only by
conventional weapons, and the sarin findings there are a result of
contamination and patient evacuation from Zamalka.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Two side notes about false-flag attacks:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The term false-flag is often associated with fringe
theories, and rightfully so – false-flag attacks are a rarity. However, in the case of the Syrian
civil war it is actually the expected behavior: Once the US made the explicit link
between a regime chemical attack and military intervention, it would be
unreasonable to assume that of the many extremist opposition groups operating
in Syria, not even one would try to exploit it.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Many believe a scenario involving an opposition attack “on
their own people” is implausible. (a) In the context of a war where hundreds
die each week, there will definitely be people who would find a sacrifice of
this size justified in order to stop the killing. (b) Some of the
fundamentalist groups are in <a href="http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/20137127710849717.html">direct war</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">with the more secular FSA factions. They could have viewed the FSA-dominant Zamalka
residents as legitimate targets. (c) These groups have a high percent of foreign fighters, who may not feel as attached to the local population.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Fit to evidence:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This scenario fits all evidence well.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Scenario Plausibility:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Unlike the regime-attack scenarios this makes perfect sense
in terms of motivation. However, it has two weak points:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">While theoretically possible, producing sarin on this scale is
something that was not done before by a non-state actor.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">While the opposition seems to have gained access to
practically every heavy weapon in the Syrian Army’s arsenal, there is no
evidence yet of them seizing UMLACAs.</span></li>
</ol>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<b>Update - Foreign Intervention Scenario</b></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In the discussions below, several contributors suggested scenarios
involving foreign intervention on the side of the opposition. This could be
relevant in three aspects of the attack: (a) Sarin production, (b) delivery
devices, and (c) execution.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
The last two do not seem very likely:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li>Execution – There is no doubt that a large part of the
opposition is composed of foreign fighters, especially among the fundamentalist
factions. However, these are usually individual volunteers or militants from
similar organizations in other countries. While it is theoretically possible
that foreign troops or covert agents are assisting the opposition on the ground,
there is no evidence that this is the case. There is also not much reason to bring
troops into Syria and risk war, when there are enough combatants in Syria that can
be trained abroad.</li>
<li>Delivery devices – Since there is strong evidence that the
attack used UMLACAs, and that these were developed by the Syrian Army, there
doesn’t seem to be a likely scenario where foreign countries provided the
delivery devices.</li>
</ul>
<o:p></o:p><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This leaves us with the option of foreign support in sarin
production.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Since there is not much evidence supporting or refuting foreign
involvement in sarin production, we can only evaluate it on its a-priori plausibility.
There are a few possible sub-scenarios to consider here:<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<br />
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Help in acquiring chemicals necessary for sarin production – Chemicals that are further along in the sarin production process are more heavily
regulated, and a seller receiving large orders of these should alert
authorities (as Al-Nusra <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html">discovered</a> in Turkey). If buyers know that authorities
are willing to look the other way, they could order the more advanced chemicals
at larger amounts. This would result in an easier production process, less
failures, larger amounts and higher quality.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Providing lab equipment – High quality lab equipment is
essential for mass production of sarin. Obtaining such equipment would be
easier for a country than for an underground group.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Guidance and know-how – Countries may provide access to chemistry
specialists and knowledge, which are not easily accessible to an underground
organization.</span></li>
</ul>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Actual production – Last, a country can produce sarin (or more
likely, its immediate precursor Methylphosphonyl Difluoride) in
its facilities and provide it ready made to the opposition.</span></li>
</ul>
<br />
<o:p></o:p><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Doing any of these would be a violation of the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chemical_Weapons_Convention">Chemical Weapons Convention</a>, and constitute a significant risk on the part of the supporting country. This
should mean that more “obvious” support, such as sarin production or specific
guidance is less likely. However, ignoring acquisition of suspicious chemicals
and lab equipment is more easy to explain as unintentional, and may be done by government
officials without receiving explicit approval (e.g. similar to the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iran%E2%80%93Contra_affair">Iran-ContraAffair</a>).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
So which countries could be relevant here? The three
immediate suspects are those most involved on the opposition’s side: Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. Turkey has <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/sarin-and-syrian-opposition.html">arrested</a> Al-Nusra operatives trying to produce
sarin, which indicate it is probably not cooperating in such an effort, and Qatar
seems to have <a href="http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/09/why-qatar-is-quietly-supporting-a-us-strike-in-syria/279302/">stepped down</a> its involvement. Saudi Arabia, however, does seem like a possibility, and especially its head
of Intelligence, <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bandar_bin_Sultan">Bandar Bin Sultan</a>, who is reported to be directly involved in toppling the Syrian regime and convincing
the US that Syria used chemical weapons.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In terms of evidence relevant to foreign intervention, we
only have the Syrian report of a chemical cache <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html">found</a> in Jobar. This included
bags of Lye manufactured in Saudi Arabia. Lye could be used to destroy sarin in
case of spills, but is otherwise a multi-purpose chemical not related to sarin
production. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
It is important to note that while the whole foreign intervention scenario is mere speculation,
it does have some value: The complexity of underground production of large
quantities of sarin is currently estimated to be the weakest point in the plausibility
of the rebel-attack scenario. The addition of the foreign assistance option provides
another way for the opposition to acquire sarin, and therefore strengthens this
scenario and increases its plausibility.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Summary: While there is not much evidence to either support
or refute foreign assistance, it extends the range of options for sarin
acquisition, thereby increasing the likelihood of a rebel-attack.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Conclusion: At this point the rebel attack theory seems far more
likely than the regime attack theory. Please help by sharing your feedback and scenario proposals.</b></span></div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com141tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-20236010791735211192013-10-07T05:51:00.000+01:002014-01-22T03:35:52.345+00:00Prior Alleged Chemical Attacks<div class="MsoNormal">
If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">A common claim made for the regime attack theory is that it
was just one of many chemical attacks. For example, the <a href="https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/235094/Jp_115_JD_PM_Syria_Reported_Chemical_Weapon_Use_with_annex.pdf">UK Intelligence assessment</a> claims lethal chemical weapons were used in 14 occasions. If indeed the
regime has used chemical weapons in the past, it would constitute very strong
circumstantial evidence for its culpability in the August 21<sup>st</sup> attack.
To evaluate the strength of such evidence, I analyze in this post the reports
of previous chemical attacks.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">A
major limitation in examining these reports is the high
motivation among the opposition to convince the world that chemical weapons are
used by the regime. From the moment Obama issued his <a href="http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/obama-issues-syria-red-line-warning-on-chemical-weapons/2012/08/20/ba5d26ec-eaf7-11e1-b811-09036bcb182b_story.html" target="_blank">red line</a>
in August 2012, and especially after his <a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/03/world/meast/syria-civil-war">direct
threat</a> on December 4<sup>th</sup>, 2012 ("if you make the tragic
mistake of using these weapons, there will be consequences"), the
opposition started frequently giving erroneous reports of chemical attacks. For
example, in <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePBuzfzDt80">this video</a> a doctor shows a
chemical detection kit and describes it as a chemical weapon captured by the
FSA (similar examples <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/08/this-is-not-chemical-weapon.html">here</a>).
In this <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wEXryPaUVMo">video</a> from one week after the red line speech, Syrian Surface-to-Air missiles seized
by rebels are reported to be chemical missiles (minute 1:56). More examples
are described below and many more can be found online. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white;">This is further complicated by the fact that many
nerve agent symptoms may be caused by other types of injuries (e.g. foaming), or
by common medical treatments (e.g. <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Morphine">morphine</a> </span><span style="background-color: white;">causes miosis), and can also be easily faked. Even sarin blood and urine tests can be faked by drinking <o:p></o:p></span></span>diisopropyl methylphosphonate, a chemical available on the market (see the comments for details).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">One thing that becomes clear when reviewing
videos from claimed chemical attacks is the large number of incidents in which
victims show symptoms that seem to be caused by a strong irritant.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Differentiating between an irritant and a nerve
agent is not difficult. Nerve agents affect the nervous system and cause loss of control of the body. Victims will often appear calm or sedated and report mild symptoms such as loss of vision, dizziness, and nausea, while the
more advanced symptoms such as convulsions and foaming are normally accompanied by loss of consciousness</span></span><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">. The progression of
symptoms is generally rapid and painless.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Irritants, on the other hand, cause damage to sensitive organs, resulting in aggressive conscious responses such as forceful
coughing, vomiting, and noticeable suffering.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white;">To explain this inconsistency in symptoms, it is
often suggested that a combination of sarin with a weaker agent has been used, in
an attempt to create some less-than-lethal weapon. As described in detail in
Brown Moses’ <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/07/chemical-weapon-specialists-talk-sarin.html">interviews</a> with chemical experts </span>this is highly unlikely: Sarin is designed to kill, and has no other effective use.
It is also chemically unstable and should be kept away from other chemicals. <span style="background-color: white;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Keeping this in mind, let’s analyze the reports
one by one:<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Daraya 6-Dec-2012</b><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white;">This is the first claim of a chemical attack,
made 2 days after Obama’s </span><a href="http://edition.cnn.com/2012/12/03/world/meast/syria-civil-war">direct
threat</a> <span style="background-color: white;">(if anyone has an earlier report, please share).<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; color: #222222;">According to <a href="http://www.lccsyria.org/10611">this report</a> </span><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; color: #222222;">“the regime forces shelled Mohasan and Buomar by Phosphorous
Bombs and threw toxic gases in Daraya</span>”.<span style="background-color: white;"><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">There are no videos from Darayya claiming a chemical attack,
but there were definitely <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yoBf9BkVbO0">clashes</a> going on at the time. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">There are <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lDPuBukJ-kM">videos</a> that clearly <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?&v=3KLPyuA9I_k">show</a> a White Phosphorus attack
in Mohasan.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: No evidence of a chemical attack. Possibly
White Phosphorus.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Aleppo 8-Dec-2012</b><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">A <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SN5Zo7ggHNc">video</a> showing burn victims claimed to be from a regime chemical attack.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white;">Nerve agents do not cause burns of this level, leaving
us with the option of mustard gas (the only chemical weapon in the Syrian
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction">arsenal</a> that is not a nerve agent</span><span style="background-color: white;">). At high concentrations <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sulfur_mustard">Mustard gas</a> would cause severe respiratory
problems, which are not present here. At lower concentrations blisters would
develop over a few days, causing severe pain.</span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: No evidence of a chemical attack. Probably
misrepresentation of the cause of injuries.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><o:p><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Darayya 22-Dec-2012 </b><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">The regime </span><a href="http://www.presstv.com/detail/2012/12/23/279711/syria-militants-use-chemical-weapons/" style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;">reports</a><span style="background-color: white; font-family: inherit;"> losing 7 soldiers to a rebel
attack with a yellow toxic gas. No evidence is presented.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Unverifiable<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Homs 23-Dec-2012</b><o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="background-color: white;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This is the first of many attacks that are documented by
video and seem to show similar symptoms, including severe respiratory irritation,
vomiting, and pain. T</span>he agent is described as a “white smoke”.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uLc4zoAmbRE">video</a> (minute 1:14) and this <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SrAvea8_-PU">v</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SrAvea8_-PU">ideo</a> (minute 1:08) seem to show normal sized pupils. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">While it is theoretically possible to be exposed to nerve agents without suffering miosis, this seems to be very rare in practice: </span><a href="http://www.nj-ptc.org/training/materials/Rutgers/SOP_PharmSaveWorld/ChemicalAgentsinTerrorism.pdf" style="font-family: inherit;">99% of victims</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> of the sarin attack in Tokyo exhibited miosis.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Some <a href="http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jan/16/homs-syria-chemical-weapons-leak-decoded">speculated</a> that <span style="background-color: white;">“<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/3-Quinuclidinyl_benzilate">Agent 15</a>” </span><span style="background-color: white;">was used in this attack, but the symptoms seem highly inconsistent.<o:p></o:p></span></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Victims are all males of fighting age.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Irritant used on a military target, possibly
White Phosphorus. 7 reported dead, but no evidence this was the cause.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Khan Al Assal 19-Mar-2013</b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This attack is very different from the other attacks described here, in several aspects.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Following this attack, the Syrian </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">government </span><a href="http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2013/130430_Syria.doc.htm" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">requested</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">
</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">a UN investigation. This was delayed following requests by Western
governments to </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">allow the UN team to visit other sites, which was initially refused
by Syria. During the negotiations, Russia </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">sent its own investigation team </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">which </span><a href="http://rt.com/news/chemical-aleppo-findings-russia-417/" style="font-family: inherit;">found</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> traces of sarin and blamed the opposition. Of course, the area is
under control of the Syrian Army and the investigation was done by a Syrian
ally, damaging the reliability of this report. </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">An agreement was eventually </span><a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23524536" style="font-family: inherit;">reached</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">
</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">as to which sites could be visited, and the UN team was sent to Syria.
However, upon its arrival the August 21</span><sup style="font-family: inherit;">st</sup><span style="font-family: inherit;"> attack took place, and the
team was diverted there. On September 25</span><sup style="font-family: inherit;">th</sup><span style="font-family: inherit;"> they <a href="http://rt.com/news/syria-un-team-returns-investigation-343/">returned</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">to complete the investigation.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This attack is also far deadlier than all others, with 26 deaths
compared to none or low numbers in <a href="http://ghs-ihr.squarespace.com/storage/Syria_Chemical_Weapons_June2013.pdf">other attacks</a>. It is also the only one with civilian casualties.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Videos from the attack are available but seem to have been
taken a long time after it occured. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">This <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J7F1yS6xmNc">video</a> shows one victim foaming at the nose. In this <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xh7IV15BXKQ">video</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">symptoms are reported to include “immediate fainting, convulsion
and death”, which are consistent with nerve agents and not with irritants.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The victims seem to be a mix of <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/19/us-syria-crisis-chemical-idUSBRE92I0A220130319">Syrian soldiers</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">and regime-supporting civilians (One blames ‘terrorists’ for
the attack, and another is wearing the official Syrian flag on her hand). </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">An opposition source blamed the attack on the regime,
<a href="http://www.syriadirect.org/main/30-reports/237-govt-fsa-trade-chemical-attack-charges">claiming</a> it was a false-flag attack on the regime-supporting town.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
Some eyewitnesses <a href="http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/03/19/us-syria-crisis-chemical-idUSBRE92I0A220130319">report</a> smelling chlorine, which is a simple chemical weapon to deploy, and was used <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chlorine_bombings_in_Iraq">numerous times</a> by Iraqi insurgents. However, the symptoms reported (convulsions, immediate fainting) are inconsistent with chlorine, and chlorine symptoms like skin or eye irritations were not reported. The chlorine smell could theoretically be the result of low-budget sarin production, but in that case many other smells should have been reported.<br />
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Seems like a lethal chemical attack, possibly sarin, possibly chlorine. Not enough evidence to
determine culpability, but a rebel attack seems much more likely.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Otaybah 19-Mar-2013</b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Three videos from this event: One <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MKZ4QOKqtZI">showing</a> an unconscious
victim foaming at nose, </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">another <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-ME3RLI-yOc">showing</a> victims with no specific symptoms</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">,
and another <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pd4vKLDcudE">showing</a> two bodies claimed to have been killed by a chemical attack</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">. All are males of fighting age.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Not enough evidence.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Adra and/or Douma 24-Mar-2013</b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">According to the <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2013/05/27/chemical-war-in-syria_3417708_3218.html">Le monde article</a> 39 people were affected and two died.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This video <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_OibQ0NlWuY">shows</a> <span style="font-family: inherit;">mild convulsions, and its title describes “chemical and phosphorus weapons". Another video <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hT9svgYk3ns">shows</a> a </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">bloody discharge from the nose. While nerve agents can cause bleeding
from mouth and nose, this seems to be rare and all records of foaming from
Zamalka mentioned white foam.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Victims are males of fighting age. <o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Not enough evidence. Possibly white phosphorus<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Jobar 7-Apr-2013</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">One <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nag-LRXJ-oQ">video</a> found claiming sarin or VX, while showing a victim coughing violently, and
describing nine victims fainting, losing eyesight, and coughing severely. Another
victim has miosis and is filmed from three different angles and lighting
conditions, possibly in an attempt to look like multiple victims. Since he is
not exhibiting any other symptoms, this seems very dodgy.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Probably an Irritant misrepresented as nerve
agent.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Jobar 12-14 Apr 2013</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This event was not documented but it is reported as one of
two events for which the French government received blood samples that <a href="http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/2013/06/french-sarin-detection-syria">tested positive</a> for sarin.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This is probably related to an event described in the <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2013/05/27/chemical-war-in-syria_3417708_3218.html">Le Monde article</a>:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<blockquote class="tr_bq">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; background-position: initial initial; background-repeat: initial initial; color: #16212c;">On April 13, the day of a chemical attack on a
zone of the Jobar front, Le Monde's photographer was with rebels who have been
waging war out of ruined buildings. He saw them start to cough before donning
their gas masks, apparently without haste although in fact they were already
exposed. Men crouched down, gasping for breath and vomiting.<span class="apple-converted-space"> </span></span></span></blockquote>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">These symptoms suggest the use of an irritant rather than a nerve agent,
and the article gives no explanation why a professional photographer did not document
an event of such importance (adding to many other inconsistencies in the Le
Monde article which I’ll hopefully get to in the future). It therefore seems there
is no way to know the source of these samples.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Unverifiable. Possibly irritant, possibly sarin.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Sheikh Maqsoud (<span style="background-color: white;">near Aleppo) </span>13-Apr-13
and Saraqeb 29-Apr-13</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">These two attacks were analyzed by Brown Moses <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/04/links-between-alleged-chemical-attacks.html">here</a>,
<a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/05/was-attack-in-saraqeb-chemical-weapons.html">here</a>, and <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/05/devices-linked-to-alleged-chemical.html">here</a>. Both attacks used the same small white canisters, and in Saraqeb a helicopter
is <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22549861">seen</a> dropping something that leaves a trail resembling that of White Phosphorus.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Symptoms <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vu5ijl2FtWI">shown</a> in <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22549861">videos</a> include severe coughing, vomiting, miosis, foaming and convulsions.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Samples from 13 Saraqeb victims were taken to turkey and
<a href="http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/regions/middle-east/syria/130505/syria-chemical-weapons-obama-red-line-turkey-idlib-aleppo-sarin-israel">tested negative</a> for sarin. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">France, on the other hand, </span><a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2013/06/04/laurent-fabius-confirme-l-utilisation-de-gaz-sarin-en-syrie_3424140_3218.html" style="font-family: inherit;">reported</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> finding sarin in samples from Saraqeb and
Jobar (13-Apr-2013, see above). The manner in which the samples were taken is unclear.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Following the Saraqeb incident, the regime accused
the opposition of carrying two false-flag chemical attacks in the town. <a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/05/01/301178/militants-use-chemical-material-syria/">One</a> in which powder was thrown on civilians, and <a href="http://web.archive.org/web/20130517165323/http://sana.sy/eng/21/2013/05/01/480240.htm">another</a> in which they brought hostages to a site of a chemical accident. No evidence
was provided for either claim.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Contradicting evidence makes these events difficult
to figure out, but the evidence for sarin seems weak.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Barzeh 26-Apr-13</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The regime <a href="http://breakingnews.sy/en/article/16423.html">reported</a> that Syrian troops were attacked by a chemical shell. The symptoms <a href="http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/world/2013-04/28/c_132347695.htm">mentioned</a> include asphyxia, nausea, foaming of mouth and nose, loss
of consciousness and indirect contamination of medical personnel. Of all cases
examined here, this is the only report where many sarin symptoms are described
accurately. Of course, all we have is the news reports and no evidence.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Unverifiable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Qasr Abu Samra (near Homs) 14-May-2013</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">According to <a href="http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887324188604578543820387158806.html">this article</a>, this is one of four instances in which the US believes chemical weapons
were used. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">I could not find any evidence of such an attack.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Unverifiable.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Adra (patients treated in Douma) 23/24-May-2013</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This incident has a large number of videos, which show unconscious victims, one <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J-0xWF2Hou8">case</a> of convulsions, one <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hmZvbO6wGn0">case</a> of miosis (also seen <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dit1sLEm2yc">here</a>), another <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cBiY76iTGI4">case</a> of foaming at the mouth, another <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cJc-iytI7LE">case</a> of disorientation accompanied by miosis. Other victims do not present miosis, which as mentioned above is atypical to nerve agent exposure.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
This incident is unique in that in <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=I6iQV_j_MSU">one of the locations</a> m<span style="font-family: inherit;">edical personnel are <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F-nUUElXRFA">treating patients</a> while wearing gas masks. Something that was not seen in any other video, including Douma <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-p1NgK_0xtQ">videos</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">from the August 21</span><sup style="font-family: inherit;">st</sup> attack.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">All victims are </span>males of fighting age.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Conclusion: Unclear. These are the only videos showing significant symptoms consistent with nerve agent exposure. However, not enough evidence is available to determine this is indeed the case.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Harasta 26-May-2013</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b><br /></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HYtSbTABQ0o">video</a> seems to have been taken a significant time after
the attack, with no atmosphere of emergency. The doctors report treating 200
people with symptoms of vomiting and dizziness. Since (a) vomiting is an
advanced symptom of sarin accompanied by other symptoms that are not reported, (b)
few deaths were reported, and (c) no second-hand contamination to medical
personnel is reported, this does not seem to be a sarin attack.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
An earlier <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u7xOx5D4vKg">video</a> shows one victimg shivering and in pain, and <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KYsgUryEOKo">another</a> shows several victims with no specific symptoms.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">All victims are males of fighting age, some wearing military vests. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;"> </span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Unclear. Symptoms seem to go beyond those of the other irritant cases, but are still not consistent with a nerve agent. Perhaps some strong riot control agent?<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Al-Otaybah 26-May-2013</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePBuzfzDt80">video</a> shows a doctor describing symptoms of miosis and
convulsions. He shows blood samples which are to be sent for analysis to
prove the use of chemical weapons, and then mistakenly describes a chemical
detection kit as a chemical weapon.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: No evidence of a chemical attack.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Jobar 27-May-2013</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sy2F4lerKUs">video</a> shows several males of fighting age suffering
from respiratory irritation, with the cameraman claiming sarin was used.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">A civilian girl is shown breathing heavily, but does not
show other symptoms.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Possible irritant use.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Zamalka 19-Jun-2013</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Reported <a href="http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2013/06/19/Rebels-Syrian-forces-used-chemical-weapons-in-attack-on-Zamalka/UPI-78641371692979/">here</a>. One <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-P4E-autZzQ">video</a> found, showing a victim with bloody foam – somewhat similar to a symptom seen in the 24-Mar-2013 attack, and not typical to nerve agent exposure.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Unclear. Probably not a nerve agent.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Adra and Douma 5-Aug-2013</b><o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">These two attacks were already analyzed <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/analyzing-previous-umlaca-attacks.html">here</a>. </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">More videos can be seen <a href="http://claysbeach.blogspot.co.il/2013/08/syria-new-poison-gas-attacks-reported.html">here</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=x91X7mA9yNE">here</a></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">,
with a victim describing a “red color”, “sulfur smell”, blurred vision, and suffocation.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">While the Adra victims are males of fighting age, exhibiting
similar symptoms to other attacks, the Douma incident seems to be of a much
wider scale and involving many civilians, although with light injuries and no deaths.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Conclusion: Adra seems like a typical irritant attack on
opposition forces. Douma could be White Phosphorus smoke from a fighting zone reaching
a civilian area.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Summary of Findings</b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">In multiple cases, opposition fighters are seen affected by some
kind of irritant. Phosphorus is sometimes mentioned, but may not be the only
chemical involved.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">These cases are correlated with clashes between the regime
and the opposition in the area, and nearly all victims are males of fighting
age.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The number of deaths reported in these incidents is very
small and unverified.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">In most cases, the symptoms are not consistent with use of a nerve agent, including
severe coughing, vomiting and pain that are not accompanied by loss of consciousness.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Despite multiple claimed chemical attacks and the high
availability of cameras, there is no documentation of an actual attack taking
place or the munitions used. In a few cases, evidence of white phosphorus is
seen.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">In <a href="http://www.lemonde.fr/proche-orient/article/2013/05/27/chemical-war-in-syria_3417708_3218.html">multiple cases</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">blood samples have been <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ePBuzfzDt80">taken</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">from victims and
sent to countries friendly to the opposition. Given the political interests, it
is safe to assume that when not reported otherwise, the results were negative.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">The Khan Al Assal attack is very different from the other
cases: (a) victims are Syrian soldiers and regime-supporting civilians, (b) a significantly
larger death toll, (c) the symptoms described are consistent with the use of a nerve
agent, (d) environmental samples tested positive for sarin, and (e) the regime requested a UN investigation.</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">In general, the effects of these attacks are negligible compared to the extent of the conflict. So if indeed a chemical attack is the cause it would have small military gain for the regime, but significant political gain for the opposition. This of course is not evidence in itself, but it does mean that much stronger evidence is required before accepting that the regime has used lethal chemicals.</span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Conclusion: The regime has used White Phosphorus and
possibly <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Non-lethal_weapon">less-than-lethal</a> chemical agents against opposition forces. There are no reliable indications for
nerve agent use by the regime. There is some evidence indicating the attack in
Khan Al Assal was an opposition attack with a lethal chemical weapon.<o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Did I miss anything? Please share your evidence and analysis and help improve the conclusions.</span></span><br />
<div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">In this report I found the compilation of evidence done by
<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Syria_and_weapons_of_mass_destruction#Chemical_Weapons">Wikipedia</a>,
<a href="http://acloserlookonsyria.shoutwiki.com/wiki/Category:Chemical_Weapons">acloserlookonsyria</a>,
<a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/">Brown Moses</a>, and <a href="http://ghs-ihr.squarespace.com/storage/Syria_Chemical_Weapons_June2013.pdf">George Washington University</a> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;">very helpful. All evidence was independently verified.</span></div>
<br />
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<u>Update:</u><br />
<br />
Gleb Bazov directed me to this <a href="http://www.wdr.de/tv/monitor/sendungen/2013/0704/pdf/HSPOP_4_1.pdf">research</a> from the <a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/Harvard-Sussex-Program-mission.htm">Harvard Sussex program on chemical and biological weapons</a>. It analyzes the allegations of chemical attacks (including some that I missed), and reaches a similar conclusion that the Syrian Army has been using less-than-lethal chemical agents against opposition forces.<br />
<div>
<br /></div>
</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com26tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-35424167285711600972013-10-02T03:36:00.002+01:002014-02-09T04:16:08.025+00:00Sarin and the Syrian Opposition<div class="MsoNormal">
If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Since it seems that over 500 kg of sarin were used in the
attack, and the regime is known to have large amounts of sarin, this is
circumstantial evidence supporting the regime attack theory. To evaluate its
strength, we need to estimate the likelihood that the opposition could obtain
sarin.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
<b>Update: </b>The final UN report published after this analysis was written provided strong evidence that the opposition has obtained and used sarin on several occasions (see <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2014/01/analysis-of-second-un-report.html">here</a>).<br />
<b><br /></b></div>
<h3>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Direct Evidence Connecting the Opposition to Sarin </span></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Carla
Del Ponte, a senior UN investigator who interviewed victims of previous
attacks, <a href="http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-22425058" target="_blank">shared</a> her personal opinion that chemical attacks were
initiated solely by the opposition. I usually ignore opinions brought without
concrete evidence, but unlike other reports, this comes from a very
reliable and relevant source. Given that the <a href="http://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13298">clarification</a> the UN issued following her interview does not contradict her claims, this testimony may have some value.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Update: In a later <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DvH435WWhO0" target="_blank">interview</a> (minute 4:17), she reiterates her assessment, and explains this is what the initial evidence indicates, but recommends waiting for the final report. (Found by Jim Dobbin).<br />
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
In a chemical attack in Khan Al-Assal, whose victims were Syrian troops and regime-supporting civilians, a <a href="http://rt.com/news/chemical-aleppo-findings-russia-417/" style="font-family: inherit;">Russian investigation</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> determined the use of sarin. While
the report attempts to lay blame on the rebels, it does not share its evidence
and is therefore difficult to evaluate. More <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/prior-alleged-chemical-attacks.html">here</a>.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">On June 2nd Syria
<a href="http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2013/06/02/306700/syrian-army-seizes-sarin-in-hama/">reported</a>
seizing 2 canisters of sarin. Additionally, on <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/10/prior-alleged-chemical-attacks.html">two occasions</a> (Barzeh April 26th, Jobar August 24th) Syria reported a
chemical attack on its troops, describing symptoms typical to sarin.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Since evidence was not presented, these reports are of no use.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">On January 2<sup>nd</sup> an FSA official <a href="http://rt.com/news/syria-fsa-chemical-weapons-229/">claims</a> to have chemical
capabilities, but does not provide specifics.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This video also shows an activist </span><a href="http://www.infowars.com/video-syrian-rebel-admits-using-chemical-weapons/" style="font-family: inherit;">claiming</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> to have chemical weapons, but does not provide specific evidence.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This
well-known <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CcYH-5uz91k">video</a> threatens Assad’s supporters with chemical weapons, and
demonstrates their use on rabbits. The video uses the term “Reeh Sarsar” which is later mentioned in the Liwa Al
Islam rocket launch <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/liwa-al-islam-videos-improved-quality.html">videos</a>. Assuming it is authentic, it would only demonstrate
intent and not capabilities, since poisoning an animal in a small confined space
is very different from an operational chemical weapon. Additionally, the chemicals shown are not directly related to sarin production.<o:p></o:p></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Update: I</span>n a comment below <span style="font-family: inherit;">Charles Wood showed this video most likely shows chlorine poisoning.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br />
Another <a href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=b85_1373564487" target="_blank">video</a> shows two Liwa Al Islam operatives coordinating bombardment of a building. One of them says he will bring just one sarin (translation verified independently). It is heavily edited, and can easily be fabricated, but still worth noting.<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Two days
after the chemical attack in Ghouta, the Syrian TV broadcasted <a href="http://www.liveleak.com/view?i=94a_1377271950" target="_blank">two phone
calls</a>, which were presumably intercepted by Syrian Intelligence. In the
first a rebel reports to his Saudi sponsor that his group carried a chemical
attack in Homs. In the second a transfer of sarin is coordinated.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">They seem authentic but are not strong enough as evidence: The first does not include details about the attack, and may be an exaggeration to impress the sponsor, and the second can possibly be interpreted as sarin antidotes.</span></div>
<br /></div>
<h3>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Evidence of Attempts to Acquire Sarin</span></h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The most important evidence for opposition involvement in
acquiring sarin, is <a href="http://thekurdishcause.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/turkish-prosecutor-indicts-six.html">the arrest</a> of 11 Al-Nusra operatives in Turkey in May 2013. They were initially <a href="http://rt.com/news/sarin-gas-turkey-al-nusra-021/">reported</a> to possess 2 kg of sarin, which was later <a href="http://www.nti.org/gsn/article/no-chemical-arms-seized-syrian-militants-turkish-envoy-says/">claimed</a> to be antifreeze. They were eventually </span><a href="http://thekurdishcause.blogspot.co.uk/2013/09/turkish-prosecutor-indicts-six.html">charged</a><span style="font-family: inherit;"> with attempting to acquire chemicals for the
production of sarin. Interestingly, the prosecution listed these chemicals,
including:</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ul>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Thionyl Chloride (SOCl2)</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Potassium Fluoride (KF)</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Methanol (CH3OH)</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Isopropanol (C3H8O)</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">Isopropanolamine (C3H9NO)</span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;">White Phosphorus (P4)</span></li>
</ul>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Comparing this to the sarin production process (in the
appendix </span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/chemical-analysis.html" style="font-family: inherit;">here</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">),
shows this is unmistakably a sarin shopping-list. The initial downplay as
‘antifreeze’ probably referred to the Methanol, which is one type of antifreeze.</span><br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">Interestingly, only one week later, Iraq <a href="http://news.sky.com/story/1098214/iraq-smashes-al-qaeda-poison-gas-cell">arrested</a> five Al Qaeda
operatives that were planning to produce sarin for use in Iraq and abroad.<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<h3>
Complexity of Producing Sarin</h3>
<div class="MsoNormal">
Last, let's examine the difficulty of producing sarin in underground conditions.</div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">One way to examine the difficulty of underground sarin
production is by examining the only case where this is known to happen: by the </span><a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aum_Shinrikyo" style="font-family: inherit;" target="_blank">Aum Shinrikyo</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">
cult in Japan (</span><a href="http://www.foi.se/Global/V%C3%A5ra%20tj%C3%A4nster/Konferenser%20och%20seminarier/CBW%20symposium/Proceedings/Tu.pdf" style="font-family: inherit;">source1</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, </span><a href="http://www.stimson.org/images/uploads/research-pdfs/atxchapter3.pdf" style="font-family: inherit;">source2</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">, </span><a href="http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_Danzig_1.pdf" style="font-family: inherit;">source3</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">). The cult started producing sarin and
other nerve agents after failing to produce a biological weapon. They made
significant investments in lab equipment intended to produce 70 tons of sarin. In
practice, technical problems and government investigations limited their total production
to less than 100 kg over their year and a half of operation.</span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<br /></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;">However, Syrian opposition groups may have some significant
advantages over Aum Shinrikyo:<o:p></o:p></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li>Much weaker government supervision. Treating the opposition as a non-state actor would be inaccurate, as they have full control of some areas of Syria, making them the de-facto state there. This is critical: Aum Shinrikyo had stopped their process several times and destroyed products because of police investigations. </li>
<li>Possible access to former Chemical Warfare professionals from Iraq, Libya or Syria.</li>
<li>Access to lab technology that is 18 years more advanced. This was specifically addressed in <a href="http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_AumShinrikyo_Danzig_1.pdf" target="_blank">this detailed analysis</a> of Aum’s chemical program, which estimated that current lab equipment would make a similar effort much cheaper. Quotes:<br /><i>“Such an effort might be well disguised or established on a smaller scale, however, by taking advantage of the development over the last decade of powerful, low-cost <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Micro_process_engineering" target="_blank">micro-production</a> chemical capabilities”.<br />“… the chemical industry has, over the last decade, introduced modular and flexible designs where reactions may occur in a solvent-free environment, at increased concentrations and in much smaller and less expensive facilities”.</i></li>
<li>International allies. This could prove very helpful when trying to obtain regulated chemicals or lab equipment.</li>
<li>Internet access, which makes information on sarin production widely available (e.g. details of Aum Shinrikyo’s process). This can significantly accelerate production - Aum Shinrikyo scientists spent much of their time in trial and error.</li>
</ol>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">This indicates that sarin is not a chemical that “</span><a href="http://www.globalresearch.ca/president-bashar-al-assads-interview-on-syrias-chemical-weapons-transcript/5350429" style="font-family: inherit;">anyone can make in their kitchen</a><span style="font-family: inherit;">”, as is often claimed. However, an organization with
sufficient funding and trained professionals can produce large quantities of
sarin within several months.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal">
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Conclusions: <o:p></o:p></b></span></div>
<div class="MsoNormal">
</div>
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>There is strong evidence that Syrian opposition groups have
attempted to acquire sarin, and some weak evidence that they succeeded in doing
so.</b></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>There is some weak evidence that Syrian opposition groups have
carried out chemical attacks.</b></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Production of sarin in the quantities used to attack Zamalka
is within the reach of well-funded underground organizations.</b></span></li>
</ol>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Did I miss anything? Please share your evidence and analysis and help me improve my conclusions.</span></span>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com59tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-87767652416798553082013-09-29T16:09:00.002+01:002013-11-03T02:04:02.117+00:00Location of Liwa Al Islam VideosIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span><span style="font-family: inherit;">Following the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/liwa-al-islam-videos-improved-quality.html" target="_blank">enhancement</a> of the Liwa Al-Islam videos, I<span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"> analyzed them to create a map of possible locations, based on the following:</span></span><br />
<ol>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">An open field</span></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Within <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/umlaca-simulation.html" target="_blank">UMLACA range</a> of Jobar. The b</span></span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">lue circles are 3 km and 4 km from Jobar center. </span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">Within UMLACA range of Qabun. The green circles are 3 km and 4 km from Qabun center. </span></li>
</ol>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">The 4 km circles (which are beyond UMLACA range) were used since the attacks are not necessarily near the town's center.</span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Note: These are the locations matching the <b>claims</b> made in the video. It may have been shot elsewhere.</span></span><br />
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;">
<a href="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgYhqye68rSmvNHthoffBzPrxVwCeINZpo85_PL8YX7odXZXFojEL-DPA8I4NjnWfiTQzBrgDMU9QJaTsGs4nKyrIPVkDUK89Br43pq4uKuTDJfp8dNtYxt1zeB67Fwk4Y4X3RqLpmzWLE/s1600/liwa+source+area.png" imageanchor="1" style="margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 1em;"><img border="0" height="320" src="https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/img/b/R29vZ2xl/AVvXsEgYhqye68rSmvNHthoffBzPrxVwCeINZpo85_PL8YX7odXZXFojEL-DPA8I4NjnWfiTQzBrgDMU9QJaTsGs4nKyrIPVkDUK89Br43pq4uKuTDJfp8dNtYxt1zeB67Fwk4Y4X3RqLpmzWLE/s320/liwa+source+area.png" width="315" /></a></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The orange areas match all three criteria, with the areas within the two inner circles representing higher likelihood. The western area is less likely since it is the <a href="https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/6/68/Military_situation_in_Damascus_region_as_of_15th_of_September_2013.png">border between</a> regime-controlled area and contested-area and would mean a rocket attack coming from behind the Syrian Army.</span></span></span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The red area is the estimated launch source that was </span></span></span><a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/mapping-source-of-attack.html" style="line-height: 18px;" target="_blank">independently calculated</a><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"> </span><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">from rocket impact sites.</span></span></span></div>
<div>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><b>Conclusion: Assuming this is no coincidence, it seems that the videos were shot at the location of the real source of the attack, or were fabricated by people who know it.</b></span></span></span><br />
<br />
<div>
</div>
</div>
Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com41tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-23690706279673027702013-09-28T23:39:00.001+01:002015-04-17T10:43:17.823+01:00Liwa Al Islam Videos - Improved QualityIf this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Anita Hunt has kindly prepared enhanced versions of the Liwa Al Islam videos (which were analyzed <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/evidence-contradicting-regime-attack.html" target="_blank">here</a> and geolocated <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/location-of-liwa-al-islam-videos.html">here</a>). They show much more detail and could assist us in finding more clues as to the nature and reliability of these videos. Please share your findings.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">Some interesting screenshots <a href="http://imgur.com/a/48k5x/all" target="_blank">here</a>.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">Thank you Anita!</span><br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe width="420" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/VlcbBTjh2EU?rel=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe></div>
Transcript:<br />
<div style="text-align: center;">
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; text-align: left; unicode-bidi: embed;">
Man saying in a Syrian Accent: Wednesday 21<sup>st</sup>
of August 2013, operation "Reeh Sarsar" (<i>this term was used in the Quran to describe the wind that was sent as a curse to the people of
A'ad, who disobeyed god and refused to follow his messenger, and defied God's
teachings</i>) by "Liwa'a Al Islam" targeting the Assadi's regime forces in Al-Qabun. Allahu Akbar! (<i>God is the greatest</i>).<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; text-align: left; unicode-bidi: embed;">
[<i>Footsteps, behind the man there are black
banners (flags) with the words "There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is
the messenger of Allah". Below that the words "Liwa Al-Islam" in a smaller font</i>]<o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; text-align: left; unicode-bidi: embed;">
[<i>The rocket is launched with "Allahu
Akbar". On their foreheads there are black bands with the words "No God
But Allah and Muhammad is the messenger of Allah" is written in white
color</i>]. <o:p></o:p></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div style="text-align: left;">
<br /></div>
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe width="420" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/r9Ztl0bm7u8?rel=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe></div>
<br />
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; text-align: left; unicode-bidi: embed;">
Transcript:</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; text-align: left; unicode-bidi: embed;">
Man saying in a Syrian Accent with a mix of
original Arabic: Assad's Shabiha (<i>a pro-regime militia</i>) in the Qabun district, Wednesday 21<sup>st</sup>
August 2013 with an Ababil rocket (<i>Ababil is a word from the Quran describing the birds that attacked the invaders of God's holy mosque in Makkah by rocks, and turned them into perforated dead bodies</i>).</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; text-align: left; unicode-bidi: embed;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; text-align: left; unicode-bidi: embed;">
[<i>He is asking people to Say "Allahu
Akbar" by saying "Takbeer"</i>, <i>and
people are responding by "Allahu Akbar"</i>].</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; text-align: left; unicode-bidi: embed;">
[W<i>hen the rocket is launched, he asks with excitement "Takbeer!",
and people are responding with "Allahu Akbar!"</i>].<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; text-align: left; unicode-bidi: embed;">
<br />
<br />
<div class="separator" style="clear: both; text-align: center;"><iframe width="420" height="315" src="https://www.youtube.com/embed/F2QbEuRhgY4?rel=0" frameborder="0" allowfullscreen></iframe></div>
Transcript:</div>
</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; unicode-bidi: embed;">
Man
saying in a Syrian accent with a mix of original Arabic: Assad dogs in Jobar area with two Ababil rockets on Wednesday 21<sup>st</sup>
of August 2013. Allahu Akbar! (God is the greatest) </div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; unicode-bidi: embed;">
[<i>Then he's
asking other people to say Allahu Akbar by saying "Takbeer"</i>!]</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; unicode-bidi: embed;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; unicode-bidi: embed;">
<i>Man: </i>Come on, let's go back Abu Muhammad. Go
back.<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; unicode-bidi: embed;">
[<i>A rocket is launched with a man calling "Takbeer" again,
and people responding with "Allahu Akbar</i>"].</div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; unicode-bidi: embed;">
<o:p></o:p></div>
<div class="MsoNormal" style="direction: ltr; unicode-bidi: embed;">
[<i>Then another rocket is launched with the
same scenario</i>].<o:p></o:p></div>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><u>Appendix</u></span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><u><br /></u></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Prior to October 7th, the videos in this page were based on lower quality originals. Here are the old links <span style="font-family: inherit;">in case anyone needs them: </span></span></span><br />
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">
<a href="http://youtu.be/vOgMdTdE52c" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank">http://youtu.be/vOgMdTdE52c</a></div>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">
<a href="http://youtu.be/x-r3kNlromg" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank">http://youtu.be/x-r3kNlromg</a></div>
<div style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: arial, sans-serif; font-size: 13px;">
<a href="http://youtu.be/zNs4TSnLoTk" style="color: #1155cc;" target="_blank">http://youtu.be/zNs4TSnLoTk</a></div>
<br />
Thanks to Petri Krohn and Amund Hesbol for finding the higher quality originals.Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com102tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-4304138063571120909.post-91093049763243143772013-09-28T23:02:00.000+01:002014-03-30T03:29:08.585+01:00What Happened in Moadamiyah?If this is your first time here, I recommend starting from <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-conclusion.html" target="_blank">the conclusion page</a>.<br />
<span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">So far we've been very successful in collecting and analyzing evidence from the Zamalka attack, with every conclusion backed by multiple independent sources. But the Moadamiyah attack still remained with its highly inconsistent evidence. It's easy to dismiss it as just another one of the <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/summary-of-anomalies-in-un-report.html" target="_blank">many slip-ups in the UN report</a> and forget about it, but that's not how things are done here... So I went through all the </span></span><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Moadamiyah </span><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">videos, reports, and UN findings and tried to settle all the discrepancies.</span></span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span>
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">First, a summary of the problems with the Moadamiyah chemical attack report:</span></span><br />
<ol>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">No UMLACAs were found there, compared to multiple findings in Zamalka. This is especially weird as Moadamiyah is within <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/umlaca-simulation.html" target="_blank">UMLACA range</a> of Mazzeh airport, a site from which we have <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/09/launchers-for-munitions-linked-to.html" target="_blank">multiple sightings</a> of UMLACA launches.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">The only munition suspected to be associated with a chemical attack is an M14 rocket body. Its warhead was not found, even though chemical warheads should survive impact, and the UN reported that locals were bringing them various munitions.<br />Update: some have claimed a strong boosting charge can destroy the warhead. In that case, serious damage should have been evident on the rocket body.</span></li>
<li><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">While images and videos of UMLACA impact sites were <a href="http://brown-moses.blogspot.com/2013/08/are-these-munitions-used-in-todays.html">uploaded</a> by activists within hours of the attack, the first (and only) M14 <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UEX8AeNSYE" target="_blank">video</a> was uploaded only after four days. Furthermore, it was recorded at an arbitrary location and not in its impact crater.</span></li>
<li><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">The M14 rocket body shows no signs of damage from impact with the ground, while all UMLACAs are bent or broken. Especially interesting since its terminal velocity is supposed to be higher due to its aerodynamic design and better fuel-to-weight ratio.</span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">No other M14 rocket bodies or warheads were reported. </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">This is especially interesting since the UN reported another impact site it believes originated from the same launcher.</span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The M14 has an optional 2.2 kg sarin warhead. To cause the amount of deaths reported in Moadamiyah would require between 13 and 66 M14 rockets (see full calculation by pmr9 in comments below). </span></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">The M14 is an obsolete weapon, with the markings on this one indicating it was </span><a href="http://siberiantimes.com/other/others/news/chemical-weapon-propulsion-unit-on-syrian-missile-made-in-siberia-says-russian-expert/" style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;" target="_blank">manufactured in 1967</a><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">.</span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">There are no videos or images of the Syrian Army (or anyone else in Syria) using an M14 or its launcher (if anyone has it, please share).</span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">The UN team wore gas masks near Zamalka impact sites, but not in the Moadamiyah impact site - probably since their mobile </span><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">chemical detectors beeped only in Zamalka.</span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">While </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">the </span><a href="http://info.publicintelligence.net/UN-SyriaChemicalAttack.pdf" style="background-color: white; color: #888888; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px; text-decoration: none;" target="_blank">UN report</a><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"> found sarin in 90% of samples taken around UMLACA impact sites in Zamalka, n</span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">one of the samples in the vicinity of the rocket were positive for sarin, despite being taken 2-3 days before the UMLACA samples. A few of them tested positive for sarin breakdown products (DIMP, IPMPA, and MPA): 2 out of 15 tests in one lab, and 5 out of 15 in the second lab.</span></li>
<li><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">Still, 14 out of 15 blood samples taken from victims in Moadamiyah tested positive for sarin exposure, a higher rate than in Zamalka.</span></li>
<li><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">While in Zamalka we have <a href="http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R-n5t5Fq8og">videos</a> showing the disarray in the streets, all Moadamiyah videos are taken in the hospital.</span></li>
<li><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">The UN report provides 8 indirect quotes from victims who report being infected in Zamalka (one on Page 16, seven on 36-38), but none for Moadamiyah.</span></li>
<li><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">While hundreds of eyewitness accounts can be found for Zamalka (see <a href="http://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports/chemicaldamascussuburbs">here</a>, <a href="https://www.vdc-sy.info/index.php/en/reports/chemicalmassacrefollowup">here</a>, <a href="http://www.itv.com/news/2013-08-23/we-smelt-a-strange-smell-eyewitness-accounts-of-damascus-chemical-attack/">here</a> and many more), I could only find two for Moadamiyah: <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FFenx4CiuTQ">One</a> that is constantly interrupted by a local doctor and is cut off when the witness starts mentioning an "explosion", and <a href="http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/syria_cw0913_web_1.pdf">another</a> taken over skype by HRW (page 4) which describes no odors at the scene (highly <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/chemical-analysis.html">inconsistent</a> with Zamalka), and claims a shirt dunked in water protected him at ground zero (impossible).</span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><a href="http://storyful.com/stories/62835">Reports</a> in social media from Moadamiyah were inconsistent, alternating between descriptions of chemical and conventional shelling. 13 hours after the attack seven casualties from chemicals were claimed, and only later did this change to 56.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">When the UN team approached Moadamiyah, they were targeted by sniper fire. No such interruptions were reported in Zamalka.</span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 18px;">Unlike Zamalka, Moadamiyah was downwind from central Damascus during the attack, making it an unlikely target for a government chemical attack.</span></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="background-color: white; line-height: 18px;">Zamalka and Moadamiyah are on opposite sides of Damascus, which would make an attack on both targets fairly complex, and thus less likely to be carried out by the opposition.</span></span></li>
</ol>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">So what happened here?</span></span><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">First, the positive samples from victims can be explained as Zamalka victims rushed to Moadamiyah hospitals. Since thousands of people were affected in Zamalka, the small local hospitals were quickly overrun and victims were distributed to any available opposition hospital. And indeed, when each hospital reported its casualties it created the </span></span></span><a href="http://freehalab.wordpress.com/2013/08/22/hundreds-of-children-gassed-in-damascus-chemical-massacre/">initial impression</a><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"> that the attack spanned a wide area.</span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"> </span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br /></span></span></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">So any visit to an opposition hospital near Damascus would have yielded positive samples. The only reason the investigators happened to visit Moadamiyah is because they </span></span></span><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">only</span><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"> </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">visited impact sites, and were informed of the intact M14 rocket body found there.</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><br />Shouldn't the UN team have picked up on this? Not necessarily:</span></span></span><br />
<ol>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Their Moadamiyah visit lasted for only two hours.</span></span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">It was done in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=03Z4cVE6iwg" target="_blank">unfavorable conditions</a>.</span></span></span></li>
<li style="direction: ltr;"><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Their charter was to find whether a chemical weapon was used, not how. So they probably put less emphasis on this issue.</span></li>
<li style="direction: ltr;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">For some reason, the UN report <a href="http://whoghouta.blogspot.com/2013/09/summary-of-anomalies-in-un-report.html" target="_blank">chooses to ignore</a> facts that weaken the regime attack theory.</span></span></li>
</ol>
<br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">Next, let's examine the M14 and its alleged impact site:</span></span></span><br />
<ol>
<li><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">As mentioned, the M14 is obsolete and would make for a very weird choice when UMLACAs with a <span style="font-family: inherit;">sarin capacity 25 times larger are available.</span></span></span></li>
<li><span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UEX8AeNSYE" target="_blank">This video</a> shows the rocket body one day before the UN arrival, in an obviously different location than <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYQWTW16S20" target="_blank">when it was examined by the UN</a></span></span></span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">. The investigators still went on to analyze a<i> "small crater/impact point"</i> found</span> near the rocket and treated it as if it was related. </span></span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">The discussions with the local activist in <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eT4HlTHqpyk" target="_blank">this video</a> and <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v7Y2IQB0JPw" target="_blank">this video</a> from the same time give some idea as to the reliability of evidence collected from this scene. And indeed</span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">, t</span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">he investigators did report that <i>"</i></span></span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"><i>Fragments and other possible evidence have clearly been handled/moved </i></span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"><i>prior to the arrival of the investigation team"</i>.<br />Update: It seems like the "small crater" that was reported to be found near the rocket is one of the two dents in the floor seen in this <a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QYQWTW16S20" target="_blank">video</a>. Describing this as a rocket impact crater is highly speculative, and the fact the the team used it to calculate trajectories is concerning.</span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">Even if we were to assume this rocket did hit this location, the UN report states: <i>"</i></span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"><i>[We] determined that it initially impacted the corner of the second floor of an adjacent apartment building to the east, with either the warhead functioning or shearing off from the body at that point and the motor section having sufficient kinetic energy to continue along its path to its terminal impact location"</i>. </span><span style="background-color: white; color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">This provides an excellent alternative explanation for the rocket body being intact (other than it having a chemical warhead): its conventional explosive warhead did not detonate or detonated at a distance.</span></li>
</ol>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">Still, we need to explain why some of the samples tested positive for sarin-breakdown </span><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">products</span><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">. When examining these in detail (pages 24-25 and 27-29 together) an interesting pattern emerges:</span></span><br />
<ol>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">The only sample positive in both labs is a soil sample from the impact point in the outside terrace (page 18).</span></span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">Additional four samples found positive only in Lab 2 are from two metal fragments taken from the same terrace.</span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">An additional sample found positive only in Lab 1 is from a scarf of a victim said to have died of poisoning. </span></li>
<li><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">The rest of the samples, which were negative in both labs, are from inside the apartment (see </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8FhY7xNkihk" style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;" target="_blank">video</a><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">) taken from the floor, a bed sheet, a slipper, a pillow, and a mattress. Some of these samples tested positive for </span><a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hexamethylenetetramine" style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;" target="_blank">Hexamethylentetramine</a><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">, a chemical related to RDX (a type of explosive). </span><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">It should be noted that the alleged poisoning occurred inside this apartment.</span></li>
</ol>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222;"><span style="line-height: 18px;">So the only positive tests were the 5 taken in the terrace and the one from the scarf, while the only negative tests were the 9 taken inside the apartment. However, we already know that the terrace was previously visited by activists (those who took the M14 </span></span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4UEX8AeNSYE" style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;" target="_blank">video</a><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">), or as the UN puts it <i>"</i></span><i>The sites have been well traveled by other individuals both before and during the investigation"</i>. This means that if one of these activists has traveled to Zamalka </span>(e.g. to assist the victims or investigate impact sites) <span style="font-family: inherit;">before visiting this scene</span><span style="font-family: inherit;">, the soles of his shoes would immediately contaminate the area (or may even have done so intentionally). More specifically, he would contaminate the floor (and not the bed) and would do so with sarin breakdown products and not with sarin (which disintegrates quickly when exposed).</span><br />
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;">The scarf sample is unique in that it is not described as a sample taken </span>personally <span style="font-family: inherit;">by the investigators (and is not shown in the </span><a href="https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8FhY7xNkihk" style="font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;" target="_blank">video</a><span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;">), which may indicate it was given to them by locals. Until more information is provided on how it was collected, it's hard to assess the source of its contamination.</span><br />
<span style="color: #222222; font-family: inherit; line-height: 18px;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><span style="color: #222222; line-height: 18px;">This all seems to suggest the following scenario: </span><span style="background-color: #f9f9f9; color: #222222; line-height: 19px; text-align: justify;">Moadamiyah suffered a conventional attack (like much of Ghouta), and treated patients from Zamalka (like all Ghouta hospitals). Reports related to these incidents created the confusion that the area is attacked by chemical weapons (as initially happened in all towns treating Zamalka victims). </span><span style="background-color: #f9f9f9; color: #222222; line-height: 19px; text-align: justify;">When they later saw the international impact, some local activists decided to stick to the story.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f9f9f9; color: #222222; line-height: 19px; text-align: justify;"><span style="font-family: inherit;">This scenario is definitely plausible, and it perfectly matches all the evidence. In comparison, the scenario of a chemical attack in Moadamiyah implies many unrealistic assumptions.</span></span><br />
<span style="background-color: #f9f9f9; color: #222222; font-family: Cambria; font-size: 14px; line-height: 19px; text-align: justify;"><br /></span>
<span style="font-family: inherit;"><b>Conclusion: It's still uncertain what exactly happened in Moadamiyah. However, the evidence for a chemical attack is weak and inconsistent, while the evidence for a conventional attack that was misrepresented to be chemical is much stronger. </b></span>Anonymoushttp://www.blogger.com/profile/16560859391032391947noreply@blogger.com87